

Arab Uprising and Its Effects On Tunisian National Security

Jean Damascene GASANA

LLB, Post Graduate Diploma in Legal Practice, LLM in public International Law

Now Phd student, in International Relations/ European University of Lefke, Cyprus

ABSTRACT

In December 2010 to January 2011, Tunisian revolution drove out its long-term despotic regime. In the months that take after, this intensity of Tunisians will spread all through the Arab world. This is Arab uprising. Be that as it may, similar causes won't create similar impacts all over the place in Arab states. Only Tunisia where everything started succeeded in maintaining the democratic process set up in 2011. Today, the Arab uprising identical with democracy and the will of the population has offered route to the testing issues of security in the Middle Eastern states. At this point, this paper expects to examine Arab uprising and its effects on Tunisian National security in clarifying why regardless of whether Tunisia faced genuine difficulties and security dangers, the test of reestablishing public order and guaranteeing inward security from one perspective and overcoming terrorism on the other, post-uprising Tunisia is seeing broadened securitization of open life because of cohesion, self-sufficiency and trustworthiness of national security forces.

Keywords: Tunisia, Arab Uprisings, Security, Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

Seven years ago, after a month of uprising, the Tunisian population brought down the Ben Ali's regime¹ into power since 1987. At the origin of these events, which led to 337 deaths, the suicide of fruit and vegetable in road seller, Mohamed Bouazizi, on December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, in the center of Tunisia, to protest against police brutality, is considered as the start of the revolt of population in Tunisia.

But this unrest became Jasmin's revolution², will not be limited to Tunisia. Very quickly it is the entire Arab world that faces claims of freedoms and democracies. This is the Arab Uprising. Started in Tunisia, the Arab Uprising will then spread to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria. It is in these countries that the most important and violent movements will lead to the fall of the regimes in place all except Syria where revolts went to civil war.

But the Arab Uprising is not limited in these 6 countries only, it is the entire Arab world that is affected but the protests will not become revolutions everywhere because in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and Oman for example, the constitutional reforms calmed popular revolts.

But today, seven years after this tremendous flow in democracy and freedoms, the results are rather insufficient. Only Tunisia succeeded in maintaining the democratic process set up in 2011. In Egypt, the first free election of 2012 was won by Mohamed Morsi but Egypt continued to be in the blood, a year later by Ali Sisi, still in power today. In Libya, the fall of Muammar Gaddafi has led to chaos

¹ Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is a Tunisian previous government official who filled in as President of Tunisia from 1987 until his expelling in 2011. Ben Ali was designated Prime Minister in October 1987, and he expected the Presidency on 7 November 1987 of every a bloodless rebellion that removed President Habib Bourguiba.

² Tunisia and the more Arab world, this change are known as the revolution or some of the time the Sidi Bouzid Revolt, got from Sidi Bouzid, the city where the underlying dissents started. In the Western media, these occasions have been named the Jasmine revolution after Tunisia's national bloom and with regards to the geopolitical classification of " colours transformations". The name "Jasmine revolution" began from American Andy Carvin, yet it was not generally embraced in Tunisia itself.

because today the country is fragmented and administered by the militias who struggle with each other.

Today, the Arab uprising synonymous with democracy and the will of the people has given way to the challenging issues of security in the Middle Eastern states, especially terrorism and migration. But if the balance sheet of Arab uprising is contrasted, it should not hide the success of the Tunisian revolution where it all began.

Tunisia is by all accounts the best nation in its progress procedure toward another political life since the uprising. It has prevailing with regards to remaining not so much brutal but rather more adaptable regarding political exchanges between various gatherings. (Dixon,2011).

Tunisia is in this manner a fascinating contextual model as it gives a fruitful political, social and security show for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area.

So this paper will analyse the Arab Uprising and its impacts on Tunisian National Security in explaining why even if Tunisian national security is challenging by the war against terrorism, but post-uprising Tunisia is seeing extended securitization of public life because of cohesion, self-sufficiency and trustworthiness of national security forces.

Origin and causes of the Arab Uprising in Tunisia

At the point when Mohamed Bouazizi, a youthful road seller from Sidi Bouzid, set himself ablaze on 17 December 2010, nobody questioned this was the trigger for the Tunisian prevalent uprising. From that point, the challenge turns out to be more across the board and spreads all through the nation around financial and afterward political words. The motto is "work, freedom, national pride". After a month, President Ben Ali escapes the nation following twenty-three years of run the show. To be sure, conditions were ready for an upheaval to break out in Tunisia.

The Economic Factor

The founding of the state in the postcolonial period took a particular shape in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The increasing power of the state over political, financial and social life has had many ramifications. Economies overstepped by the state have been a key thought in this area. On the financial level when Ben Ali assumed control over the administration of Tunisia, the nation was especially paying off debtors by the capitalist emergency of 1973. The Tunisian specialized leading coming to a great extent from American schools subsequently impacted by liberalism.

Under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank, Ben Ali started a substantially bigger privatization program. Pitching the economy to multinational enterprises incapacitated the economy and created joblessness in Tunisia. On the political front, auxiliary alteration strategies have broadened political intercession in the market, and the link between the state and the representatives and visionaries of private firms has created such degradation (Owen, 2012).

After purchasing their own survival at the expense of the country by seeking the help of the IMF and the World Bank, the leaders of the Tunisian government accumulated huge deficiencies, with gradual ascents in the residential and global obligation, resulting in a deterioration of the cash flow.

These unemployed and persecuted individuals therefore turned into prepared for the developments of the Arab Uprising; it is probable that the ideological angle was more decisive in persuading the protestors in the Tunisian case and in the emotional nature of the Bouazizi case (Hakimian, 2011).

The Social Factor

The state prevailed in Tunisian culture, with the ability to control the lives of individuals and to ensure that the general population complies with the rules. This is all but a misrepresentation in the case where we say that a civil society was truant, and the general population had nothing to do with government issues and no real share in the administration. The restriction was subject to police severity and gave no rights, and nationals had no sense of having a place in the state where they lived, nor did the legislator guarantee their rights (Fahmi 2011).

Meanwhile, Hassan (2011) argues that the Tunisian uprising was not a massive transformation, but rather a white-collar class led mainly by government employees, exchange associations and communist pioneers.

As Hassan (2011) observed that the Tunisian "turmoil" of 2010-2011 was essentially an internal revolt in which the resistance parties (mainly in a banishment state in London and Paris) and civil society associations supported the players. In this way, when the state interfered with the chances of this competing working class, robbed of their guaranteed future since 1987, they seized the opportunity to speak out against the state.

Be that as it may, with regard to the Tunisian civil society, note that the amount of associations developed under Bourguiba and Ben Ali as a major aspect of the general program of social change. These associations include a large number of deliberate affiliations and national associations that cover a wide variety of activities, limited by law to take part in political action and should be enlisted in the Service of the interior and to open NGO require prior approval.

The safeguards with their families have been prone to provocation, terror and detention (Rishmawi and Morris 2007: 22).

As a result, with the progress of these NGOs' exercises and their expansion, the Tunisian tyrannical administration system had to destroy those it could not control, while changing those it could control into more social control instruments.

It is a typical strategy of each totalitarian administration (Rishmawi and Morris 2007), and it is an arrangement followed in Tunisia of the takeover of Bourguiba. He sealed the improvement of these structures among the class of competitors by making associations and relations under his control, for example, the General Association of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) and other social relations for liners, women, workers, specialists, legal advisers, columnists and others. All were carried out by the administration or placed under state control, with new pioneers introduced by the state (Owen, 2006). So, anger against social injustice was encircled by civil society activists.

The Political Factor

Under Ben Ali, there was in fact a multi-party framework in Tunisia, yet the stakeholder dominated to the point that the restriction parties were more than the accessories used by the administration to meet all the requirements of the voting status (Ottaway, 2013).

The Tunisian elections, for example, were, for the most part, controlled by the state, without any autonomous association authorized to supervise. In the meantime, the decision-making party has allowed just a few symbolic restriction gatherings to take part, not to have an equivalent opportunity, but rather to make the image of the races as based on popularity and just.

The main restriction parties were Ennahda³ and the Tunisian General Labor Association (UGTT), both of which were submitted by the administration since the mid-1990s. The Administration's Procedure in Management the restriction was through "the limited exclusion of the pioneers of development, the detention of thousands of people, and the torment and death of his followers (Henry, 2011).

Therefore, as far as the political factor is concerned, Tunisia was fundamentally a one-party state, but it subsequently had secret restrictions with educated and large-scale support, regardless of the danger of exclusion or detention.

This short political history of abuse and defilement of government issues of a decision class means that individual's revolt and demand change. Taint was unlimited throughout the Tunisian economy under Ben Ali as an informal setting to put wealth in the hands of the family and its partners. This laid-back structure was so focused and protected from general visibility. While the ruling of the theocracy was degenerated, the faculties of security, police and common administration were also depreciated (identified with the basic financial components already examined), despite the fact that the latter were generally powerful (Henry, 2011).

As a result, the administration has responded with the utmost savagery and could contain dissent and put an end to it by sending armed force into the city (Clark, 2013). Politically, a mass dissent in 2005 against the state's understanding of curtailing the opportunity of articulation was crushed by compulsion. From then on, minor episodes of political dissent occurred in Tunisia, which included individual activities by a couple of border officials and activists who advocated political flexibilities and common freedoms (Ottaway and Hamzawy ,2011).

³ The Ennahdha Party, otherwise called Renaissance Party or essentially Ennahdha, is a Muslim democratic political gathering in Tunisia. Established as "The Movement of Islamic Tendency" in 1981, Ennahdha was roused by the Iranian revolution, and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but has additionally been called "the mildest and most law based Islamist party ever". Rached Ghannouchi remains its leader.

Be that as it may, monetary and political grievances have evolved considerably, especially in the 2000s, and the Bouazizi episode has reinforced a kind of cooperative energy of the country between the financial and political grievances of the all-inclusive community; despite the inexorably immense and widespread against the government's exposures toxic gas, mass catches and unpredictable real fire" demonstrated not equipped to quell the revolt (Henry, 2011).

Background of the Tunisian National security

The postcolonial period in the MENA region was known for its military administrations. As state control grew, the main state apparatus for controlling its domains was the army. As a result, this component of the state structure has received a lot of consideration and much strength to maintain and strengthen its reality. In this unique situation, the armed forces have built their own institutional structure, which implies that their innovative, instructive or regulatory assets are not simply accessible to all that is left of society.

Given the general structure of the state in the postcolonial period, in the same way as other nations, Tunisia has a few particular bodies responsible for the nation's security. In this way, the police, the National Guard and the armed force each have their own intelligence administrations and their own particular specific units. But Tunisia was somewhat extraordinary with regard to the military-political network.

Since its creation in 1956, the Tunisian armed force has been kept out of the political field. Habib Bourguiba, the first Leader of the Republic and head of the Military, has constantly considered that Tunisia does not have to furnish itself with a plethora and very much prepared armed force like those of neighboring nations. In Tunisia, it was forbidden for military officers to take part in the political meeting and to gain access to an essential base of outstanding governmental problems in Tunisia (Clark, 2013). Be that as it may, this armed force has consistently had a superb unit of skillful officers from esteemed Western military schools.

From that point on, the military was kept low, both in terms of scope and wealth. Additionally, the military was avoided drawing in with common everyday life. The police were in charge of security and keeping up common request, and the armed force was happy to be soothed of the weight of ensuring the country.

In spite of the fact that in 1978 and 1984, the armed force addressed the administration's call to reestablish arrange following common aggravations, the commanders snubbed being advised to accept police works and were upbeat to have their men come back to sleeping enclosure when the emergencies had passed (Barany, 2011).

This reality implied that the military was barred from day by day security parts, which exonerated them of the famous wrongdoings related with the harsh security contraption. This equation proceeded under Ben Ali from 1987, yet this time with progressively various and intense security powers, which basically made Tunisia a police state (Dorsey, 2011).

Another critical point in the structure of Tunisian military is that it didn't keep up significant business financial endeavors, not at all like in Egypt. This reality fended off the military from defilement and from control over open organizations. The operational undertakings of the military were restricted; the military assumed a part in framework improvement, calamity help and compassionate help.

Truly, Tunisia's armed force was moderately one of a kind in the MENA in that it had never at any point endeavored an overthrow, had never assisted in settling on political choices, had never been a country building instrument and had never participated in financial advancement plans. Ben Ali kept it a little and humbly subsidized power concentrated on fringe resistance (Barany, 2011).

Tunisian National security 6 years after the Arab uprising

The Tunisian revolt of January 14, 2011 did not happen by chance. It is the continuation of certain opportunities that preceded it. Each of the shows was done by activists, without ideological and political titles. Yet, the "overthrow of Jasmin" had a remarkable resource that assumed an unequivocal share in its prosperity, new progress (web, informal communities, phone reviews and online). Admittedly, Tunisians revolted to censor the oppression of an administration that functioned as an inseparable unit with a real social shame (mass degradation, nepotism, unemployment, bias and regionalism).

Since 2011, close by the impressive political and financial difficulties that, Tunisia faces genuine difficulties and security dangers, the test of reestablishing open request and guaranteeing interior security from one perspective and vanquishing the terrorism of the other.

The local security division which incorporates national security army, police, national monitor and jail administrations is stating its self-sufficiency and improving its proficiency, cohesion and trustworthiness after Arab uprising and now ensure the national security is their concerns. For instance, they likewise contributed fundamentally to the steadiness of the nation by securing the way toward setting up democratic institutions in elections.

Minimized and detained into sleeping shelter under the run of Habib Bourgiba and Ben 'Ali, particularly amid the celebrated instance of the claimed conspiracy of "Barraket Essahel 1991"⁴, the Tunisian military was welcome to tune in to the official expression of remorse of the state and get the thankful of the president of Republic after uprising has re-found its centrality amid the upheaval in 2011, when it favored protestors, going about as an operator of progress. Despite the fact that it was sent into the roads to contain prominent discontent, it professedly declined to get serious about dissenters, picking up the certainty of the populace.

By supporting the uprising, the Tunisian armed force additionally advanced its corporate advantages, ascending in noticeable quality among the diverse establishments of the State and recalibrating its connection with the Interior Security Forces bigger than the Tunisian military⁵, Tunisian Government chose to modernize the military and adjust it to the new difficulties the nation faces to keep up the national security . (Gaub,2017).

Furthermore, the financial plan of military was expanded and its weapons framework modernized⁶ . Part and obligations were reclassified, changing the administration of the military from the individual run of Ben 'Ali into an institutional administration, with shared duties.

As indicated by the 2014 Tunisian constitution, the President is the chief supreme of the military, while the defense Minister oversee more standard military and barrier undertakings.(Grewal, 2016).

After these 6 years, only with the threat of terrorism, Tunisia will be created in all areas and secured in the Maghreb countries where security is gradually observed as a global circumstance where individuals and groups live free, in peace and safe from harm, participate in companies, make the most of their fundamental rights.

With its institutions set on pilgrimage, the State of National Security aims to ensure that the political, social and material vitality of the state is massively focused on "security" and "open demand" inquiries. Often referred to as a Hobbesian social contract in which the state gives assurance in return for the acquiescence of society, the state of national security is in reality a state in which "security" is differentially transmitted and lived by a population gradually requested. It is described by an "extremely sensitive situation", often evoked or standardized, allowing a suspension of rights and a centralization of vitality in the hands of the official.

Different parts of life are mobilized in the state of national security, and an overabundance of laws persistently portrays new types of guilt. In the aftermath of September 11, the United States led the pack and forcefully designed a collection of evolving universal laws that aimed to institutionalize the national security state and the corresponding counter-terrorism response.

However, the Security Forces and Army having stepped up, have figured out how to wreck numerous terrorists, including striking pioneers, keep on dismantling an ever increasing number of cells that

⁴ The conspiracy of Barraket Essahel is a decapitation activity of the Tunisian armed force that occurred amongst April and July 1991 at the activity of the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali administration. It influences 244 military work force, including 25 senior officers and 88 officers. All treacherously associated with a plot to oust the regime that lone existed in the imaginary. <http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/10107-affaire-barraket-essahel-apres-la-torture-les-honneurs-au-palais-de-carthage>.

⁵ In 2010 the police had 200,000 security powers, while the armed force had 37,000 warriors, the littlest military in North Africa. Also, the yearly spending plan for military obtainment was US\$70 million, the least in the Middle Eastern world. William C. Taylor, *Military reactions to arab Uprising ,analysis from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria*, p. 75 and ff., Palgrave MacMillan, 2014, New York.

⁶ The spending plan multiplied from €400 million of every 2010 to €800 million out of 2017 while consumptions expanded by half of the Total national output in the vicinity of 2011 and 2015 in Dahmani,F,comment les militaires en Tunisie ont entrain de changer , Jeune Afrique, 2017.

were in standby and flush out an ever increasing number of reserves of weapons, explosives and various accessories (Grewal, 2016).

Terrorism in Tunisia since January 2011

In Tunisia, terrorism stays by a wide margin the most determined and exasperating danger, given the multifaceted nature of its temperament, its targets, and its business as usual, its measurements at the national, territorial and universal levels likewise the multidisciplinary of any technique to manage it.

For sure, there is nothing to propose any soon, the finish of this problem because Libya, with its prolongation in the Sahel-Saharan region, is origin of genuine terrorist dangers to security of Tunisia, for a couple of decades. This perception is the consequence of a target investigation of the circumstance winning in this neighboring nation, Libya, and in the Sahel-Saharan area, in connection, obviously, with the geostrategic setting on the planet and the world specifically.

To start with, it merits recollecting that the terrorism risk isn't a post-uprising wonder in 2011; despite what might be expected Tunisia encountered its first terrorism showdown, as of now in Ramadan 1995 at the Soudess National Watch. Then other actions with their groups of military casualties, security agents, civilian citizens and also foreign tourists, came to remind that Tunisia is not at all spared by this terrorist nebula⁷.

After January 2011, the principal conflict amongst troopers and terrorists occurred in Errouhia (Siliana) in May and brought about two passing's on each side and a military setback.

The year 2012, recorded at least four terrorists attacks, progressively in the area of Sidi Ali ben Khélifa (Sfax), in Jendouba, Feriana and Douar Hicher in Tunis. Amid that year 2012, numerous individuals and sympathizers of the "Ansar Sharia" Movement, at that point not yet characterized terrorist association, propelled a strike against the American Embassy in Tunis.

The year 2013 was ridiculous and the start of a defining moment because the terrorist movement has developed in force and has broadened into sorts of activities and targets and has spread to basically the whole national region, Tunis, Kasserine, Sfax, Jendouba, Sousse, Mednine, Kebili and different areas. The example is the death in early afternoon in Tunis of two political pioneers, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.⁸

Starting at 2014, it was significantly more dangerous and wealthier in differing terrorists activities, all through the domain and along the entire of the nation at least twenty activities. The synchronous assault of two military positions at HenchirTella/Dj Chambi on July 16 was a standout amongst the most agonizing terrorists' tasks, 14 warriors executed and 18 others injured. In a demonstration of aggregate doubt of the express, the component of monitor of the home of the Minister of the Interior at the time was assaulted and, 4 policemen are killed and a fifth injured.

Amid the Year 2015 and 2016 radicals focused on new kinds of targets, travelers and the Presidential Guard, image of the state and they caused numerous losses among travelers, 68 executed and 71 injured, and the Presidential Guard, 12 slaughtered and 20 injured.

Amid 2017 the Forces Securities are absolutely in all out attack mode, they are the ones who trap and find the terrorists who escape and even forsake their injured; they flush out terrorists cells and destroy them everywhere throughout the nation for all intents and purposes of disassembling of numerous terrorists units situated in urban and provincial regions⁹.

Examination of data from official sources, demonstrates that the greater part of the terrorists exercises recorded in Tunisia since January 2011, were directed by components having a place with Katibat bunches Okba ibn nafa who swore fidelity to AQIM (Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb), succeeding the previous GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). Positively, Tunisia has overseen so far to control the danger of terrorism; be that as it may, this risk is a long way from being for all time eradicated, neither physically, nor socially and "ideologically".

⁷ These include the attacks of the station of the National Guard of Essrai (Kasserine), the Synagogue of El Ghriba (Djerba) April 2001 and the bloody operation that took place south Tunis (Hammam Chott-Ain Tebournok-Soliman), at the end of 2006, beginning of 2007, during a fortnight where 12 terrorists were shot dead and 15 others wounded, except a Mauritanian, all were Tunisian belonging to the Algerian GSPC in Mohamed Meddeb: La Sécurité Nationale, sept ans après! Jeune Afrique, 2017, in www.jeuneafrique.fr

⁸ Ibidem

⁹ For instance, the previous pionner the okba ibn unit, Mourad Chaieb, was murdered by the Tunisian national forces in 09/08/2017.

The Libyan territory with its Sahel-Saharan prolongation will constitute a wellspring of genuine different dangers, psychological militants among others. This circumstance alone forces and abundantly legitimizes the duplication of the national safeguard exertion. In security sector, endeavors will center on the control of the movement and products, crosswise over borders, those of the south-east (Libya side) in priority.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that Tunisia has gained noteworthy ground towards democracy, this advance remains amazingly delicate. To deflect all dangers, the nation needs an all-around organized, very much prepared and all around prepared armed force. In any case, it is up to government officials to make national security a need.

New Tunisia will then have the capacity to propel all the more doubtlessly on the way of democracy and advancement, and merit its spearheading status for a fruitful Arab uprising.

In the interests of national security and the war against terrorism, the post-uprising revolt in Tunisia sees increased security of open life.

Taking everything into account, surely, the nation is going to win a first critical fight, in its war against the terrorist movements. Be that as it may, given the provincial security circumstance, especially in Libya and the Sahelo-Saharan zone, yet additionally in the worldwide setting, the terrorism risk is a long way from being completely defeated, it will even now weigh vigorously on the district and the nation numerous years to come.

The endeavors, until now gave at all levels, State, Security Powers and nationals must proceed, fortified even and stretch out socially and mentally to remove the terrorism.

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