SOCIABILITY AND SHYNESS AS FACTORS FOR PRONNESS TO SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE AMONG UNDERGRADUATES IN EKITI STATE UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

1MOKUOLU Bolade Olubu
2AJAYI Olubukola & 3DADA Olugbenga David

Department of Psychology
Ekiti State University, Ado Ekiti, Nigeria
1bolademoks@yahoo.co.uk
2buddex2003@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Substance use and abuse is a common issue among the youths. The relationship between substance abuse, sociability and shyness was what this study centered on, being issues that are common among youths. 200 undergraduates participated in the study. The result found a significant main effect of sex and shyness on substance use and abuse but no significant main effect of sociability. There is also no significant interaction effect of the three independent variables on substance use and abuse

Keywords: substance use and abuse, sociability, shyness

INTRODUCTION
Adolescence is a turbulence period in life, bringing along with it significant personal and social challenges. This period is characterized with some challenges which include transition to college, search for identity and purpose in life, social and academic pressure, separation from family, formation of new groups. While people managed the stresses and challenges of this period, some find it difficult to adjust, thereby ending up with emotional turmoil that led to the search for adventure and relief.

In a bid to determine what distinguishes the adolescents who could confront new life challenges with relative ease from those who succumb to substance abuse, researches point to a number of factors. Genetic and biological factors have been found to play important role in determining individual susceptibility to these problems, other factors which include personality, life experiences, values, beliefs, family background, and surrounding environment cannot be overemphasized. Consequently, Page (1990) reported shyness and sociability as the personality risk factors that predict illicit substance use in male adolescents. Shyness has long been described as a character trait, an attitude or a state of inhibition (Lewinsky, 1941) Page (1990) reasoned that high shy and high social individuals were at increased risk for substance use because these behaviours may help them to cope with an approach-avoidance conflict that they experience during and or in anticipation of social interactions. There is the pull from the environment towards social interaction – feeling belong - and the shyness that brings about avoidance, therefore in order to overcome the avoidance tendency as a result of shyness, substance use became a companion.

The effects of substance use and abuse on undergraduates are staggering in terms of substance dependence injury, illegal acts, poor academic performance, risky sexual behaviour and high cost to the surrounding communities. This research aims at examining the effect of sociability and shyness on substance use and abuse among undergraduates.

The specific purpose includes to:
1. Examine the behavioural pattern of undergraduates on substance use and abuse among undergraduates,
2. Assess the effect of sociability on substance use and abuse
3. Ascertained the influence of shyness on substance abuse and also assess gender influence on undergraduates’ substance use and abuse

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study, a survey research made use of ex-post facto design. Two hundred undergraduates were drawn from Ekiti State University, consisting of 103 males and 97 females with the average age of 22 years. Questionnaire comprising of four sections was used for the study. Single-item variables like sex, and age were contained in section A, section B has measures of substance use and abuse, section C has shyness scale and section D contains sociability scale.

The shyness scale developed by Melchor and Cheek (1985) contains 20 items with Likert response pattern ranging from strongly agreed to strongly disagreed, having both direct and indirect scores. High scores indicate high level of shyness.

Sociability questionnaire is a 7-item questionnaire developed by Hanewicz and Bellamy (1988). All the items are scored directly and attracts 1-5 rating thereby making the scores to range from 7 to 35 with a mean 26.2.

Drug abuse screening test is a 20-item questionnaire designed to be used in a variety of settings to provide a quick index of drug related problems.

Procedure: Cluster sampling method was employed to distribute the questionnaire among the undergraduates in their hostels so as to cut across students from different faculties of the university. Two hundred copies were used out of the retrieved copies; indicating 100% retrieval.

RESULTS
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of scores on substance use and abuse among the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>24.52</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shyness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shy</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>24.15</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not shy</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>23.59</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociable</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>23.95</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sociable</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>23.77</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex and Shyness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male shy</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>24.59</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male not shy</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24.03</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female shy</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23.68</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female not shy</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23.10</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex and sociable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male sociable</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24.29</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male not sociable</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24.36</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female sociable</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23.52</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female not sociable</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23.25</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shyness and sociability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shy and sociable</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shy and not sociable</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24.23</td>
<td>3.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not shy and sociable</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>23.84</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not shy and not sociable</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23.17</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on results shown in Table 1 the mean indicates that those that are shy are more involved in substance abuse (mean = 24.15) than those that are not shy (mean = 23.59). Male are more involved than female but no interaction effect of sex and shyness as female that are shy (mean = 23.63) are not as involved in substance abuse as male that are not shy (mean = 24.03).
Table 2: 2x2x2 ANOVA showing the main and interaction effect of shyness and sociability and on substance use and abuse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sum of square</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Mean square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex (A)</td>
<td>43.28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43.28</td>
<td>6.80*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shyness (B)</td>
<td>23.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.99</td>
<td>3.77*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociability (C)</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AxB</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AxC</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BxC</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AxBxC</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>1221.84</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1301.87</td>
<td>199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* sig at .05

Result as stated in Table 2 shows that there is a significant main effect of sex and shyness on substance use and abuse but no effect of sociability. There is also no significant interaction effect of the three independent variables on substance use and abuse.

Table 3: One-way ANOVA summary table showing the mean and standard deviation of student from each of the academic level on substance use and abuse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 Level</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23.60</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 Level</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23.25</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 Level</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23.91</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 Level</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24.08</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 Level</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25.57</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F = 2.40 p<.05

Table 3 shows that the classes of the undergraduates significantly affect their level of substance use and abuse.

Table 4: Comparison of male and female on substance use and abuse, shyness and sociability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substance use &amp; abuse</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>24.32</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shyness</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>56.69</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>56.49</td>
<td>9.61</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociability</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>27.04</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>26.29</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* sig at .05

Table 4 revealed that there is a significant difference between male and female undergraduates on their perception of substance abuse [t(198)= 2.57, p< .05, but no significant difference on shyness and sociability was observed

DISCUSSIONS
The results revealed that shyness has a significant main effect on substance use and abuse among the undergraduates. The observation of the mean shows that those that are shy are more involved in substance abuse (mean = 24.15) than those that are not shy (mean = 23.59). Males are more involved than females but no interaction effect of sex and shyness as female that are shy (mean = 23.63) are not as involved in
substance abuse as male that are not shy (mean = 24.03). This could be explained with the fact that substance abuse is more of antisocial behaviour and from the literature males tend to be involved in antisocial behaviour than females. Substance use among male tends to be societally tolerated than with females and abuse most of the times start with use. Hence occurrence of abuse is more among male than female.

The work also went further to report that there is no significant difference in the sociability and shyness of male and female undergraduates, meaning that shyness and sociability is not a function of the sex. There is no significant difference in the drug abuse of those that are sociable and those that are not. There have been inconsistencies in the reports on the relationship between shyness, sociability and substance use. Cheek and Melchior (1990), Leary and Kowalski (1995) did not find a significant relationship between shyness and alcohol use. Cheek and Buss (1981) examined the relationship between shyness and sociability and demonstrated that that the dimensions were not only modestly related, contrary to lay judgments, shyness is not merely low sociability.

That an individual is high in shyness does not necessarily follow that he will be low in sociability. The difference between the two factors has also been established by the work of Schmidt and his colleagues (1995) who reported that shyness and sociability are distinguishable on measures of central and autonomic psychophysiology.

Due to the impairment in interpersonal relations that may be present in individual that are high in shyness, the use of illicit drugs may be higher as reported in this study. This is in line with report by Page (1990) that high shy / high social individuals were at an increased risk for substance use because this will help them cope with an approach avoidance conflict that they experience during and/or in anticipation of social interaction, although this work did not find a significant interaction effect of shyness and sociability on substance abuse but on shyness alone suggesting that the individuals that are high in shyness are having interpersonal impairment. As university is a social environment, an undergraduate who may want to socialize and relate with others in social environment, may find solace in substance use so as to cope with the challenges posed by the personality problem of shyness. No significant difference in substance abuse was found between individuals that are sociable and those low in shyness. This bothers on the fact that low sociability is not synonymous to shyness.

REFERENCES


A RELIGIOUS TERRORIST GROUP’S WAR ECONOMY: STRATEGIES TO DISLOCATE THE FINANCIAL POWER OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

CHARLES, Alfred
Department of Political Science and Administration,
Babcock University, Ogun-State, Nigeria
Email-twonbrass@gmail.com. 07060694033.

ABSTRACT
No war or severe conflict of any sort can survive without a war/conflict economy. Long-drawn-out religious and other conflicts in Nigeria are becoming the norm rather than the exception. The study principally focused on the current Boko Haram terrorist group that has caused and is still causing considerable destructions of lives and properties in the country. This study broadly identifies the major sources of the war economy of Boko Haram. It suggested that the issues of bad governance, systemic corruption must be addressed vigorously and transparently and the international community should help to upgrade the Nigerian informal and formal banking systems so that all cash dealings in both sectors including cash transfers from overseas to Nigerians and others will be sufficiently scrutinized.

Key words: Economy, Insurgency, Boko-Haram, Religion, War and Terrorism

INTRODUCTION
The body bags are still coming in. The dead bodies are still being counted. Boko Haram has captured territories inside Nigeria. No fewer than 29, 600 civilians have been killed in Boko Haram’s campaign of murder and mayhem since 1998 (Dare, 2015 and Leon and Alao, 2014). Boko insurgents are now controlling over 20,000 square kilometers of territory in the three North Eastern states of Nigeria, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. The land mass under the control of the insurgents is about the size of Wales in the United Kingdom or the state of Maryland in the United States, and bigger than Northern Ireland (Abdullahi, 2014). The fire power of Boko Haram that is funded by a huge war economy is so sturdy that in just a day or two the terrorist group killed about 2000 people in Baga, in the north eastern state of Borno (Sahara Reporters, 2015).

Religion is a fact of life in most developing countries, and it is also one of the major causes of conflicts. Nigeria has suffered and she is still suffering currently in an unparalleled manner her own share of religious’ induced violent conflicts. Actually religious conflicts were not the characteristic of the ancient empires and the city-states that occupied what is now known as Nigeria in the pre-colonial era before they came in contacts with the civilizations of the East and the West. Religion became a subject matter, a means of discrimination and a major cause of all types of conflicts when the two leading religions, Islam and Christianity, became a sort and a part of state or empire religions in the colonial era and in the post-independence periods.

Religious conflicts became much unbridled in post-colonial Nigeria because it was introduced offhandedly into politics and governance by the traditional rulers, economic elites and the political leaders to largely subjugate the masses of the people. And from independence till date the Nigerian state has been confronted with one form of religious conflict or the other. The Boko Haram (BH) conflict is the most current religion-induced insurgency that the Nigerian state is grappling with and it may be the force that will finally collapse and implode the already failing Nigerian state, if the formidable and still horizontally and vertically developing war economy of the BH is not attacked and dismantled urgently.
It is a fact that BH is able and capable of confronting the Nigeria state with her numerous security outfits because it has successfully built a war economy that is providing the needed fund and other material war related resources for it to operate with less hindrance. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to identify the channels BH is using to mobilize fund for its pricey operations against Nigeria and others.

WAR ECONOMY
To Naidoo (2000) the term war economy covers all the means warring parties use to appropriate and exploit a country’s resources for the sustainability of an intractable conflict. For Goodhand (2004) however, war economy is the production, mobilization and allocation of economic resources to sustain a conflict, it also includes the economic strategies of war aimed at the deliberate disempowerment of specific groups.

To all intents and purposes, the term war economy is now employed to explain all the activities that warring factions in any violent conflict use to mobilize funds and other material resources to prosecute a war or any type of violent conflicts in all modes. War economy is a must for both state and non-state actors prosecuting any type of violent conflict or war. Therefore, without a formidable and well-resourced war economy the possibility of overcoming a foe in a war in this current century is very remote. This is because, globalization and its attendant exigencies have currently turned, war to cash and cash is now wars’ godfather.

Before the cold war, the term war economy was basically used to describe the economic activities such as scarcity, inflation and other disruptions and sometimes expansions of the formal economic activities of a country or nations during a war period (Atkinson, 1999). During the era of the Cold War, most warring factions enjoyed almost unlimited supports from the main protagonists—the United States and the defunct Soviet Union; therefore warring factions did not seriously look elsewhere to build war economies to sustain wars (Jurgen, 2003).

However, immediately after the end of the Cold War, warring factions worldwide started to source for their own war economies to help them sustain and prosecute wars because supports from the super powers were no longer substantial as a result of the alteration of the balance of power in the international arena and politics (Naidoo, 2000). War economy involves all the direct and indirect activities those who are in a war employ to raise money internally or get cash or other supports from outside to prosecute war; the major driving force that underscores the development of war economies is war financing.

The largely religious Lebanon war; the Ugandan conflict that has a religious bias with a huge war economy; Al-Shabaab, another religion-based separatist group in Somalia; the Taliban group in Afghanistan that has a colossal war economy that is helping it to actively sustain the war with the well-resourced Allied Forces to the dismay of all stakeholders of peace such as the United Nations and the EU; and every other non-religion induced long drawn wars such as the conflicts in Spain, Angola, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Niger Delta violent conflict of Nigeria were and are all still being sustained by huge war economies (UN Office and Drugs and Crime, 2003; Shanty, 2011; Atkinson, 1999; Feldman, 2008; Australian News Agency, 2012 and Gorka, 2006).

RELIGIOUS INSURGENCY AND BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA
Since the dawn of the growth of organized religions with global perspectives and reach with holy writs such as Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, conflicts have been associated with them. James (2008) summarized the whole concept of religion thus:

A religion is, among other things, a complex of relationships: with a divine figure, with a teacher or leader, with a sacred text or set of symbols, with a set of ideas, with a community of co-religionists. Such relationships embody certain patterns, and these patterns often reflect and repeat relational patterns in other areas of a devotee’s life: a search for an authority figure or the rejection of all authority, a deep longing or attachment or a drive to keep aloof and distant from others, a need for absolute certainty or a fear of any commitments (James, 2008:23).
Therefore, the survival and the expansionists’ altercations structured religions have waged against other social institutions in the trajectory of mankind’s civilization that are very numerous and are as old as history were expected because, religion as way of life cannot co-exist with other social and physical institutions without compromising them. Right from when organized religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Christianity, Islam, etc started they have been confronting other competing cultures in the course of their expansion and development.

With the exception of a handful, religion induced crises are always very fatal and protracted because what usually accentuate the crises are always more of spiritual than physical (James, 2008). Religions do not only confront other social institutions, they sometimes confront themselves (inter) and they also often fight their own (intra). The Crusades (1095-1291) were inter-religious crises while the 16th century Protestant Reformation conflict was a vivid example of an intra-religious violent confrontation (Philip and Damien, 2007).

Africans according to some studies are more religious than Europeans and Americans in most respects; this perhaps explain why the continent is the home of about one fifth of all the world’s professed Christians (of various denominations) and about one fourth of the world’s Muslims population; about half of African also are adherents of various strands of traditional or ethnic/tribal religions; only very few Africans can be classified as non-believers or atheists (Bjorn, 2006).

This diversity and tenacity of the Africans to the extraterrestrial perhaps also explains why religions-induced and backed conflicts are prominent in the continent. Virtually all African nations have experienced religious crises in various degrees. At present it is safe to conclude that religion is the most prominent cause of both inter and intra communal conflicts in the continent.

Religious conflicts are not new phenomenon to any community in Nigeria (Andrew, 2006). Organized religions have confronted all aspect of any culture they met in traditional Nigerian societies before the beginning of official colonization of the country by Britain. Achebe in his debut and internationally well received novel, Things Fall Apart, revealed the blood-spattered confrontations that occurred when Christianity and African traditional religions contested for supremacy in the Igbo pre and colonial eras in what is now known as Nigeria (Achebe, 1995). Because of the negative consequences that had resulted in the crises that have been induced by religions in Nigeria, scholars have been attracted to study all the trajectories of religious conflicts in the country (Corner House, 2004; Gregory, 2005; Pham, 2012; Kwaja, 2011; and Forest, 2012).

Akinyele (2013) aptly revealed the three sources of religious conflict in Nigeria. To him religious conflicts have become a distinguishing feature of Nigeria because:

First is the open air preaching associated with Pentecostalism and the reaction of the Muslims to this. Second is the increasing intervention of the government in religious matters in spite of the constitutional definition of Nigeria as a secular state. The third, and the far more serious than the two, is the politicization of religion (Akinyele, 2013:4).

Bjorn (2006) summation of why religious bloody crises are rampant in countries like Nigeria is also germane. According to him:

Whereas both non-African religions (Christianity and Islam) were obviously successful in their proselytizing activities in quantitative terms, i.e. with regard to the total number of converts, they may have been much less successful in qualitative terms, i.e. with the regard to the “depth” of the conversions, as indigenous beliefs exhibited a remarkable resilience and “stickiness”. As a result of this process, religions in Africa tend to be less “pure” than in Europe and most of them are syncretic or “creolised”, i.e. they represent amalgams of indigenous and foreign elements (2006:44).

The fact is that virtually all the religious organizations including the Maitatsine group in Nigeria in the 1980s that caused considerable destructions of lives and properties did not have a formidable war economy like the current BH group. The war economy of all the pre BH religious terrorists groups were pedestrian and were not well-established locally and internationally. Therefore, it was easy for the government of Nigeria then to dismantle them and crush the groups with ease.
The Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad (Jamāʿat Ahl as-Sunnah lid-daʿwa wal-Jihād), popularly known as Boko Haram (BH) has constituted itself as a terrorist group and it is active in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Literally BH is a Hausa word which means, western education is sinful bad and unprogressive. The founder of the sect Muhammed Yusuf established it in 2001. A good part of the history of BH was characterized by non-aggressive engagements, peaceful proselytizing of its ideas, ideals, welfare arrangements and tendencies for the materially-challenged ones under its influence and others in mostly the deprived northern parts of Nigeria.

To understand the background of BH the explanation given by the United States Institute of Peace researcher Andrew Welker in his study, Bokom Haram, is very valuable. According to Andrew (2012):

...the name BH is rather a distillation of the group’s core beliefs, it was a name given to the group by dismissive neighbors who had not joined the sect and had no time for it. It was as if they were saying “those people who go on and on about Western education being a sin.” Boko Haram, as a group, clearly does not utterly reject the modern world out of hand. The group’s use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs, YouTube, chemical explosives, automatic weapons, and cars shows it is more than prepared to use the fruits of Western education when it suits them (Andrew, 2012:5).

He concluded in his exposition that:

Boko Haram is, however, against those in northern Nigeria known as “yan boko.” Yan boko is literally translated as “child of the book.” It refers to the elite created by the policy of indirect rule used by the British to colonize Nigeria—the people who have had their heads turned away from Allah by easy money and corrupting Western values. To be yan boko is to be spiritually and morally corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminally enriching oneself rather than dedicating oneself to the Muslim umma (community) (Andrew, 2012:6).

BH, took up arms against the Nigerian state in 2009 and since then it has caused considerable damages in mostly the northern sections of the country that has vibrated even in the south, east and western parts of the country. The violent activities of BH have forced the federal government of Nigeria to proclaim state of emergency in some northern states The unsavory activities of BH have also compelled the government to resort to security mechanisms that are depleting the nation’s soft and hard resources in an unprecedented manner.

BH in its few years of resorting to violence has commandeered a lot of media attentions which has propelled both international, states and non-states actors to signify interests to help the Nigerian state to tame the organization. Actually, the organization has been labeled a terrorist group by the United States after it successfully bombed the United Nations’ office; the Nigerian Police and the ThisDay newspaper’s headquarters in Abuja

Unlike the Maitatsine riots that made the northern part of Nigeria bloody and ungovernable in the 1980s and others like the numerous Kano and Kaduna religious crises that started on the premise and promotion of raw violence induced by religion with a poor conflict economies; the BH religious insurgency mutely crept into the Nigerian socio-religious, economic and security psyches indirectly as a result of the mishandling of the organization’s soft activities and demands. Haruna (2013) revealed that:

Boko Haram predated Jonathan’s presidency on his own steam in 2011 by at least nine years. During most of that period the sect was completely non-violent. It became violent from 2009 only after its members had been systematically persecuted and killed by our security forces at the instance of the then Executive Governor of Borno State, its home base, Alhaji Modu Ali Sheriff, not because of their creed that Western education is sin, a creed widely regarded by most ordinary Muslims and their clerics alike as heretic, but because it became highly critical of what it said was the governor’s venality and anti-people policies and programmes (Haruna, 2013:1).

He further exposed that:
This systematic persecution and killings of its members climaxed in the July 2009 military raid of its headquarters which in turn led to the extrajudicial killing by the police of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf, his father-in-law, Baba Fugu, and Sheriff’s Commissioner of Religious Affairs, Buji Foi, both of them prominent members of the sect. The military raid in July 2009, ordered by Jonathan’s predecessor, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, a Northerner and a Muslim, wiped out the sect. Or so we thought, until it returned with vengeance within a year after Yusuf’s deputy, Abubakar Shekau, who had been presumed killed in the raid, surfaced from nowhere to resume its insurgency (Haruna, 2013:1).

BH in about six years of carrying arms against the Nigerian state has killed thousands of people and have destroyed properties that worth millions of dollars (Premium Times, 2014 and Punch, 2014). Only in the first 40 days of 2014, BH cold-bloodedly murdered 200 people (Omojuwa, 2014). Haruna (2014) cited a Hausa newspaper, Amintiya, in his article which claimed that only in the first two months of 2014 the insurgents killed 538 people. He piece revealed:

There were, the newspaper said, ten attacks against villages and communities in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states between January 28 against Waga Chekawa which left 30 people dead and against Jakana on March 4 in which the casualty was 11. In between were the attacks on Kauri (83 dead), Konduga (34), Izge (106), Bama (60), Buni Yadi (59 pupils of the unity school located in the town which is in Yobe State), Michika and Shiwa (28), Mainok and Maiduguri bombing (97) and Mafa (30), making a total of 538 dead within a period of less than two months….(Haruna, 2014:1).

The UN reported that in January 2014 alone about 5,000 refugees fled to the republics of Cameroon and Niger because of the renewed deadly activities of the BH (Omojuwa, 2014). It is a fact that BH could not have caused all these pains, including the abduction of numerous secondary schools girls, boys and others, to the crude oil rich Nigerian state and her people if it has not built a massive war economy that is helping it to finance its expensive war expenses. The massiveness and the well organized nature of the BH war economy were confirmed by the governor of Borno State, the state where the terrorist group actually blossomed.

Andrew (2012) in his study exposed the drives, the current objective and the plea of BH thus:

Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes northern politics has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Since 2009 it has been driven by a desire for vengeance against politicians, police, and Islamic authorities for their role in a brutal suppression of the group that year. But the group has proved itself to be very adaptable, evolving its tactics swiftly and changing its targets at the behest of a charismatic leadership (Andrew, 2012:9).

BH is govern by a thirty-member Shura Council (the highest consultative decisions making body) the council members do not usually assemble in one place for obvious reasons, the members move freely around Nigeria and others in the sub-region and they use mobile phones and other communication medium to communicate regularly. Each member of the Shura Council is responsible for a cell (a small group) and each cell is focused on a task or in geographical area (Andrew, 2012).

Campbell suggested that BH means several things at the same time, he posit that, BH is a movement of grassroots anger in northern Nigeria at the continuing depravation and poverty in the north; it is also a core group of Mohammed Yusuf’s followers who have reconvened under Abubakar Shekau and who are exacting revenge against the state for their treatment. The group also appears to be personality cult; an Islamic millenarianist sect, inspired by a heretical but charismatic preacher.

That BH has a huge war economy with corresponding complex strategies that is alien to the Nigerian security forces was succinctly revealed by Adeniyi (2014), he exposed that:
As Governor Shettima said, the enemies that our soldiers confront are not only motivated, given that they fight for an ideology for which they are prepared to die, they are also heavily funded otherwise how did they acquire anti aircraft guns? The possibility of local collaborators among the political elite is also not ruled out given some security reports about the nature of funding of the Boko Haram activities, all of which put the lives of our military men at risk (Adeniyi, 2014:43).

He concluded by further divulging that:

To compound the situation, the Boko Haram insurgents who operate mostly on motorbikes are experts at guerrilla engagements and they have become so professional that they almost always carry away their wounded and the dead. In contrast, the fighting spirit of our men (Nigerian soldiers) seems to wane given reports that the bullet wounds on some of the recent victims reveal that they were shot in the back, which could only mean the soldiers were killed while running away (Adeniyi, 2014:43).

**WAR ECONOMY OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENTS**

As it has mentioned above, no hostility or violent conflict subsists without a war economy. This explains why warring factions, mostly non state actors always look for means of raising funds to pay for the costly operations of warfare of all types. The phenomenon of developing a war economy for both state and non state actors is as old as war itself. In the ancient period wars are paid for through: predation on local population, taxation, feudal levies of people and material resources, ransoming cities, borrowing domestically and abroad, creating currencies, and printing monies, that is: paying for war through inflations (Cramer, 2006 and Sahara Reporter, 2015).

These traditional elements of the ancient war economies have been tremendously modified and in most cases expanded in the light of the present realities by the current war lords and conflict entrepreneurs. This is why organizations such as BH and the Taliban could resist the onslaught of states’ Special Forces with ease.

The following from our findings through random, unstructured interviews with well-informed sources that are in line with most credible studies are the major sources of the war economy of BH that is enabling it to carry out its rebellious activities and are helping it to resist the onslaught of the Nigerian state and her neighbours’ armed forces (Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, 2014; Thisday, 2014; Michele, 2014; Funmi, 2014 Adeniyi, 2014) The sources of BH war economy are:

a) **Foreign sources**- a good percentage of the fund that BH is using to prosecute the war is from different foreign sources. Both state and non-state actors with similar and shared ideologies contribute to the BH war economy. Some few years ago late Bin Laden gave Islamists in Nigeria $3m donations. Sometimes, the contributions come unsolicited, while others are sent as fund for charity;

b) **Target extortion**- another major source of fund for the organization is target extortion. Target extortion is when a wealthy person is directly ask to bring a stated huge amount of money (in one case, it was fifty million naira that was demanded from a prominent business man). This type of extortion goes with a vile threat geared toward making the target to comply almost immediately;

c) **Bank robbery**- this was a major source of fund at the beginning of the insurgency;

d) **Donations from politicians and other wealthy individuals**- like all organizations BH also have sympathizers that are non-active in the field but financially very buoyant. These members are a huge source of fund for the organization. Most of these members do their contributions in clandestine ways currently. Before the organization took to arms, most members of this group donate to the organization overtly;

e) **Kidnapping for purely monetary ransoms**; this element of the war economy of the sect is now a familiar one in Nigeria. It was used and perfected by the Niger Delta militants. It is a huge source of instant income for warring factions.
f) *Internet scams:* this may be a very minimal source of income because the processes of scamming unsuspecting victims take a long time and usually the proceeds are minimal and for an organization such as Boko Haram, the proceeds are too minimal for the leadership to give it a considerable attention. It is possible some of the young members of the sect are doing this to raise fund for donations.

g) *Proceeds from sabotage from the Nigerian security forces:* some of the gargets and arms the BH is using are from the officers of the regular security forces that are sympathetic to it. It is no secret in Nigeria that some officers of the security forces are sturdily sympathetic to the BH.

h) *Contributions from active members:* most active BH members are still equally very busy in their various income generating businesses and paid jobs. These members willingly contribute to the conflict economy of the organization.

i) *Proceeds from BH owned investments across the West African sub-region:* BH leaders like the late Osama bin Laden has food stuffs, textiles and other lucrative businesses they have established in Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Chad and other countries. These businesses are managed by its core loyalists who are good business men and women. Some of the BH investments are also manage by trusted partners who are core conflict entrepreneurs.

**CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The BH organization is an extensive entity at the moment and it needs equally huge fund to sustain its numerous expensive activities. This invariably means that the dislocation of the war economy will go a long way in limiting the activities of the organization. The insurgence will continue to also be a protracted one because war entrepreneurs have started making it big by working to help BH expand its war economy.

Already the largely insincere rulers of the Nigerian state have started borrowing money from international financial houses to prosecute the war against BH. President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria has asked the Nigerian parliament to approve the borrowing of an external loan of $1bn (about N165bn); the money according to the president would be used to upgrade the equipment of the Armed Forces (Ameh, 2014). As it has happened in most cases the money to be borrowed will be embezzled by the same politicians that are sponsoring BH. Therefore most of the activities of the corrupt government of the Nigerian state amount to the development of the BH war economy (Michelle, 2014).

Therefore, the earlier concerted efforts are made to dislocate the war economy the better, because as soon as the war economy becomes hugely lucrative for most of the passive and the active stakeholders and war entrepreneurs, any peace process arrangement that will be brokered in the future will be seriously affected.

This is what is happening to the post-amnesty peace process in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Crude oil bunkering and kidnapping for ransoms were elements of the war economy of the Niger Delta struggle, these elements are tremendously still affecting the post-amnesty peace processes because they are still being exploited by some of the ex-combatants and war entrepreneurs, hence the conflict in the delta is far from over. The following recommendations therefore will help the Nigerian State to immediately dislocate the war economy of the sect which will help to reduce it rebellious activities:

a) Financial transfer from any source from abroad to Nigeria should be monitored. The monitoring should not be limited to any part of the country or to any group of people. There should be general monitoring and forensic auditing of financial transfers in the country;

b) The financial activities of politicians and top public servants including security officers should also be scrutinized always;

c) Adequate security protection should be provided for those who report cases of threats from BH and others so that they will not pay the “protection” fees and the extortion-related sums demanded from them;
d) It is time to also watch and analyze in details the financial activities of the informal sector. All major informal sector businesses should be registered and the owners’ financial transactions monitored;
e) Security in the banks and other financial institutions should be tighten;
f) The rampant payment of ransoms for kidnapped victims should be discouraged. A multi-special unit should be established to handle cases of kidnappings in the country; and
g) Lastly and most importantly, the international community led by the United Nations should help Nigeria to overcome and address the issues of bad governance and systemic corruption that have been helping to trigger the growth of all types of unprogressive tendencies in the country.

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1 Baga is a major town in Borno State in the north eastern part of Nigeria. Baga is a border town near the shores of Lake Chad between the Nigerian and the Chad Republic. It is a town that is largely populated by Muslims. In the first week of January, Boko Haram fighters invaded the town for about two days and killed more than 2000 people. This was widely reported in both the Nigerian and the international mass media and which attracted international uproar and condemnations. Amnesty International described the Baga incident as the “deadliest massacre” in the history of Boko Haram, according to the UK based Guardian newspaper of Saturday 10 January 2015. The United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, the EU, the UNICEF, etc all robustly condemned the Baga Massacre. The Nigeria Army however disputed the causality figure of the Baga invasion by Boko Haram. The Premium Time of 12 January, 2015 reported that: The Nigerian military has denied media reports that over 2,000 people were killed in a terrorists attack in Baga community, Borno State, by the extremist group, Boko Haram. At a briefing Thursday, the Defence spokesperson, Chris Olukolade, said the number of people killed during the massive onslaught by Boko Haram in Baga town on Friday did not exceed 150 – including the terrorists. “From all available evidences, the number of people who lost their lives during that attack has so far not exceeded about 150 in the interim. This figure includes many of the terrorists who were bearing arms and got killed in the course of their attack and battle with troops.” Mr. Olukolade was reported to have said (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/174791-nigerian-military-denies-2000-killed-baga-says-150-died.html)

2 The eastern part of Nigeria is dominated by the Igbo/Ibo ethnic group. The late foremost Nigerian novelist Chenua Achabe was an Ibo/Igbo.

3 The history of terrorism and religious fanaticism in Nigeria could be traced to the Maitasine violent conflicts of the early eighties. The Maitasine religious sect was founded by late Malam Muhammadu Marwa alias Allah Ta-Tsine or Maitatsine. Like Boko Haram, Maitatsine’s ideology was largely opposed to most aspects of “western civilization” that are immoral and debasing. The group unleashed acts of terror against the Nigerian state. The first Maitasine violence in Kano shocked many Nigerians deeply. The sect killed more than, 4,177 people. The Kano incident was regarded as the first religious crisis that took a huge toll on human lives and property - See more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/06/how-maitasine-raised-curtians-for-militancy/#sthash.TYvhqYnh.dpuf

4 President Goodluck Jonathan according to the Daily Trust newspaper, asked the House of Representatives to grant approval to his government to borrow an external loan of $1bn (about N165bn). Jonathan said the money would be used to upgrade the equipment of the Armed Forces.

5 Some authorities believe that the current governor of Borno State is a or was a Boko Haram member. According to these authorities this explains why he has been treating them with kid gloves.

6 John Campbell was a former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

7 Due to the security situation, openly gathering data for the study was very risky. However, we randomly conducted unstructured interviews with well informed sources in the private and public sectors. We interviewed security personnel, academics, traditional leaders, students from the affected region and others.

8*We got similar information from some of our respondents too.
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