



Failed State Controversy and the Future of Socio-economic Development in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria was on the list of failed states for five consecutive years between 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, thus raising fears that its chances of survival are slim. How seriously should Nigeria be taking herself as a country? What really is the state of her health as a successful, failed, succeeding or failing state? Are there signs to show how far a country has plummeted or risen on the success ramp? Recently, Robert I. Rotberg posited in his book: *Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators*, wrote that there is a predictable measure of such security breach, when a government can no longer provide predictable, recognizable, systematized methods of adjudicating disputes and regulating both the norms and the prevailing mores of a particular society or polity. For him, against the backdrop of the multiple overlapping security crises which had transformed Nigeria from a weak state into a failed one. They noted -that Buhari's government had proved woefully unprepared to tackle these challenges. The study found out that lack of security creates a vicious circle of failed development opportunities as it concern jobs creation and diversifying the economy away from oil. The study concluded by posting that without adequate state security, non-state actors and armed gangs began to compete with corporations for control of state resources. A continued weak economy drives theft in the Gulf of Guinea, and banditry on land. But inadequate security is unable to prevent thefts, which continue to weigh down the economy. The paper concluded by positing that the military cannot solve everything. But a functioning and accountable security service is a critical element for keeping Nigeria stable and growing.

Keywords: Failed State, Insecurity, Post-colonial State, Nigeria, Policy makers.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, John Campbell and Robert Rotberg described Nigeria as a 'failed state,' even though the country still retains some attributes of viability, especially with respect to international affairs. The duo wrote in an article titled, 'The Giant of Africa is Failing,' against the backdrop of the multiple overlapping security crises which had transformed Nigeria from a weak state into a failed one. They noted that Buhari's government had proved woefully unprepared to tackle these challenges.

In recognition of that fact, these scholars noted that International community should deepen their engagement with Nigeria and seek to hold the current administration accountable for its failures while also working with it to provide security and right the economy. It further said that Nigeria, with a population of about 214 million people, would not afford to fail as it could have profound consequences on the entire region and beyond.

Nigeria is a country that has been outfitted with severe cases of threatened sovereignty, economic fluctuations, unending internal strife, loss of faith in the government and governing process, general disappointment, dissent, political malaise, and malignant corruption, just to mention a few. Insecurity is the order of the day in Nigeria. While it is true that the country has always been faced with problems since its inception, the intensity of these concerns in recent times should be given some attention. Let us take the state of physical security in Nigeria. *Vanguard* newspaper made available the details of a kidnapping report by SBM Intelligence {SBM, 2021}. It is saddening to see the extent to which kidnapping has become commonplace in Nigeria.

The study hinged Nigeria's failure on three issues: Insecurity, Corruption, and the Economy. But security challenge is its major ground for concluding that the country had failed. According to the thesis of the article, if a state's first obligation to those it governs is to provide for their security and maintain a monopoly on the use of violence, then Nigeria has failed, even if some other aspects of the state still function. "Multiple overlapping security crises have transformed Nigeria from a weak state into a failed one { *Fasan,2021* }.

In its reaction, the federal government of Nigeria on June 3, issued a statement stating its displeasure at the said publication. The Senior Special Assistant to the President, Garba Shehu, accused Campbell of predicting the country's failure while allegedly pushing out distorted views about the country and the efforts of its government.

Ambassador Campbell has been predicting the collapse of Nigeria since 2005. He is of course entitled to his opinions, even where events consistently prove him wrong. But facts should not be bent to support distorted opinions.

Other expert opinions published in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine do not totally agree.

For instance, an article captioned "Don't Call Nigeria a Failed State, " written by a Doctoral Fellow in Leadership Studies at King's College London, Fola Aina and Professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham, Nic Cheeseman, disagreed with Campbell.

The article stated that though bedeviled by security challenges, the Nigerian government has not allowed the situation degenerate into a second civil war leading to state failure but acknowledged that inter-communal clashes and organized crime operations have surged in Nigeria's northwest and north-central regions and are now spreading to parts of the southwest. In the country's historically marginalized Niger Delta region, many fear a militant resurgence, as they do in the predominantly Igbo southeast, where secessionist militants are suspected to have played a role in a recent attack on correction centers at Imo and Kogi states that enabled 1,800 prisoners to escape.

Nigeria's government has not only failed to deliver law and order but in some cases contributed to the violence and lawlessness. The police and military have struggled to win hearts and minds, and both stand accused of human rights violations and incompetence. Like claims that Nigeria is not a true nation, however, claims that its state has completely failed go too far. Whereas nearby countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone have suffered repeated and prolonged civil wars, Nigeria has successfully avoided a return to widespread violence, despite a recent increase in agitation from Biafran separatists. The absence of renewed conflict along these dangerous cleavages is not an accident but rather the product of careful statecraft, the duo wrote on May 5, 2021 { *Ragozzino ,2021* }.

Also, neither the US Department of States nor the White House have categorized Nigeria as a failed state or share similar view as Campbell's. The UN Security Council usually deploys peace keeping troops into territories where an existing government has lost legitimacy and is unable to secure lives and property of residents. Thus, the presence of UN peace keeping mission is evidence of uncontrollable security challenges in an area as checks by the media on the UN peace keeping website showed that it is not operating in Nigeria.

Its current operations are in Western Sahara (Morocco and Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), Central African Republic, Mali, D.R. of the Congo, Golan, Cyprus, Lebanon, Abyei, Kosovo, South Sudan, India and Pakistan and Middle East.

However, the Security Council has at different times condemned the killings and terror activities in its member states including in Nigeria. For Nigeria, it usually sympathizes with its government while urging it to do the needful in securing the country. Though there are security challenges, the UN and members of its Security Council do not believe Nigeria is a failed state

Instead, the UN had noted that “Nigeria (since 1960) has been a major contributor of troops and police to United Nations peace operations, having served in dozens of missions” in other countries. It is at the background of authorities’ inclusion of the world’s most populous black nation of over 200 million people in the list of failed states that one is driven to ponder over the relationship between economic development and state failure in Nigeria and whether indeed Nigeria has met the conditions that qualify her as a failed state.

Conceptualizing State Failure

The concept of state failure has been attracting scholarly attention. Indeed, Robert Jackson mentioned it in his 1987 work captioned *Quasi-States*. Among the first analysts to use the term ‘failed state’ were Helman and Ratner (1993). Their concern was about what they termed ‘a disturbing new phenomenon’ whereby a state was becoming ‘utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community’. They argued that a failed state would ‘(imperil) their own citizens and (threaten) their neighbours through refugee flow, political instability and random warfare’. From this definition it can be said that Helman and Ratner emphasizes the inability to maintain public order leading to chaos which in turn compels citizens to flee across the border in search of safety.

On his part, Ignatieff (2002) adopts a Machiavellian/Weberian understanding of state failure when he argues that state failure occurs when the central government loses the monopoly of the means of violence. Through this loss of the monopoly of the instruments of coercion, several armed groups arise and often threaten to overthrow the state. The concept of state failure, according to Gross (1996), was brought to limelight by former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright alongside others at the United Nations in the early 1990. Gross contends that a failed state is one in which public authorities are either unable or unwilling to carry out their end of ... the social contract.

Indeed there are many categories and definitions of ‘state failure’ that have proliferated in political science literature. State failure can occur in many dimensions such as security, economic development, political representation, income distribution among several others. However, despite the lack of agreement on the conceptualization of state failure, Cojanu and Popescu (2007:115) assert that the most widely accepted definition of state failure is that put forward by Zartman in 1995. According to Zartman (1995:5),

State failure occurs when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed...It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new.

This conceptualization depicts a situation of total paralysis. In other words, the state has atrophied due to factors like intractable violence, lack of capacity of willingness to perform state functions as well as the inability to monopolize legitimate use of force among several others.

In the opinion of Milliken and Krause (2003), the analysis of the concept of state failure contains two dimensions: the institutional and the functional dimensions. To them, a polity is failed as it is unable to provide public goods and state failure is analysed through the functional aspect of the state. On the other hand, they corroborated Zartman, by considering state collapse as a situation where an “extreme disintegration of public authority” occurred, and this can be approached through the institutional dimension of the entity.

On his part, Stewart (2006) based his classification of failed states on the issue of governance. He contends that state strength is a relative concept and can be measured by the state’s ability to provide the

fundamental political goods associated with statehood: physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management and social welfare. Expatriating further, he noted that many countries have yawning gaps in one or more of these four areas of governance. This is illustrated by the struggle to guarantee monopoly of legitimate use of coercion, maintenance of public order, provision of safety from criminals as well as the inability to control borders and territory.

Rotberg (2003) wrote extensively on failed states in his work captioned *Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators*. The work carefully examined contemporary cases of nation-state collapse and failure and established clear criteria for distinguishing collapse and failure from inherent weakness or apparent distress, and collapse from failure. He outlined two reasons why nation-states fail – persistent internal conflict and the inability of the government to deliver political goods to the inhabitants. In his words;

Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens (Rotberg, 2003:1).

Expatriating further, the scholar noted that nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders). Thus they organize and channel the interests of their people, often but not exclusively in furtherance of national goals and values. They buffer or manipulate external forces and influences, champion the local or particular concerns of their adherents, and mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international arena and the dynamism of their own internal economic, political, and social realities. On what constitutes political goods, the scholar contended that:

Political goods are those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens once made on sovereigns and now make on states. They encompass expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions (Rotberg, 2003:3).

States, therefore, see access to political goods as the inalienable rights of its citizenry being that it is one of the major ways of assuring the legitimacy of the government. It is across some or all of these dimensions, according to Rotberg, that States succeed or fail. Nevertheless, it is according to their performance - according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial political goods - that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed states, he noted.

On the types of political goods, Rotberg placed them in a hierarchical order to include security (especially human security). Thus the prime function of the State is to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion; enabling the citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the political process. Included here are the essential freedoms: the right to compete for office; respect and support for national and regional political institutions, like legislatures and courts; tolerance of dissent and difference; and fundamental civil and human rights among several others. Rotberg noted that this

bundle of political goods, roughly rank ordered, establishes a set of criteria according to which modern nation-states may be judged strong, weak, or failed (2003).

The author contended that strong states obviously perform well across these categories and with respect to each, separately. According to Rotberg (2003:4),

... They perform well according to indicators like GDP per capita, the UNDP Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House's *Freedom of the World Report*. Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity... Overall, strong states are places of enviable peace and order.

An extensive characterization of failed State was presented. According to the author, failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. Again, failed States cannot control their borders. They lose authority over sections of territory. Often, the demonstration of official power is limited to the capital city and some other major cities.

As noted earlier, there are many conceptualizations of the failed state with each focusing on various dimensions of state failure. Thus Torres and Anderson (2004) attempted to synchronize these various definitions especially those by international institutions and agencies. The Political Instability Task Force (2002:12) defines state failure as *an instance where central state authority collapsed for several years*. According to the Task Force, there are four events which can precipitate state failure. These are: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides/politicides. It can be deduced from this approach that states like Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan etc have all failed going by the intractable conflicts which has been ongoing in them for several years. It can also be deduced that sporadic pockets of violence do not define a failed state entirely.

The World Bank (2000) presented its own characterization of failed state using the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS). According to the World Bank (2000:23), LICUS are characterised by very weak policies, institutions, and governance. Aid does not work well in these environments because governments lack the capacity or inclination to use finance effectively for poverty reduction. Two distinct LICUS environments were identified by the World Bank viz post-conflict environment and non- post-conflict environment. Torres and Anderson contend that "the main advantage of the Bank's approach is that it distinguishes these countries from others, tries to develop indicators, but LICUS list is not publicly available and the classification is based on the Bank's own Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) system" which was developed in 2004.

The CRSC (2006:13) defined *Failed State* as:

A condition of state collapse, e.g. a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence.

This definition was drawn extensively from that of Zartman (1995) and Rotberg (2003) as noted earlier. However, there is a tendency to label a poorly performing state as failed. This is so because the line existing between poorly performing states and failed states are rather thin. The opposite of a failed state is an enduring state and the absolute dividing line between these two conditions is difficult to ascertain at the margins. Even in a failed state, some elements of the state, such as local state organisations, might continue to exist, Logan and Preble surmised.

Failure, however defined, needs to be understood in the historical context in which it occurs. It is misleading, for example, to define a 'failed state' in the context where state formation never really

happened in the first place. Moreover, if policy intervention is to be more effective, it is useful to establish the time frame of 'state failure': processes of state weakening are likely to have different characteristics and dynamics if they are at an advanced as opposed to an initial phase, Di John (2009) highlighted.

Williams (2007) focused on *State Failure in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Responses*. In this work, the scholar interrogated the meaning of state failure, causes of state failure, the scope and phenomenon of state failure in Africa as well as how insiders and outsiders have responded to the process of state failure in Africa. He undertook a review of a number of conceptualizations of state failure especially that of Rotberg and Menkhaus. On what causes states to fail, he noted that there is no single formula for understanding the causes of state failure in Africa. However, Williams made two distinctions from the relevant literature. The first distinction, according to him, is between states that fail because of a lack of relevant capacities and those that fail to promote the interests of all their inhabitants through political choice, often with the intention of benefitting the incumbent regime and its supporters at the expense of another group. The second distinction has to do with the differences between structural and contingent causes of state failure.

Expanding further on the structural category, Williams noted that there are three major arguments commonly advanced. First is that the Westphalian ideal of statehood has not successfully taken root across all of Africa because local conditions were inhospitable to state building and exerting high levels of state control over local societies. Although international society helped the process by granting recognition to Africa's newly independent states —many of which became the archetypal examples of Jackson's quasi-states — it could not ensure that their inhabitants invested a great deal of faith in or commitment to them. The second structural argument is premised on the challenges posed by political geography, especially resources and environmental factors. In this case the point is that some African states that were creations of the European colonial powers were not endowed with a physical environment conducive to administering an effective state. In particular, states such as those in the West African savannah suffered from extremely low densities of people, which made administration and social control both costly and difficult. The same was true for much of Africa since large areas of it have ecologies that cannot easily support high densities of population, not least because over 50% of the continent suffers from inadequate rainfall that makes inhospitable environments for both human settlement and agriculture. Third is the argument related to the concept of the security dilemma to explain how fear of an ungoverned future can propel the actors within states to hasten the collapse of central government once public order begins to erode and a situation of domestic anarchy seems likely to emerge. Here the suggestion is that the Hobbesian fear that lies at the heart of the security dilemma explains why groups begin to think that their potential rivals will not be restrained by state authority once the institutions of state have started to disintegrate. The contingent causes of state failure in Africa are even more numerous with five main factors commonly cited within the literature.

Roughly summarized, these refer to the influence of bad leaders, predatory actors such as warlords and so-called 'spoilers', bad economic policies, bad environments and bad neighbours. On the scope of the problem of failed states in Africa, Williams noted that failed states can spawn a variety of transnational security problems with terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), crime, disease, energy insecurity, and regional instability chief among them. However, it should be noted that these challenges are unevenly distributed across Africa's failing states. Transnational criminals, for instance, tend not to operate in areas of complete state collapse (such as Somalia) but instead prefer areas where a basic degree of physical and financial infrastructure exists and where bureaucrats and officials are susceptible to bribery (such as Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa). Similarly, cells of transnational terrorist networks are likely to require similar levels of infrastructure and at least a degree of order if they are to use failing states for anything other than transit routes and temporary bases of operations.

Ottaway and Mair (2004) identified the existence of three major manifestations of state failure. One is the splitting of a country into different entities, as one or more secessionist movements succeed in taking over

part of the territory and form functioning new states – this, according to them, happened, for example, when Ethiopia failed to maintain control over all its territory and the Eritrean insurgents declared the independence of Eritrea in 1991. Secondly, state failure can also occur as the result of the annexation of part or all of the territory by a neighbouring state - an example is the annexation by Morocco of Western Sahara. The third is the disappearance of any central authority, with the territory de facto being parcelled out among a heterogeneous mix of traditional authorities, religious leaders, warlords, and even non-governmental organizations, which start performing some state functions at the local level. This happened in Somalia, for example, and in Afghanistan before the Taliban imposed control over at least one part of the country.

The authors contended that the first two forms of state failure constitute a legal and political, rather than practical, problem for the international community. If a relatively orderly state emerges, as in Eritrea or Somaliland, human security is not at risk. Nevertheless, international law allows the reconfiguration of borders only under very special circumstances. Neither conquest by a neighbouring country nor secession is a legally recognized reason for border modification.

A relevant contribution to the field of failed states and its attributes was made by Jack Goldstone in his paper "Pathways to State Failure". He defines a failed state as one that has lost both its effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness means the capability to carry out state functions such as providing security or levying taxes. Legitimacy means the support of important groups of the population. A state that retains one of these two aspects is not failed as such; however it is in great danger of failing soon if nothing is done. He identified five possible pathways to state failure:

1. Escalation of communal group (ethnic or religious) conflicts. Examples: Syria, Somalia, Myanmar, Chad, Iraq, Yemen, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Liberia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan.
2. State predation (corrupt or crony corraling of resources at the expense of other groups). Examples: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Brazil, Philippines, Italy, Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, South Africa, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, Lebanon.
3. Regional or guerrilla rebellion. Examples: Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Congo, Colombia, Vietnam.
4. Democratic collapse (leading to civil war or coup d'état). Examples: Liberia, Madagascar, Nepal.
5. Succession or reform crisis in authoritarian states. Examples: Indonesia under Suharto, Iran under the Shah, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev
6. Failure to provide civil protection and public service due to corruption i.e. Greece (Goldstone Jack, 2008).

The Gap

A summary of the reviewed literature shows that scholars like Helman and Ratner (1993), Zartman (1995), Gross (1996) Ignatief (2002), Milken and Krause (2002), Rotberg (2003), Anyanwu (2005) among others dwell much on inability to maintain public order demonstrated by insecurity and conflict as the major feature of state failure. Also, inability to provide political goods, loss of monopoly of the means of force by the state and chaos leading to the mass exodus of citizens were identified by them as the major features of state failure. The reviewed literature, however, did not give any clear-cut explanations on whether the prevailing economic conditions in Nigeria has led to state failure or whether there is a significant relationship between economic development and state failure in Nigeria. This work is designed to fill this gap existing in the available literature.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Our evaluation of failed states and economic development using Nigeria as a case will be predicated on the Theory of post-colonial states. This theory has been popularised by scholars like Alavi (1973), Ake (1981, 2001), Ekekwe (1986) among others. Most of these scholars believe that the classical theory of the

state did not fully explain the character of neo-colonial states. Alavi (1973) opines that in the post-colonial society, the problem of the relationship between the state and the underlying economic structure is more complex than the context in which it was posed in the European society. It is structured by yet another historical experience and requires fresh theoretical insight.

Corroborating this fact, Ekekwe (1986) pointed out that the difference between the two forms of capitalist state is thus: that whereas the state in the advanced capitalist formations function to maintain the economic and social relations under which bourgeois accumulation take place, in the periphery of capitalism, factors which have to do with the level of the development of the productive forces make the state a direct instrument for accumulation for the dominant class or its elements. Colonialism shaped the character of post-colonial states in the sense that in their quest to secure and perpetrate their economic interests, the colonizer discouraged the rise of a strong indigenous bourgeoisie and instead planted stooges. Having a very weak economic base, these stooges resorted to using the state for primitive capital accumulation thus becoming a ready instrument for class formation and class domination.

One implication of the rudimentary development of the state in Africa, according to Ake, is the Hobbesian character of political struggles. In the absence of autonomizing mechanisms in the post-colonial State, the resources of physical coercion becomes the tools of particular groups, especially the hegemonic factions of the ruling class, and the affinity between the coercive institutions and these hegemonic factions has inevitably become particularly visible. Also, the only effective check on the use of the coercive resources becomes merely the prudence of enlightened self-interest of those who control them. So we have essentially relations of raw power in which right tends to be coextensive with power and security depends on the control of power. The struggle for power, then, is everything and is pursued by every means. This is amply reflected in the fact that as a general rule, in the politics of post-colonial Africa efficiency norms prevail over legitimacy norms.

In a seminal work, Simutanyi (2006) agrees that the post-colonial state in Africa bears resemblance to the colonial state. Like the colonial state, the post-colonial state was authoritarian, divisive, predatory, and exclusive and an instrument in the service of the dominant capitalist class. The over-arching desire for economic development in the immediate post-independence period was to lead to justifications for the state to play a prominent role in promoting economic development. Thus Ake (1981) asserted that to begin with, we have a state that is interventionist and involved in the class struggle, that is to say a state already dragged into politics and politicized. Partly because of this fact (whose significance is the perception of the state as being very partial), and partly because the state power in question is highly developed, there is a bitter struggle to gain control of it.

Elaborating further in a subsequent work, Ake (2001), noted that colonial rule left most of Africa a legacy of intense and lawless political competition amidst an ideological void and a rising tide of disenchantment with the expectation of a better life. The political environment at independence was profoundly hostile to development. Hence the struggle for power was so absorbing that everything else, including development, was marginalized. As those elites outside the corridors of power sought to garner credible force to challenge those in power as well as to limit to a significant extent their own vulnerability to harassment and abuse, those in power were obsessed with consolidation of power and crushing of any form of opposition. In a highly statist post-colonial polity, they did not even have the option of channelling their ambitions into economic success, which was primarily a matter of state patronage. Political power was everything; it was not only the access to wealth but also the means to security and the only guarantor of general well-being.

Besieged by a multitude of hostile forces those in power were so involved in the struggle for survival that they could not address the problem of development. The elites made token gestures to development while trying to pass on the responsibility for development to foreign patrons. Development plans were written and proclaimed. But what passed for development plans were mere aggregations of projects and objectives informed by the latest fads of the international development community. As these fads changed in the larger world, so they were abandoned. The summary of Ake's argument is that the main obstacle to

development ...is not so much that the development project has failed as that it never got started in the first place.

On his part, Ihonvbere (2000) noted that one of the consequences of colonialism in developing societies is the legacy of the reification of power. Since the colonial State was absolutist in every sense, it combined the power of life and death and dispensed power without consultation or accountability. Thus the indigenous elites that had been structurally incorporated into the power and economic networks of colonialism in the aftermath of the Second World War were nurtured in the context of undemocratic values.

Given the tenuous relation of the African elite to productive activities, political independence witnessed the capture of political power bereft of economic power. As a consequence, accumulation, survival and domination could only be guaranteed through the unmediated control of State power. The new elite were thus forced to devise strategies of ideological containment, depoliticization, diversion, violence and human rights abuse to ward off opposition. Thus this scenario raised the premium of power to few and frightening proportions. In order to capture, control and effectively deploy political power, villages were raided, taxes were imposed, communities were punished for not voting rightly and suspected enemies of the State were found all around the society. The State instruments of coercion were strengthened as private security outfits are armed to the teeth.

Thus in Nigeria today, the yawning gap between the rich and the poor widens with each passing day despite lofty poverty alleviation/eradication policies and programmes. This compels one to wonder whether these policies were not designed so as to make their implementation unproductive. As the income gap widens, a great number of people are forced into abject poverty with a concomitant rise in crime wave. Discontent with the existing social order equally heightens. Solution to these vices lies explicitly on redressing the imbalances within the political system and not by wholly embracing one alien development agenda or the other going by the fact that such foisted development agenda have a history of massive failure in Nigeria. This cannot be done by outside forces as they can only gloss over the problems in question but never solve it in its entirety. Bereft of a government capable of formulating and implementing people-oriented policies and programmes, development has continued to be a mirage in Nigeria.

By highlighting that post-colonial states captured political power without economic power, this theory aptly captures the hypothesis that the prevailing economic conditions lead to failure of the state. This is because the economic base of the state is under the control of external forces and owing to its mode of incorporation into the global capitalist economy; it is structured to respond to changes and developments in the global capitalist economy. Again, the workings of the economy have been programmed to favour those in control of it through the manipulations of international finance institutions. Therefore, economic development and state failure is intertwined

RESEARCH METHODS

To generate relevant data needed for this study, we relied heavily on qualitative method for documentary sources. Given the nature of this study especially the type of data required to interrogate our hypotheses, therefore, we utilized secondary sources of data. Secondary sources of data refer to a set of data gathered or authored by another person, archives, either in the form of document or survey results and code books collected for a purpose other than the present one (White, 1983; Ikeagwu, 1998; Asika, 2006). As stated by Selltitz (1977), the fecundity of secondary sources of data lies in the obvious fact that information of this sort is collected periodically. This makes the establishment of trends and consistent patterns over time possible. Also gathering information from such sources does not require the co-operation or assistance of the individual about whom information is being sought.

Consequently, the study depended on institutional and official documents like the reports of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Transparency International as well as other governmental and non-governmental organizations. The aforementioned institutional and official documents was supported by

data from other sources such as textbooks, journal articles, seminar, conference papers and magazines as well as other written works that dwelt on failed state and economic development especially as it relates to Nigeria. The use of observational method in this study was complemented by the experience the writer has gathered over the years as a keen observer of contentious developmental issues in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general.

Method of Data Analysis

For the analysis of data, we will rely on qualitative descriptive analysis. Asika (2006) defines qualitative descriptive analysis to mean summarizing the information generated in the research verbally so as to further discover relationships among variables. The adoption of the foregoing analytical method becomes necessary since the study will rely principally on secondary sources of data. The qualitative descriptive approach has the advantages of flexibility, in-depth analysis, and the potential to observe a variety of aspects of a social situation (Babbie, 1986).

Logical Data Framework (LDF)-The Nigerian Case

The research design of this study is based on *ex post facto* analysis of documentary evidence. *Ex post facto* or after – the – fact research design is based on the examination of the dependent and independent variables after the events have taken place and the data already in existence. In *ex post facto* designs the test of the hypothesis involves observing the independent and dependent variables at the same time because the effects of the former on the latter have already taken place before the investigation. As Cohen and Manion further clarifies the phrase *ex post facto* means ‘after the fact’ or ‘retrospectively’, and refers to those studies which investigate possible cause – and – effect relationships by observing an existing condition and searching back in time for plausible causal factors. The theoretical model of Marxian Theory of the State adopted in this study reinforces the *ex post facto* design. The *ex post facto* or single-case design assumes the form of an experimental design where an existing case is observed for some time in order to ‘study’ or ‘evaluate’ it.

Hypothesis	Variables	Main Indicators	Data Source	Method of Data Collection	Method of Data Analysis
Failure of economic development accounts for state failure in Nigeria	(1) Failure of economic development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability to provide political goods • Failure of power supply • Collapse of industries • Inability to feed the population • Unemployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Library ▪ Textbooks ▪ Journals ▪ Internet sources ▪ Newspapers ▪ Institutional/official publications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Secondary sources - Documentary method - Observation - Recorded human documents such as books, laws, websites, journals, historical documents 	Qualitative descriptive analysis Tables
	(1) Leads to state failure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insecurity of the citizens • Increase in crimes • Rise of armed opposition militia • Rise in terrorism • Loss of monopoly of the means of coercion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Library ▪ Textbooks ▪ Journals ▪ Internet sources ▪ Newspapers ▪ Institutional/official publication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Secondary sources - Documentary method - Observation - Recorded human documents such as books, laws, websites, journals, historical documents 	Qualitative descriptive analysis Tables

1.8 Empirical Verification

Here, effort will be made to look at the independent variable which is the failure of economic development and the dependent variable which is state failure. In doing so we shall look at the following as the indicators of the independent variable:

- Inability to provide political goods which is demonstrated in:
 - Inadequate Power Supply
 - Collapse of Industries
 - Inability to Feed the Population
 - Unemployment

It is the prevalence of the above factors/conditions that have resulted in the inability of the State to maintain public order and loss of monopoly of the means of force by the state. These are discernible in the following indicators:

- Insecurity of the citizens
- Loss of monopoly of the means of coercion
- Increase in crimes like armed robbery and kidnapping
- Rise of government opposition militia
- Rise in terrorism

These indicators are in tandem with what scholars have listed as evidence of state failure. This is illustrated with the table below:

Table 1: Showing Most Common State Failure Features, the Scholars and Our Empirical Referents

Feature	Scholars	Empirical Referent
Inability to provide political goods	Gross (1996), Milken and Krause (2002), Rotberg (2003), Fund for Peace (2010)	Security, Power, Industries and Employment
Inability to maintain public order	Helman and Ratner (1993), Zartman (1995), Gross (1996), Ignatieff (2002), Milken and Krause (2002), Rotberg (2003), Fund for Peace (2010), Failed State Index (2010)	Conflict and Insecurity
Loss of monopoly of the means of force by the State	Ignatieff (2002), Fund for Peace (2010),	Rise of armed/militia groups
Chaos leading to mass exodus of citizens	Helman and Ratner (1993), Failed State Index (2010),	

From the table above, it could be seen that scholars identified inability to provide political goods as a feature of state failure. Political goods which the state is expected to provide include security, prevention of cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; elimination of domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; prevention of crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and enabling citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion; enabling the citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the political process; the right to compete for office; respect and support for national and regional political institutions, like legislatures and courts; tolerance of dissent and difference; and fundamental civil and human rights among several others. Failure to provide these goods is termed as failure on the part of the state.

Again, the inability to maintain public order has been identified by a greater number of scholars as a major cause of state failure. Inability to maintain public order leads to a state of chaos and lawlessness. A total breakdown of law and order leads to a state of insecurity. It should be noted that the inability to

maintain public order has the potential of leading to state failure if and when it becomes a recurrent situation. In other words, spontaneous outbreak of riots and/or conflicts cannot be said to be a sign of state failure. It becomes a sign of state failure if the government is unable to bring it under control and it escalates leading to mass exodus of citizens.

Again, the table above indicates that the loss of monopoly of the means of force by the state is also a feature of state failure. A situation whereby armed groups openly and freely harass other citizens with arms and even engage the state machinery in armed face-off is an infringement on the exclusive right of the state to possess arms. This scenario can lead to state failure in that it is capable of leading to the overthrow of the state by these armed militia groups.

Inadequate Power Supply

Supply and distribution of electricity constitute a central development issue which cannot be over-emphasised. Apart from serving as the pillar of wealth creation in Nigeria, it is also the nucleus of operations and subsequently the 'engine of growth' for all sectors of the economy. In recognition of the consolidating linkage between the energy sector and the other sectors of the economy, electricity development and utilisation therefore have pervasive impacts on a range of socio-economic activities and consequently the living standard of citizens in the country. Okafor (2008) contends that there is hardly any enterprise or any aspect of human development that does not require energy in one form or the other – electric power, fuels etc. Nigeria is richly endowed with various energy sources, crude oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower, solar energy, fissionable materials for nuclear energy. Yet the country consistently suffers from energy shortage (this has proved to be a major impediment to industrial and technological growth). The National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), a government parastatal, has the sole responsibility for managing the generating plants as well as distribution of power nationally. The total generating capacity is about 3000MW, approximately thrice the current level of national demand.

However, in the Nigerian case, 'the actual power available at any given time is less than 40% of the total capacity due to poor maintenance; hence there is a perennial shortage' (Odeh, 2010:12). This situation is exacerbated by a grossly inefficient, poorly maintained distribution system. Industry can only cope with power outages by resorting to internal generating plants (Ajanaku, 2007; Adegbamigbe, 2007).

In recognition that the problem of power supply is a challenging one, scuttling socio-economic activities across the country, the civilian administration in Nigeria since its advent in 1999 started making huge investments in the energy sector. Available records showed that by the end of 2001 the generating capacity had increased from 1824 MW (from 19 generating units) in March 2000, to about 4000MW (from 40 generating units) and a new peak generation of 2934 MW was recorded in the process. This was made possible through rehabilitation of existing generating units, installation of new generating plants and the procurement of power from independent operators (Makoju, 2002; Adegbamigbe, 2007; Agbo, 2007). The table below provides a clearer representation.

Table on Power Generation in Nigeria

YEAR	INSTALLED CAPACITY (IN MEGAWATTS)	MEGAWATTS GENERATED
1990 – 1998	6136	Less than 1,700
1999		1,700
2000		1,824
2001		2,934
2004		2,410
2009		3,653
2010		2,800
2011		4,242
2012		4,477

Sources: Imoke (2004); <http://www.vanguardngr.com>; <http://www.nairaland.com>; <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com>; <http://www.powersectorafrica.com/html>.

From the above table, it could be seen that the volume of electricity generated has been fluctuating with often divergent figures from the power sector as to the quantum of electricity generated. Be that as it may, the fact remains that electricity generation in Nigeria is still very far from meeting Nigeria's energy demand.

However, the inability to provide steady power supply prompted the Obasanjo administration to introduce reformatory measures for the corporation. Among other things, its name was changed to Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). One major problem confronting PHCN is the low investment in power generation over the years. All the plants are very old. Thirty six percent of them are over twenty five years old, 48 percent are over twenty old, and no new plant has been installed in the last fifteen years prior to the advent of civilian administration in 1999 (Okafor, 2008). With this it is pertinent to note that the power supply situation in the country, from all indications, has not improved in the last eight years despite huge investments government claimed to have made on it.

With poor power supply situation almost all manufacturing companies that have remained in business run private power plant at great cost and this is evident on the amount spent on the importation of generators into Nigeria (Okafor, 2008). A London based magazine, *African Review of Business and Technology* in its April 2006 edition revealed that Nigeria topped the list of generator-importing countries for the fourth year in a row, having surpassed others since 2002. According to the report, Nigeria accounted for 35% or \$152 million of the total \$432.2 million spent by African countries on generator imports in 2005. The Report, which focused on diesel generator of between 2,000KVA and 5,000KVA capacity, said that 'the country imported three times as many generators than the closest African importers – Sudan and Egypt – that spent \$40.6 million and \$32 million respectively on the product in 2005' (Atser, 2006: 28).

A critical assessment of the performance of the power sector by the World Bank best captures its implication for industrial sector in Nigeria. The World Bank Report (2004: 135) on the nation's difficult investment climate states:

Manufacturing firms in Nigeria consider inadequate infrastructure, particularly power supply, as their most severe constrain. Dealing with the inadequate power supply and other infrastructure problems absorbs far more of management's attention than any other business problem.

Also summarising the effects of dismal electricity supply situation in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007, Johnson (2007: 22) maintained that:

At inception in 1999, Obasanjo's administration promised Nigerians steady power supply. Former Minister of Power and Steel...assured Nigerians that the nation would have steady power supply by 2001.... The promise of increasing the nation's output from 1,700MW in 1999 to 10,000MW by 2007 has remained largely unfulfilled. Despite government investment of over N574 billion in the sector, power output continues to dip, a situation that has killed many business ideas and is costing investors hefty sums to run generators. The implication is that unemployment and crime remain high in Nigeria.

What all these imply is that the cost of doing business in Nigeria is not only very high but at same time very painful.

Collapse of Industries

Adeyemi (2007) contends that the state of the manufacturing industries in Nigeria at the end of Obasanjo’s administration on May 29, 2007 can be classified as follows: 30% have closed down, 60 percent ailing and 10% operating at sustainable level.

Table 2 Showing State of Manufacturing Industries in Nigeria

<i>Industries that have Closed down</i>	<i>Ailing industries</i>	<i>Industries Operating at sustainable level</i>
Chalk Manufactures	Textiles Firms	Food, beverages and Tobacco sector
Candle Manufacturers	Vehicle assemblers	Leather sub-sector
Dry cell and Automobile batteries Industries	Cable manufacturers	Household products
Shoe Polish	Paint manufacturers	-
Matches	Steel Firms	-
-	Petrochemical firms	-

Source: Adeyemi (2007:12)

As presented in the table 2 above, the firms in the *ailing category* according to sectoral analysis include; textile firms, vehicle assemblers, cable manufactures and paint manufacturers, steel and petrochemical firms. Also firms operating on the *sustainable level* are those in the food, beverages and tobacco sector, leather sub-sector and household products such as detergents and cleaning materials, and toothpaste among others. Companies in the *closed down group* cut across all industrial products, but most affected are products such as chalk, candle, dry cell and automobile batteries, shoes polish, matches, etc. Ironically, *The Guardian Nigeria Newspaper* of October 16, 2011 disclosed that: in Lagos, Isolo Industrial Estate which used to be a textile hub is a story of regretful memory. The likes of Aswani Textile Industries, Afprint and Five Star that made Isolo industrial centre breath have given way to warehouses and marketing companies. The God Bless Nigeria Church has taken over part of the property of Churchgate Group within the industrial centre. The paper went on to disclose that other religious houses are fast filling the empty spaces occasioned by the closure of the industrial estates.

Reminiscing on the plights of industrial sector in its 2007 first quarter review of the economy, Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) noted that:

This is not the best of times for manufacturers in Nigeria, particularly those in the small and medium Enterprises category... manufacturing costs had gone up astronomically, industrial capacity declined and many businesses collapsed.

Problems identified by LCCI to have contributed to this include, deficiencies in infrastructure especially power supply, acute funding problems, policy inconsistency, import dependence and influx of substandard and cheap products.

Offiong (2001) and the National Planning Commission (2004) contend that irregular power supply is one of the greatest challenges facing the industrial sector in Nigeria. In the case of the textile sector, when the Federal Government banned importation of textile, the policy thrust was to improve on the productivity of the local factories (Okafor, 2008). However, the sector has continued to record worse performance. For instance, the popular Kaduna – based United Nigeria Textile Plc shed its 1200 workforce in 2005 due to high cost of production attributed to lack of power supply for production (Adegbamigbe 2007; Ogunjobi, 2007).

Table on Status of Industries 2005 - 2007

YEAR	INDUSTRIES IN OPERATION (%)	INSTALLED CAPACITY (%)	FUNCTIONAL STATUS (%)
2005	10	100	48.8
2006	40	100	60% in comatose
2007	43	100	49%

Sources: Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) Survey, 2005, 2006; <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com>, <http://www.indexovid.industry.com/pdf>.

According to the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria’s (MAN) survey in 2005, only 10% of industries operated; functioning at 48.8% of their respective installed capacities. The MAN survey maintained that 60% of the companies were in comatose while another 30% had completely closed down. The following year, 2006, a survey conducted by MAN in the first quarter indicated that most of the industrial areas around the country suffered an average of 14.5 hours of power outage per day as against 9.5 hours of supply. Furthermore, the figure released by the MAN indicated that the cost of generating power supply accounts for 36% of production. About 1500 firms (60%) of the association’s 2,500 members are in trouble principally because of the additional operating cost of alternative power generation. Over 750 companies (30%) have closed shop due to the problem of unsteady power supply (Udejah 2006, Adegbamigbe 2007). Not only that, Ajanaku (2007) asserted that as a result of power supply and other related factors, industrial sector contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has continued to drop since 1990 from 8.2%, got to 4.7% in 2003; 4.06% in 2004 and 4.2 in 2005%, the lowest figure since the country got independence in 1960.

At this stage, the Nigerian economy is nothing to write home about. There is an increase in inflation and unemployment. The naira keeps falling like a weak-kneed aged creature, and Nigerians are seeking salvation in other countries, often called greener pastures. This is the deplorable state of the Nigerian economy. There is hardly any commodity that can be said to be locally produced. We import the littlest of things in the country! Nigerians’ problems are all tied to some fundamental factors — the disregard, nonchalance, sheer wickedness, and greediness of those at the helm of affairs. There can be a drive for change only if those fully invested with powers and backed by all the laws are willing to bring about that change. Are they willing to? Instances have proven otherwise.

Inability to Feed the Population

Food insecurity is another aspect worth mentioning. Dr Olusegun Mimiko, former Governor of Ondo State on September 27, 2011 while addressing the audience at the Yar’Ardua Centre in Abuja during the Sun Newspapers presentation of a book, *Nigeria’s Golden Book*, stated that:

Nigeria is a nation sitting on abundant natural resources with fertile land but completely unable to feed its citizens. The Minister for Agriculture, Dr Akinwunmi recently noted that: Nigeria is now one of the largest food importers in the world. According to him, the food import bill of Nigeria in 2007-2010 was N98 trillion or \$628 billion. In 2010 alone, Nigeria spent N632 billion on importation of wheat, N356 billion on importation of rice (that means N1billion per day on rice alone), N217 billion on sugar importation and with all the marine resources, rivers, lakes and creeks we are blessed with, Nigeria spent N97billion importing fish.

Table on Food Importation

IMPORTED ITEM(S)	ANNUAL AMOUNT (IN NAIRA) SPENT ON IMPORTATION
	N98 Trillion
Wheat	N632 Billion
Rice	N356 Billion
Sugar	N217 Billion
Fish	N97 Billion

Source: <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-spends-n24-5tr-on-food-importation-annually/99450/>

Deducible from the above is that Nigeria spends on the average N24.5 trillion yearly, which is about \$160billion. This revelation is certainly unwholesome if one considers that Nigeria has over 74 mha of arable lands and yet a net importer of food as of today. This is a clear departure from the reality of Nigeria in the 1960s when agriculture provided the main source of employment, income and foreign exchange earnings for Nigeria. The advent of commercial oil exploitation in the mid 1970s, no doubt, heralded an era of decay for agricultural output in Nigeria. Interestingly, as a nation today, Nigeria produces 500,000 tonnes of rice whereas her citizens consume 2.5 million tonnes.

Unemployment

Indeed, economic development must translate in some way to human development for the people to feel its impact. One such aspect is the creation of jobs. Sanusi in Iroegbu (2012:11) observed that: “According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS); unemployment rate in 2011 is 29.3%. This means that unemployment has doubled since last five years. Unemployment in Yobe is 60.6%, Kano is 67% and that is why when you go to Kano you will see a sea of people without work. There is a serious problem when a country is growing at seven per cent and yet could not provide jobs for its citizens. It is like a broken record; a country that produces oil yet imports refined fuel, a country that is a tomato belt yet imports tomatoes”.

Table on Unemployment Nigeria

1999	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
28%	2.9	5.8	4.9	16.5	19.7	21.1	29.3%

Sources: <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=ni&v=74>

The opportunity to earn a living has turned out to be quite elusive to a growing number of people in the developing world. Many years ago, unemployment was rarely anything to be reckoned with in traditional Nigeria where subsistence agriculture (tending of crops, herding of goats, fishing etc.) were major occupation. According to a 1982 report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the problems then were wars, cattle raids, famine, diseases and poverty.

Fasoranti (2010) observed that the tide turned the negative direction as far back as the early 1980s when many countries of the world were hit by economic recession. Since then, unemployment has assumed alarming and disturbing dimensions in Nigeria with millions of able bodied persons who are willing to accept jobs at the prevailing rates yet unable to find one (Onah, 2001).

In the light of the above, successive Nigerian governments have made several attempts to solve this social menace. An example is the creation of the National Directorate of Employment with its various components which include National Youth Employment and Vocational Skill Development Programmes, Small-Scale Industries and Graduate Employment Programme, the agricultural sector employment programme and the special public works. Others include the Agricultural Development Programme (ADP) and the Accelerated Development Area (ADA), River Basin Development Authorities and National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDs), Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs), National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) among several others.

The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) has since 1999 been modified to incorporate measures to create employment for jobless youths and alleviate poverty. Hence there is the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) and the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). With the inception of the Yar'Adua regime in 2007, he introduced the Seven-Point Agenda. His administration however, retained the NEEDS project especially as it has direct bearing on Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals which is aimed at eradicating extreme poverty. The Seven Point Agenda could not be implemented to the full with the demise of President Yar'Adua while still in office. Adoghome (2007) opines that the NEEDS initiative, modelled on the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, is aimed at achieving macroeconomic stability, poverty alleviation, wealth creation, and employment generation. It equally redefines the role of both the private sector and the public sector within the Nigerian economy. In the words of the then Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (2005), the objectives of the reform package are to "reduce poverty and create wealth by relying on the private sector to grow the economy and provide jobs and on the public sector, to provide an enabling environment for development".

According to the NEEDS document (2005:25):

NEEDS is a development strategy that consolidates the gains achieved over the last four years, unlocks Nigeria's dormant potential, and provides the base for sustained development.

The government expects that NEEDS will create seven million new jobs by 2007, diversify the economy, boost non-energy export, increase industrial capacity utilization and improve agricultural productivity. However, the implementation of policies on employment creation in Nigeria has not yielded much impact as there is a wide gap between the jobs available and the number of job seekers actively seeking work in most poor nations. Ogunrinola and Osabuohien (2010) contend that not only is the level of decent jobs diminishing, the challenges of globalisation and economic liberalisation has brought about new realities having uncertain implications for employment creation in many developing nations. Sodipo and Ogunrinola (2011:2) put forward four implications of the congested labour market in Nigeria in particular and the third world in general:

First is the widening of the informal sector where many who would have remained in open unemployment take up low-wage jobs or even self-employment while still hoping to pick up formal sector job when available. Second, the unemployed in the labour market in poor nations do not enjoy any form of unemployment insurance or any social benefit from the government. Third, the reported unemployment rates in official documents are usually very low due to high rate of disguised employment and underemployment in the informal sector. Fourth, self-employment, part-time employment, and unpaid employment in family enterprises have a disproportionate share in total employment.

All these are pointers to the need for a search for solution to employment problems in developing nations. For instance, facts available for the Nigerian economy indicate a high rate of unemployment and underemployment. The rate of open unemployment was 12% in March 2005; it rose to 19.7% in March 2009 while the rate of underemployment hovered around 19% in 1998 (Adebayo and Ogunrinola, 2006, National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Among the youths in the 15-24 age cohorts, the rate of unemployment is over 40% according to the 2010 edition of the Labour Force Sample Survey of the National Bureau of Statistics.

What the above exposition points to, is the fact that the failure of economic development has a trickling down effect on the Nigerian society. Some of these adverse effects will be discussed below.

Insecurity of the Citizens

There are continued coordinated attacks by Nigeria's free-rein terrorist group, Boko Haram. The calamity sparked by the terrorist activities of the sect has displaced millions of Nigerians, and sadly, the number of displaced persons is on the rise. The 36th Report on Internally Displaced Persons {2021} shows a 1.6 per cent increase in the number of displaced persons. Nigerians are losing their loved ones and valuable properties to the unending menace wrought by Boko Haram. Thousands of Nigerian soldiers have also been lost to the cause. The loss has been to both the citizens and the government – bombed fighter jets, attacked army barracks, village wipeouts, mass pillaging, and the list is seemingly endless!

What about herdsmen attacks? Cows and their herders are now above the law, and continuous attacks on farmers and crops are given little to no attention by the Federal Government, leading to the revolt-esque creation of security outfits by state governments. There is the Amotekun group by South-Western states and the Ebube Agu by South-Eastern governors. The lack of attention to security issues was also the seed for now divergent agitations by Sunday Igboho for the Yoruba nation. Igboho's protests stemmed from the need to fend off kidnapers and herdsmen attacks in Igangan and other rural towns in Oyo State. His agitations shifted focus because the government failed to attend to the critical issue of security, leading to one of the attributes of a failed state – general outcry and dissent from citizens.

There has been an escalation of conflicts especially with the inception of democratic rule in 1999. Buttressing this fact, Elaigwu (2005) and Abdulrahman (2006) contend that no fewer than one hundred (100) conflicts were recorded in Nigeria between 1999 and 2004. It has equally been noted that within this period, at least 10,000 people lost their lives while about 800,000 people were displaced (Global Internal Displacement Project, 2005 & Nwabufo, 2005). In the same vein, the Nigerian Red Cross Society and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre in 2006 reported that in February 2006, as many as 50,000 people were internally displaced and about 150 sent to their untimely graves in a spate of violence sparked off by protests against the cartooning of Prophet Muhammad by a Danish Newspaper.

Again, the Jos crisis which has been recurrent since 1994 with its attendant loss of lives and properties deserves mention. The April 12, 1994 riot was over the creation of Jos North Local Government Area by the Ibrahim Babangida regime in 1991. On September 7, 2001 another crisis erupted over the Chairmanship seat of the Local Government. According to *Newswatch Magazine* of January 22, 2010, more than 1000 people were killed while a similar crisis in 2004 claimed 500 lives. On November 2008, 700 people were also killed in Jos North Local Government crisis. On January 17, 2010, 350 people were killed by recruited armed thugs. Furthermore, *Newswatch Magazine* reported that on March 7, 2010, 500 people were massacred in four villages (Dogo-Nahawa, Zot, Rasat and Kutgot) in Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State in an ethno-religious crisis. The victims were reported to have been either matcheted or slaughtered by armed men suspected to be Fulani herdsmen. This sparked off protests from youths of the area. The tension created by the protests forced Jos residents to abandon their businesses and hurriedly return home.

Edem (2008) while commenting on the Nigerian State and national security noted that secure means unable to escape, Security means the assurance of future well being and freedom from threat. It could be individual as in Nigeria where you put iron bars across your windows which prevents you from escaping in case of a fire outbreak, and, the non functioning national pension fund system set up for the future well being of citizens. It could be international, when the actions or inactions of a foreign state e.g. Cameroon, constitutes a threat to the well being of Nigeria as in the Bakkassi Peninsula. It could be national where the effects are internal, and in the case of Nigeria where they are numerous nations within the state, threat is often amplified as an expression of dominant nationality.

Edem noted that the paradox of Nigeria's security is that instead of the State being the framework of lawful order and the highest source of governing authority, it now constitutes the greatest threat to herself.

The political and historical development of Nigeria since her inception could explain, yet not excuse, the virtual abandonment of sovereignty to a military and political cabal within the State. It is this usurpation of sovereignty by this group and the exercise of the authority it confers without legal recourse to the populace in lieu of an acceptable referendum and constitution, that makes an overview of the Nigerian State and its national security perspective a nightmare., because the State has become the greatest source of threat to its own survival as there are no core values to defend except corruption.

As a result of this, the State is unable to enforce law and order, allowing vigilante groups to hijack the criminal justice system. There is deliberate fomentation of political disorder through the struggles of the dominant nationalities for control of State institutions and an imperfect or non-existent mechanism for the transfer of political power.

Edem (2006:8) surmised by asserting that:

The Nigerian State needless to say, does not provide any form of welfare to the people. The citizens are always informed of how, so and so member of the elite group has been taken abroad for medical treatment, there is no long term perspective in national planning and implementation, each new government preferring to start its program anew with the concomitant loss of continuity and corruption. The State's assets and resources are viewed as personal properties of the elites with its attendant looting and misappropriation. In Nigeria, the few and the wealthy pursue their happiness with wretched excess to the exclusion of the actual wretched, the envy and concomitant crime this generates, deprives the wealthy and the State of an iota of peace and semblance of security. Nigeria is the most corrupt country on earth and naturally the most insecure. Nigeria gives truism to the saying 'wealth is wasted on the wealthy'.

Edem's exposition is in tandem with that of Ibeanu and Momoh (2008) to the effect that the Nigerian state constitutes a security threat to its citizenry. Rather than being the arbiter of conflict, the state is seen as constituting a source of conflict and its failure to address cases of conflict is an indictment on the government.

Loss of monopoly of the means of coercion

In the first half of 2021 alone, an average of 13 persons was kidnapped daily, with the toll presently at about 2,371 people. Kidnapping has become the order of the day in Nigeria, another "*hustle*" for the scores of seemingly untouchable bandits. It is incredibly nonsensical to see that the government would rather enter negotiation talks with kidnappers than reinforce the country's security. What message does it send to other kidnappers when they see that abducting innocent schoolchildren is now the surest way to become overnight millionaires? There have also been reports of attacks on top military officers. About three have been attacked and killed on the highways in the past two to three months. Is it not scary to think of what chances at safety the average citizen has if top military officials could be attacked and murdered in broad daylight on federal roads? {Eme, et.al,2021 }.

A critical factor fuelling the alarming state of insecurity in Nigeria today is the dangerously large number of illegal arms circulating throughout the country. It is with these illegal weapons that sundry criminal elements have unleashed an unprecedented orgy of violence in recent times. In carrying out their dastardly acts, armed robbers, kidnappers, aggrieved militants, perpetrators of ethno-regional and communal conflagration, religious (Boko Haram) zealots, assassins and political thugs, among several others, have often utilised arms and ammunition far superior to those of legal law enforcement agencies. The ease with which violent crime is perpetrated all over Nigeria today is partly a function of the prevalence of arms everywhere, most of which are beyond the purview and control of the Nigerian State.

Yet, one of the defining characteristics of any viable state is its manifest monopoly of the means of coercion within its territorial jurisdiction. A state that cannot effectively contain the violent activities of violent groups and individuals in its area of authority is verging dangerously on the fragile borders of inefficacy and ultimate disintegration.

It is against this background that one is alarmed at the rate at which illegal weapons of diverse categories continue to filter through our porous borders to compound the country's security woes. Not long ago, it was reported that a lorry-load of arms and ammunition destined for Nigeria was intercepted and impounded in Ghana by that country's Police Service. Acting on a tip-off by a resident, the Ghanaian authorities seized hundreds of pump action and double action guns as well as type AA and BB cartridges, among others (The Nation, 2012). Nigeria's High Commissioner to Ghana, Senator Musiliu Obanikoro, disclosed that interactions with the driver of the impounded lorry indicated that this was the second trip they were making in recent times. The disturbing reality is that many more of such trips could have been successfully made before the gun runners ran out of luck.

The Nation Nigeria Newspapers of June 19, 2009 has it that:

On June 17, 2009, one Ukrainian plane fully loaded with arms and ammunition was impounded by security agents when it made a technical landing at the Mallam Aminu Kano International Airport, Kano, at about 2.00 am. On October 18, 2010, a lorry-load of arms was impounded in Onitsha, Anambra State. In an illegal arms importation scandal that caused a serious diplomatic rift between Nigeria and Iran, 13 containers of illegal weapons arrived Lagos from the Middle East country through the Apapa ports in July 2010.

The unsuccessful attempt to convert the containers to diplomatic cargo and tranship them to The Gambia led to the discovery of the illegal imports. Yet, in none of these cases is there any evidence that the apprehended suspects were conclusively prosecuted in accordance with the country's laws.

Increase in crimes like armed robbery and kidnapping

In the Nigeria context, perhaps one of the most gruesome and crippling indices accounting for its failed state status in most recent times, has been the unprecedented, wide spread and growing incidence of mass armed robbery and human kidnapping and extortion in many states across the nation. Pervasive armed robbery and kidnapping are especially crippling to a society because of the special toll they take on the core psyche of a people, as it is often tantamount in the minds of the people to the humiliation of the main symbols and institutions of national security, the police and the armed forces, and further underlines how easy it is to terrorize the country (Anosike, 2009). Consequently, the widespread occurrence of armed robbery and kidnapping in the society, such as has become commonplace lately in many parts of Nigeria, has the most potential to undermine the peace and security of the Nigerian people, disrupt economic activities, paralyze industry and economic development and progress, and lead to greater unemployment, and in general, to the immobilization of government and society (Anosike, 2009).

For Nigeria today, armed robbery and extortionist kidnapping are easily the most serious, number one domestic security problem today for the country. It is a national problem that is prevalent all across the country. According to a report released by Ibrahim Yakubu Lame, the Police Affairs Minister, in July 2009, Nigeria has recorded a total of 512 kidnappings from January 2008 to June 2009, with 30 of such persons involved losing their lives in the process. However, the eastern states top the list of kidnap incidents (Anosike, 2009). Indeed, it is now a common fact that in virtually all the eastern states, gruesome incidents of mass armed robbery and kidnapping have become common occurrence. According to the said police report released in July 2009, Abia State tops all states with a total of 110 kidnap incidents, and 3 53 cases and three deaths in 2008. This is followed by other eastern states: Imo (58 recorded kidnaps, 109 arrests, 41 prosecutions, and 1 killed), Delta (44 kidnappings, 43 released, 27

arrests, 31 prosecutions, 1 killed), Akwa Ibom (40 kidnappings, 40 released, 18 arrests, 11 prosecutions) [Anosike, 2009].

A criminal act, which first attracted national attention on 26 February 2006 when Niger Delta militants kidnapped foreign oil workers to press home their demand, kidnapping has since become ubiquitous and commercialised. It has spread from the Niger Delta to virtually all nooks and crannies of the country, with some states of course being hotspots. Similarly victims have changed from being predominantly foreign oil workers to Nigerians, including parents, grand parents, and toddlers and about anyone who has a relative that could be blackmailed into coughing out a ransom. Those behind the recent wave of the despicable act have also changed from being exclusively Niger Delta militants to dodgy elements from different walks of life - armed robbers, unemployed, professional 419ers among others. It should be noted that most of the countries where kidnapping have been pervasive have been either failed or failing states – Baghdad after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Columbia from the 1970s until about 2001, and Mexico between 2003 and 2007 (Adibe, 2010).

Rise of government opposition militia

The Niger Delta crisis which has accounted for the loss of several lives and properties equally deserves mention. The Niger Delta crisis has led to growing security threats. Although the Niger Delta issue has been present for decades, the emergence of organized and militant pressure groups in the 1990s added a new dimension to the crisis – protests and outright rebellion against the Nigerian State. From the 1990s to the present, the manifestation of these conflicts, have reached crisis proportions (Hutchful & Aning, 2004). The violent character of the rebellion which included the complete shutdown of oil installations and platforms, kidnapping of oil workers, cross-killing and maiming of militants, state security forces and innocent citizens, and the unprecedented practice of hostage-taking and oil bunkering have been thriving in recent times. The crisis has led to growing security threats. Besides attracting the attention of the Nigerian state and horrifying the international community, this strategy takes on the character of simple criminal activity which hijacks the Niger Delta struggle (*The Guardian*, Sept 9, 2006: 11-14).

Added to the image of insecurity which the above scenario conjures up, hostage-taking has an enormous cumulative cost in human, financial and economic terms. The spate of kidnapping has spread to most States of the South-South and the South-East with the kidnapping of high profile citizens. In the South-East, the menace of kidnapers is higher in Abia State. One of the major high points was the October 4, 2010 kidnapping of 15 pupils of Abayi International School, Aba. *Newswatch Magazine* of October 11, 2010 has it that the pupils were taken hostage by gunmen while going to school in their school bus. It took sustained condemnation and appeals from all and sundry to secure the release of the pupils.

However in an act of containment and compromise, former President Olusegun Obasanjo held audience with some leaders of the Niger Delta militia. Though the militant leaders who were fighting against the Nigerian State, managed to extract juicy concessions for their illegally acquired weapons as captured by Elendu (2005:2) when he asserted that:

Advisers to President Olusegun Obasanjo recognised the destabilising effect the conflict was having on the oil industry and responded in early October 2004 by flying both Asari and Ateke to meet the President in Abuja. Obasanjo gave amnesty to the militant leaders and their supporters and reportedly made payments of more than \$1,000 for each rifle and \$10,000 for each machine gun handed in to the government.

This containment was finally sealed when the Nigerian government under President Yar'Adua on June 25 2009, introduced the Amnesty Programme for the militants effective from August 6 2009. The temporal solution seen as a positive outcome is summed up in the words of Ajaero of *Newswatch Magazine* on

January 4, 2010 thus: “by the expiration of the October 4 deadline which the federal government gave the militants to disarm, virtually all the key militants had embraced the amnesty deal”.

This amnesty programme saw the government wining and dining with persons who are supposed to answer for the death of many souls. The government rather than prosecute them, helplessly accepted a face saving soft landing for her failure through the amnesty programme. A state where the possession of fire arm attracts severe penalty suddenly started celebrating the return by militants of sophisticated weapons in heaps that can fill lorries. Recently, most of these former militants have been sent to different countries to acquire some skills. The truth of the matter is that the amnesty programme is but a palliative measure because it has not addressed the issue of job creation and future youths would rise again to demand for yet their own share of the national cake. When a state cannot protect her citizens and foreigners but rather turns round to plead with the aggressors, the state has failed.

Rise in terrorism

Insecurity in parts of Northern Nigeria has rapidly replaced militant attacks on oil infrastructure hundreds of kilometres away from the Southern Niger Delta as the main security threat in Africa’s most populous nation in recent months. Boko Haram, which says it wants a wider application of strict Sharia Islamic law in Nigeria, claimed responsibility for a bomb blast at the National Headquarters of the Nigerian Police in the capital Abuja on June 16, 2011. The sect has claimed responsibility for most daily killings and attacks on police and government buildings in and around Maiduguri, Borno State. Boko Haram’s former leader, self-proclaimed Islamic scholar Mohammed Yusuf, was shot dead in police custody during a 2009 uprising in which hundreds were killed and his mosque was destroyed. It is true that the death of Yusuf rather than bring an end to the activities of the group emboldened them so much so that the attack on the police Headquarters, according to Onwuamaeze (2011) was triggered by the statement of the police Inspector General Ringim when on June 14 in Maiduguri he declared that the days of the Boko Haram were numbered. Guerrilla attacks on police stations and assassinations, including of traditional leaders and moderate Islamic clerics, intensified in the second half of last year. The bomb blast in the United Nations office in Abuja which according to Agbaegbu (2011) quoting Farhan Haq of the UN office left 23 persons dead and so many wounded on August 26, 2011 is for now the climax of the effrontery of the Boko Haram who promptly claimed responsibility for the dastardly act.

It is true that the activities of the nefarious sect sent most inhabitants of Maiduguri in Borno state packing in August 2011, a development that also scared off foreign investors and grounded the state’s economy as summed up by Ibrahim (2011 p.14) thus “the worsening security situation has grounded the state’s economy,...a group of investors from Germany who wanted to build a cement factory in Maiduguri, have withdrawn from the project due to the activities of the *Boko Haram*”. Though the government in response took steps to contain them through the setting up of a Panel to investigate the remote causes of the problem with a view to advising government on the appropriate remedies, the somewhat heightened activities of the sect confirms that the sect is unrelenting and unrepentant. This is so because between August 2011 and January 2012, about 44 number of bomb attacks credited to the Boko Haram sect have been recorded leaving a casualty figure of about 1064 deaths (Tell, February 6, 2012). The ancient city of Kano has been reported to be a shadow of herself as the sect seem to have literally over-run the city. According to *Sunday Sun* of January 29, 2012 (p. 9), the multiple bombings in Kano which left about 200 people dead triggered mass exodus of people (especially those from the South-East) from the city. The report quotes one of the returnees interviewed as stating that:

We tried to cope knowing full well that the presence of the security agents like the army and police would help the situation. But when the reverse became the case, I found out that even those we had hoped to protect us could not protect themselves. So I had to take my family home. Kano is no longer safe for business or whatever.

President Jonathan according to The *Vatican News* of Sunday February 19, 2012 admitted that the sect had infiltrated the different arms of government namely the executive, the legislature and the judiciary including the different security agencies.

CONCLUSION

In this study, we examined failed state and economic development using Nigeria as a case in point. It was discovered that it is the failure of economic development that led to failure of the Nigerian state. In other words, the perception of Nigeria as a failed state is indeed premised on the poor economic development as is especially reflected in her poor infrastructural development typified by the failure of the power sector, collapse of industries, insufficient food production and widespread unemployment among others. It therefore follows that the failure in economic development in Nigeria has spilled over to other aspects of Nigeria's national life.

As a result of the above mentioned deficiencies in economic development, there is insecurity of lives and properties, loss of monopoly of the means of physical coercion, increase in the spate of armed robbery and kidnapping, as well as rise in opposition militia and terrorist acts. The emergence of the Boko Haram sect with their base in Northern Nigeria and their activities is yet another affirmation of a state that cannot guarantee the safety of her citizens. The emergence of the sect and its terrorist activities can be attributed to a number of reasons. Firstly, it could be as a result of the activities of some politicians who feel that the power balance should have swung in their favour. Secondly, it could be as a result of the desire to emulate the Niger Delta militants with a view to attracting juicy compensation similar to those attached to the Amnesty Programme. Another notable sign of the failure of the Nigerian state is the many cases of kidnaps which are serious enough to prevent many people, especially expatriates, from visiting certain parts of the country undisguised especially in the south east. It is notable to say that at the root of these failures are corruption and unemployment as insignificant numbers of school leavers get jobs yearly.

It is no surprise that Nigeria has since 2007 been labelled a failed state by the international organization, the Fund for Peace, based on indices drawn from several aspects of economic and human development. In 2008, 177 States made the list of failed States. Out of these, 35 were classified as alert, 92 grouped as warning, 35 as moderate and 15 as sustainable. Nigeria also made the list of 20 worst states in 2008 while only Africa produced eleven of the 20 worst failed states in the world.

If failed states are to be defined as nations that have failed and fallen short of some of the basic and fundamental conditions and responsibility of a sovereign state, then Nigeria will be among the topmost in the list of failed states characterized by inability to provide reasonable public services, widespread corruption and criminality, insecurity of lives and properties etc. The inability to provide reasonable public services by the Nigerian state is very glaring. These include electricity (power), water, public health, roads, education, food, housing, employment among others.

Nigeria depends mainly on imported food materials for survival even when it has great potentials to feed herself and part of Africa. In 1999 when President Olusegun Obasanjo took over, a 50 kilo bag of rice was about N2, 000.00, but he immediately negotiated with Dangote and made Dangote the sole importer of not only rice but of every other food item one can think of. And the price of rice was pegged then at N6000.00 per bag. Since then, the price has been on constant rise as a bag of rice was sold at N15, 000 at some point in time.

In the final analysis, it is the contention of this paper that whereas a country's economy can fail and the country still remains politically strong and stable as in the case of Niger republic, Nigeria has a situation where the economy first failed and this failure now spilled over to the political sphere. This position is supported by the analysis of the failures in the power and industrial sectors above, which have culminated in the spate of insecurity and loss of confidence by the citizens, including the leadership.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are deemed necessary:

- The government should endeavour to pay particular attention to the economic development of the country.
- Improved food/agricultural production should be pursued with vigour given that Nigeria has fertile soil for agriculture. Feeding the populace should not be such a herculean task for the government.
- Concerted efforts should be made to improve the power sector. This is necessary because power supply (or lack of) is one of the major factors responsible for the collapse of many industries in Nigeria.
- The government should devise measures to empower youths through the provision of job opportunities or by helping them to set up small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs).
- The Nigerian government should ensure that perpetrators of violence are duly punished so as to discourage others from such acts in future. The situation whereby the Nigerian government has attained a reputation of always paying lip service to the sanctioning of offenders is not in any way complimentary.
- The government should do all in its power to protect the lives and property of the entire citizenry. This is necessary because no meaningful development thrives in an atmosphere of insecurity. If many foreign investors are to heed the appeals of the government to come and invest in Nigeria, security is a prerequisite.

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