



Twists and Turns in Military and Civil Governance: Nigeria and Ghana

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ABSTRACT

A choice of Nigeria and Ghana as a topic evokes some dialectical challenges. Both countries bear foundational synergies having been part of the end-product of the partitioning and sharing of Africa by European powers who sat at meetings first convened by Chancellor Bismarck of Germany in 1884 to 1885. After the variety of meetings and resolutions Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia were assigned to Great Britain thus signaling the same parent or caretaker or mentor of the ensuing colonies. Nigeria and Ghana rose to become the most important of British colonies in West Africa even as the two carried enormous disparities of history, geography, culture and prospects even when bound together by British Commonwealth attributes of language, education, governance, bureaucracy, socio-economic, judicial and political similarities. Despite this multitude of similarities, the two countries developed separately and independently without *de jure* or legal alliances beyond the membership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria was the major player in the creation and the vitality of ECOWAS whether the Nigerian government was military or civilian. Commitment to the principles of non-violence in international relations, non-interference in the internal affairs of other counties, regional and economic cooperation and development, effective participation in matters of continental interest, was assured. The commonalities and differences in the growing process of both countries evoke concrete lessons and instructions for the African and world humanity.

Keywords: civil governance

INTRODUCTION

Brief Background of NIGERIA and GHANA

GHANA originally known as Gold Coast, was the largest producer of cocoa and the largest exporter of manganese in the world. It was by virtue of its political independence from the United Kingdom, the first African country to win its independence process was Kwame Nkrumah whose 'vigorous self-asserting' and charismatic leadership blazed a trail in activist nationalism and rigorous patriotism. He led Ghana into becoming a 'cohesive, sovereign and independent country'. The nemesis of Ghana just like several African countries, was excessive dependence on one commodity as her 'golden goose'¹. Kwame Nkrumah was born in 1909 the same year as Nigeria's iconic Chief Obafemi Awolowo, trained as a teacher at Achimota College in Ghana and then studied in the USA and in Britain. He led some West African organizations in London and returned to Ghana to assume a powerful position as General Secretary of the United People's Party in 1949 with a vociferous campaign for 'Self Government Now'. He led a continent-wide crusade for the liberation of African colonies, he was a firm supporter of the British Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of African Unity. He became Leader of Government Business in the first indigenous government in 1951, and earned political independence for Ghana on 6 March 1957 and republican status on 1 Jul 1960. Nigeria lacked a national hero like Nkrumah who stood clearly taller than his peers in the sub-region² (Otoghile Aiguosafile & Obakhedo Neville Onebambhri; 2011).

Coincidences recur persistently in the history, the society, the politics, sometimes the economy and the growth process of most African countries especially Ghana and Nigeria. Both countries are multi-tribe, multi-lingual and multi-cultural. Ghana being more compact, smaller and less cumbersome than Nigeria,

made early strides in buoyancy of aggressive and purposeful leadership through the talented and bold forays of Dr Kwame Nkrumah into national, regional and continental politics. He spent the immediate years following Ghana's independence in presenting a strong voice for African unity by such demands as he presented to 32 African heads of state in Addis Ababa on 24 May 1963 in a most moving, passionate and forceful speech pleading for African unity³.

"It is said, of course, that we have no capital, no industrial skill, no communications, and no internal markets, and that we cannot even agree among ourselves how best to utilise our resources for our own social needs. Yet all stock exchanges in the world are preoccupied with Africa's gold, diamonds, uranium, platinum, copper and iron ore.

Our capital flows out in streams to irrigate the whole system of Western economy. Fifty-two per cent of the gold in Fort Knox at this moment, where the USA stores its bullion, is believed to have originated from our shores. Africa provides more than 60% of the world's gold.

A great deal of the uranium for nuclear power, of copper for electronics, of titanium for supersonic projectiles, of iron and steel for heavy industries, of other minerals and raw materials for lighter industries – the basic economic might of the foreign powers – come from our continent.

Experts have estimated that the Congo Basin alone can produce enough food crops to satisfy the requirements of nearly half the population of the whole world, and here we sit talking about gradualism, talking about step by step.

Are you afraid to tackle the bull by the horn? For centuries, Africa has been the milch cow of the Western world. Was it not our continent that helped the Western world to build up its accumulated wealth?"

Fifty years thereafter, Africa still remains the poorest continent by far in the world and is as divided and as helpless as ever.

The motley of economic, legal, social and political complexities of post-independence years was as serious as to render the regional and continental ambitions of Nkrumah as futile although much of the complications can be said to be self-inflicted. It should be recalled that Nkrumah not only trained as a teacher but attended Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, USA. He 'spoke in African-American Churches, was influenced by famous black movements including the African Students Association, the Universal Negro Improvement Association and the Commonwealth African Affairs'. Subsequently he joined the Fifth Pan African Congress³, was described as 'the great crusader of African unity' by Nwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania Solomon Dersso⁴;

The question often arises, what was Nkrumah's motivation for his tenacious pursuit of African unity. Olaosebikan surmises some causes;

- (a) the wealth and power of the USA and, a leading expositor of African nationalism and pan-Africa for political unification,
- (b) his association with George Padmore⁵, a leading expositor of African nationalism and pan-Africa for political unification.

Julie Owono; Cameroonian journalist⁵, it was who said 'the power is fragile like an egg; when you hold it too tightly, it breaks, when you hold it too loosely it falls' quoting an Akan proverb in Ghana. Her ultimate conclusion was that 'Africa just doesn't work well' but it was probably because the countries were ravaged by their colonizers prior to independence during centuries of slavery and colonialism. David Lamb⁶ disagreeing, (1987:284) posits that 'Ghana was brought to its knees after independence by its own leaders, men who pillaged with unabashed thoroughness.....'. The acerbic criticism of African leaders seems on target but there was the possible mollifying factor that the colonialists were too busy living an opulent life segregated from the natives such that the only role models available for indigenous political elite to mimic were the white overlords. The very tendency to impose the white culture and practice amidst a learning but largely uneducated people would only produce a product of 'deluded hybrids' as appropriately depicted by Prof E A Ayandele in his 'The Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society' 1974, Ibadan University Press. In any case the relationships between the colonialist and indigenes was one of 'cat and mouse', a distrustful and insincere one. Many colonialists were negrophobic – Dr Hunt as leader of the Anthropological Institute in London alongwith R F Burton, T J Hutchinson and Winwood Reade wrote a paper on 17 Nov 1863 'On the Negro's place in History'⁷not only has the Negro Race never

civilized itself, but it has never accepted civilization.With the Negro, as with other races of man, it has been found that the children are precocious, but that no advance in education can be made after they arrive at the age of maturity, they still continue mentally children.....the reflective faculties hardly appear to be at all developed.....the Negroes have been for thousands of years the uncivilized race which they are at this moment....

Another significant feature of both countries is their relative pacificity and fortitude. Measuring from the restiveness capacity of Nigerians during the civilian regimes, Nigerians tend to be more politically assertive (Dike 1976)⁸ concluded that ‘....Nigerians are traditionally a democratic people expecting to follow the rule of law, freedom of citizens and the application of checks and balances’. Opinions are pushed through the pages of newspapers ineffectually and in silent banter, in offices and street corners, in cabs and in schools. A Ghanaian journalist, Esselfie Conduah said the great thing about Ghanaians is that they are ‘never violent’ even if the situation seems to call for violence⁹ (David Lamb p285).

Both countries suffered enormously from the effects of currency devaluation. Over a fourteen-year period, Ghana devalued its currency seven times. In any case the Structural Adjustment Programme unleashed into many African countries procured nothing but wanton misery and poverty in virtually all its client countries.

A major feature of the two countries is self-aggrandizement tending towards megalomania, Kwame Nkrumah started off brilliantly, he was described as possessing ‘extra-ordinary energy, idealism and patriotism’ (David Lamb,p 287) he fervently campaigned for self-government ‘he was a handsome charismatic figure’ whose vision of black consciousness was instrumental in independence movements in Africa and ‘in influencing civil rights initiatives as far away as the United States’. He was called ‘the Hero of the Revolution’, Africa’s Man of Destiny’ (Salawu Adewuni West African Nationalism Rediscovered carletan.ca/Africanstudies/...West African-Nationalism-rediscovere.pdf). However, sooner than later, suppressive and repressive ruthlessness and intolerance set in. To pursue his dreams for national and international greatness, great sums, much of it in foreign aid, were lavished.....’ more than \$16million was spent on a conference hall to host a single meeting of the Organisation of African Unity, \$9million went for a showcase highway that was only a few miles long and usually deserted, \$8million for a State House, \$17million for a drydock. Within seven years 1958-65, foreign reserves of \$481million had turned into a \$1billion debt’. He jailed his opponents and made himself life president, he reduced the parliament to a single party rubber stamp, passed the Preventive Detention Act in 1958 permitting the imprisonment of dissidents for five years without trial. Under that law, the prominent lawyer and nationalist Dr J B Danquah¹⁰ died in detention in Feb 1965. Nkrumah developed a ‘strange love for absolute power’ wrote Col Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa, one of the leaders of the 1966 coup, (a Brigadier in the Army, he was Chairman of the Presidential Commission 1969-70. Afrifa was executed along with 2 other former Heads of State and several top functionaries for corruption in Jun 1979 under the J J Rawlings’ regime).

Nigeria is the most populous black African country with over 250 ethnic groups and over 400 languages and a population (often disputed) of 170million people. It contains the good, the bad and the ugly, full of contrasts and contradictions (Lamb 299). It has a rich cultural history, It was the black Africa’s biggest hope which soon dissipated into disappointment as ‘in the first sixteen years of independence there were three coups d’etat, the assassination of two heads of state, and one civil war that claimed one million lives’ (Lamb 301). Nigeria is acclaimed as Africa’s biggest economy and the world’s fourth largest democracy; it is reeling in developmental twists and turns.

Politically there was inherent hope but ultimate and intense despair. All the hopes for glory after independence appear to have fizzled and faded. One set of politicians and the elite after another succeeded in an orgy of mismanagement, misdirection, mischief-making on the platform of tribalism, sectionalism, bland egoism and sit-tightism. A lot of the happenings in Nigeria were similar to those in Ghana but the latter was lucky that the scale of malfeasance was much smaller just as the territory and people of Ghana were much sparser than Nigeria’s. The comparison of Ghana and Nigeria’s early political years shows such similarities that evoke the semblance of ‘identical twins’ (Les Leba Lesleba@hotmail.com, Lesleba@yahoo.com). The inference here is the occurrence of substantive

similarity of physical, emotional and behavioural likelihood of duplicated history. Les Leba's reference was to both countries' genetic brotherhood traits including being:

- The two most important British West African colonies post-1884/5 Berlin Conference,
- Being surrounded on three sides each by francophone countries and southwards by the Atlantic Ocean,
- Being beleaguered by multiple nationalities, culture and languages,
- Having shared virtually identical, political parliamentary history pre-and post independence, both cut short by military incursion,
- Both are basically agricultural countries striving to shift towards modernization and industrialisation,
- Both went through tortuous Structural Adjustment Programmes induced by foreign creditors leading to intense devaluation of currency and acute degradation of economic and socio-political life. Both had to deal with gruesome political transitions attended by phenomena of misgovernance and corruption with various disruptive implications especially in relation to Nigeria, both underwent severe inflation, foreign exchange rate free-fall and external debt profile,
- Both countries made significant impact on peace-making operations in West Africa, Nigeria made memorable interventions towards liberation movements in South Africa, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe,
- Both countries engaged in healthy competitive sporting events especially football, athletics, cricket, hockey against each other, each won two world boxing crowns and FIFA Youth Championships for a few years,
- Both countries have shown reciprocal temperamental tantrums attempting to solve perceived economic problems by expelling nationals of the other country in a massive and wanton manner, fortunately, both countries did not go to war,
- both countries had merchant fleets in shipping and aircraft, both the Ghanaian Black Star Line and Ghanaian Airways; and the Nigerian National Shipping Lines and the Nigerian Airways went totally moribund leaving the nagging issue of debts and terminal benefits to employees unresolved for years (Les Leba, Illesleba@hotmail.com),
- The first university institutions for both countries were established following the Eliot Commission set up by the British Government in 1943 in response to relentless agitation by nationalists in both countries. Thus Ibadan and Legon were the pioneer universities for Nigeria and Ghana respectively, initially set up as Colleges of London University but later became full-fledged Universities, Legon in 1961, Ibadan 1962,
- The pioneer activists for both countries started in the profession of journalism (especially Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe who started his career publishing daily papers in Ghana) and law,

STRATEGIC VISION: NIGERIA and GHANA

A comparison of both countries would perforce entail reference to the yeoman's initiative of Ghana's pioneer leader towards a distinctive recognition and the promotion of the African race, people and concept. Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah was a veritable asset to Britain, indeed 'Ghana supplied Britain with more capital than any other colony, except Malaya'. It was recorded that by 1955, Ghana's overseas reserves stood at 208 million pounds, so impressively that 'the colonies were lending money to the colonial power'¹¹. In 1958, manufacturing contributed only 1.8% of the GDP, cocoa 50-75%. By 1961, there was balance of payment of fifty-three million pounds, five years later the country was in debt. Kwame Nkrumah wallowed in over-confident self-isolation, he got his troops well trained in Sandhurst, in Mons, Aldershot just as Nigerian troops.

In comparison to Ghana's passionate promotion of African liberation through Kwame Nkrumah, Nigeria was saddled with a pacific, ambiguous, conservative regime led by former school teacher Alhaji Tafawa Balewa. Balewa was noted for a dreary and prosaic pro-Western governance. He was identified with primordial pro-northern region agenda especially compatible with directions laid by the more powerful

leader of his party (the Northern People's Congress) Sir Ahmadu Bello. Nigeria was notorious for tending towards a blatant pro-British policy internationally. The plan to inaugurate a Britain/Nigeria Defence Pact was almost enacted under his watch in 1961. It was widely opposed and subsequently scuttled by a stridently widespread opposition led by Students of Nigeria's premier Ibadan University College as well as civil society groups.

There were some flashes of some vigour in Balewa's foreign policy as shown when It 'defied Britain to champion the expulsion of South African from the Commonwealth' (1961) and when it broke diplomatic relations with France over that country's nuclear testing in the Sahara¹². Osaghae (p 51-2) summarized Balewa's foreign policy tepidity, '.....the regime lacked the progressive or radical orientation required to play these roles'. On apartheid South Africa, for example, Nigeria was one of the few countries in the continent which favoured dialogue with the Pretoria regime (it surprised other Africans by inviting South Africa to its independence celebration) although it never had a consistent policy on the matter' p.52. This flip-floppism was happening at a time that President Nkrumah of Ghana¹³ was in shrilling demands for a United States of Africa. Thus 'anti-Nkrumahism' was a 'major theme of Nigeria's foreign policy in the first republic.. Military Rule.

The military was originally an isolated part of the society, removed in terms of occupation (violence)¹⁴, training which was usually in specific and distant institutions, removed from civilian vicinity (the training institutions), culture of strict regimentation and ostracisation from society (barracks and training institutions and shooting ranges are usually deliberately far from civilian habitations). Nonetheless, there were attractions of sparkling uniforms, attractive drills and formations, shiny boots and epaulets, shrilly barking of orders, the very concept of orderliness, synchrony and conformity were alluring to many school leavers and citizens. The miscreancy of the political class and the tendency to get the military involved and attracted to civilian political disputes and the take-over contagion in Africa and elsewhere, all helped to draw the military away from their isolated cocoons into the boardroom and desks of ministerial and bureaucratic offices thus abandoning their calling and seizing what was not theirs. The ultimate effect was to transform the military into the commanding heights of state governance. In Babangida's regime, the military secured numerous sectoral privileges in terms of salary and grade placements, unusual gifts of cars, welfare insurance scheme, diplomatic postings for retired soldiers as well as appointments into governing councils and board directorships. They became part of the 'elite of power' and 'the most privileged occupational group in the country'¹⁵ (Bayo Adekanye:1993); Military Occupation and Social Stratification; University of Ibadan Inaugural Lecture.

It is usually adjudged that the performance and the influence of the Nigerian military has been 'extremely negative...'...¹⁶ (Jibrin Ibrahim; 2003). The credo of the military in Nigeria just as in Ghana was militarism and centralisation, the long period of military rule 'has destroyed Nigeria's federalism'; what were not added were the civil war and its aftermaths including the Structural Adjustment Programme and intensity of the Parkinson's Law causing a fiercely furious expansion of the bureaucracy at all levels including multiple bodies under government security apparatus (under General Abacha were created the offices of the National Security Adviser, Chief Security Officer, Special Strike Force, Directorate of Military Intelligence, Defence Intelligence Agency, the Brigade of Guards, National Intelligence Agency. Some of these teams sent some staff to politically and ideologically weird countries like Korea and Libya for training as sharp shooters trained to kill and to facilitate some subsequent extra-judicial killings and state-sponsored assassinations in Nigeria, (Jibrin Ibrahim, *ibid*, p26). Peter Ekeh reinforced this occurrence by his finding that 'Nigeria's military heads of state cannot rely on their own forces for protection, leading to the shameful employment of mercenary foreign security forces for their more secure protection' (Ekeh Peter, 2012; Theory and Cause of Military Rule and the Transition Program; http://www.waado.org/Nigerian_scholars/native/opinion/theory/html

Up to the late 90s, the military has been 'a mainstay of the political landscape of Nigeria and Ghana'¹⁷ Oligie, Ndidi Clement' Nov 2011 p 96. The military always had a plethora of reasons for take-over and offered remedial promises and indications for resumed democratization and a return to democratic civilian rule (Gowon first promised a six-month restoration of civil rule but reneged on this ultimately (Oligie p92). One major feature of military rule was the tendency for centralized administration

compatible with its unified command, this would involve a zero-tolerance for dissension from groups or individuals of any kind. In any case the military always jealously guarded their monopoly of the instruments of coercion and their claims as a nationalistic, apolitical and a corrective by-stander (Gen Ibrahim Babangida for instance turned the country 'into a political laboratory' for all kinds of political experiments (Oligie p.103). In any case, the military soon became part rather than the solution to inherited problem as summarized thus:

"by the time of the last handover of power to civilians in 1999, the generality of the people In Nigeria had become disenchanted with military rule largely because of its overall noxious impact to the polity. It had entrenched a culture of violence, authoritarianism, massive corruption in high and low places and left behind a depressed and prostrate economy through ineptitude, instability and impious experimentation..... it also bequeathed to the nation ethno-religious crises and a badly ruptured polity- consequence of the divide and rule tactics of some military rulers" (Ajayi; 2003-130). This censorious declaration is applicable to virtually all West African military governed states (ibid p96).

17. Oligie Ndidi Clement Nov 2011; *A Comparative Analysis of the Problems of Post-Military Rule in Nigeria and Ghana 1992-2011*, p. 96

Military rule was usually designed, perfected and effected by a group of military officers (sometime with external civilian support) with a pre-determined will to move the nation in another direction away from prevailing status. It is usually a presumption of the military that they should perform a national and patriotic obligation to salvage their country from some perceived rot. That rot is usually a motley of sharp complaints varying from inefficiency, corruption, to political squabbling on top of ethnic division. Their justification, programme and ideology are usually unleashed after a successful overthrow of the existing regime. It is usually a bloody and violent incursion often involving many lives of co-soldiers presumed to be actual or potential enemies of the 'revolution'. This violent method of change has been in use world-wide for ages, the first series on the African sub-continent occurred thus:

Country	Coup Date	Coup Leader	Overthrown
Benin	Oct 28 1963	Xtopher Soglo	Hubert Maga
Burkina Faso	Jan03 1966	Saingoule Lamizana	Maurice Yameogo
Chad	Apr 13 1975	Noel Milarew Odinga	Franscois Tombalbaye
Cote d'Ivoire	Dec 24 1999	Robert Guel	Henri Kenan Bedie
Gambia	Jul 22 1994	Yahya Jammeh	Dawda Jawara
Ghana	Feb 24 1966	Arthur Ankrah	Kwame Nkrumah
Guinea	Apr 3 1984	Joao Bernardo	Veira Luis Cabral
Guinea-Bissau	Nov 14 1980	Lansana Conte	Louis Lansana Beavoani
Liberia	Apr 12 1980	Staff Sergeant K Sam Doe;	Pres William R Tolbert Jnr
Mali	Nov 19 1968	Moussa Toure	Modibo Keita
Mauritania	Jul 10 1978	Mustapha Ould Salek	Moktar Ould Daddah
Niger	Apr 15 1974	Seyni Kountche	Hamani Diori
Nigeria	Jan 15 1966	Chukuma K Nzeogwu	Abubakar T Balewa
San Tome&P	Aug 15 1995	Mamel Quintas	de Almeida Miguel Trovouda (6days)
Sierra Leone	Mar 21 1967	David Lansana	Siaka Stephens
Togo	Jan 13 1963	Etienne Eyadema	Sylvanus Olympio

Source: Chidume Chukwudi G; 2003; *Military Coups in West Africa: the African "Phenomenon" That is Self-Inflicted; International Affairs & Global Strategy*, vol15, ISBN 2224-8951 Online pp 61-63.

Gross disunity on the part of the political and capital-holding classes, bitter dispute and direct sustained ideological and semantic confrontation among the known parties and leaders, are some of the causations, others are the temptation by emergent leaders, successor to the departed, to grab possession and power-wielding, has led to many African leaders following the Nkrumah example- passing a Preventive Detention Act within 12 months of independence and using it to inflict detention and peremptory incarceration on current and previous political activists, restructuring such as to absorb pressures such as

component tribe- representation through quota system and such-like discriminatory practice to aim at some ethnic balancing.

Solutions to protracted economic and socio-political crises only helped to exacerbate, not alleviate the structure and process of the conflict. Despotic restructuring of institutions usually resulted in weakening rather than strengthening institutions inherited prior to military rule. For instance after Nkrumah had settled into authoritarian proclivity, he passed the Chieftaincy Act of 1961 reducing the 'traditional leaders' powers and having himself nicknamed as the Osagyefor meaning 'the Redeemer' as part of the egoistic centralization of power.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION, GHANA AND NIGERIA

Ghana formerly known as the Gold Coast was a prominent part of the West African coast-line which attracted first the Portuguese who engaged in the gold trade intensely alongside the 'export trade in Saharan copper and salt' ref http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHome/age/republic/polit_hist.phys. Political History of Ghana, 12/30/2015. Various Committees of Merchants governed the country between 1751 and 1822 when it was made a Crown Colony under Sierra Leone. It was declared as a Crown Colony under the British in 1874. It is essential to note significant achievements of Kwame Nkrumah as leader of Ghana between 1946 and Feb 24 1966 when he was overthrown by the military:

--with foreign loans Nkrumah's government constructed an Aluminium Sheet- Casting and Rolling Plant in Accra,

--Upon returning to his country in 1946, he launched a sustained campaign for immediate independence for Ghana and for African countries following after the successful 1947 independence agitation by Mahatma Gandhi of India,

--'Nkrumah helped to have a successful harnessing of Ghana's immense natural wealth'. David Lamb insists that 'at independence, Ghana was the world's largest producer of cocoa and the world's largest exporter of manganese' 19, Lamb ibid p 284

--There was an acute orgy of a flip-side to the glorious achievements of Kwame Nkrumah:

Ghana (and Nigeria) were intensely plagued by widespread corruption, conspicuous consumption, indisciplined and egoistic leadership. There was a supposed 'connection between narcotics dealers and politicians'. Institutional failing was manifest in the weakness of the Judiciary. Parliament was dissolved sequel to each military coup in 1966, 1972, 1979 and 1981. To David Lamb, 'Ghana was brought to its knees after independence by its own leaders, men who pillaged with unabashed thoroughness'. For many, what mattered was not that Ghana prospered and grew, but that they got their cut, deposited in European bank accounts. One head of state alone, Gen Ignatius Kuku Acheampong was accused of-and later executed- for amassing an overseas fortune of \$100million. The Cocoa Marketing Board was unable to account for half of its foreign exchange earning between 1975 and 1979. 'The ruling politicians flew scores of Mercedes-Benzes into Ghana for personal use (cost \$110,000 plus shipping charges) and squandered so much money that soon there was no more foreign exchange' (Lamb 284-285). By the late 70's Ghana had been stripped bare, cannibalized like a car whose working parts had been stolen by thieves.

Nkrumah who was ascribed with 'extraordinary energy, charm, idealism and patriotism often, referred to himself as The Redeemer, passionately pleaded for Ghana's transformation from agriculture to manufacturing. His passion and efforts proved unavailing. The variety of disgusting orgies of misgovernance in Ghana of the 70's was infectious to Nigeria and many African countries also contemporaneously ruled by military coupists. The Nigeria coupists and militarists were more rapacious starting from the 70s having been emboldened by the Oil Resource boom after the successfully-fought Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70 alongside a massively weakened federalism. The mono-product economy²⁰ was a part of the colonialists' legacy but it was no more than a negative retardant to the affected countries.

The mutual separateness of Ghanaian economy and trade also afflicted Nigeria and other African countries. There are multiple reasons hindering intra-African trade including 'political tension, conflict and violence' which themselves procured a fragile and low level of economic growth, infrastructural

deficiencies causing diminished economic growth and productivity, broader issues entailing bad customs environment and the absence of economic diversification and lack of inter-regional trade.

Nigeria's export to the ECOWAS region which averaged about 7% of its total exports between 2001 and 2006, plummeted to 2.3% in 2010...the share of manufacturing in Nigeria's total exports to the ECOWAS region climbed from 1% in 2001 to 5.4 plunged to nearly nothing in 2009 and 2010 to less than 0.5 in 2010. David Lamb puts it blandly "Trapped by its colonial past differences, divided by political and cultural differences, isolated by the absence of an intra-communications system, each country is little more than a haphazardly placed economic pocket, neither related to nor dependent on its neighbours. As a group of three or two major regional communities, Africa could have great economic system. As fifty –one separate entities it has virtually none"(Lamb p 289),

During the military phases undergone by Ghana in 1966-69, 1972-78-79, 1981-82, and Nigeria 1966-79, 1983-99, there was a motley of experimentations in constitution –making and democracy trials. Ultimately, the two countries settled for electoral multi-party democracy during the 90's till date. The Nigerian transition expectedly carried an intensely complex and multi-faceted drama, twists and turns, machinations, manipulation to achieve a contorted transition. In attestation of the multiple twist and turns, the Babangida regime's sneakiness and unpredictability earned the title of 'Evil Genius' which he gave himself apart from the title of the 643-page book "Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society" A Kirk Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran edited by Lary Diamond, A Kirk Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran and published by Vintage Publishers in Ibadan, Nigeria in 1997.

The task of constitution and democracy –construction and re-construction has never proved easy or straight-forward for African military regimes. Just as the colonialists did not quite plan to definitely surrender power, soldiers in fact never planned to self-evict from most African countries – the successor indigenous elites did not plan to cede or transfer power either. Rather each of them dug their boots into government houses and tried to outclass their predecessors in their capacity to monopolise, to flaunt and to cherish raw, ruthless power. The bug of sit-tightism caught on Kwame Nkrumah who proclaimed a Preventive Detention Act within a year of his country's independence locking up prominent opposition and his former co-activists into indefinite incarceration. He went on to proclaim Ghana as a one-party state under himself between 1964 and his overthrow in 1966.

Another item of synergy was the concept of first lady title being simulated by the wives of heads of state and (in Nigeria), state governors' and local government chairmen's wives. This was prominent in Ghana and in Nigeria. The Nigerian case was more prominent especially starting with Ibrahim Babangida 1985-1993 whose wife Maryam, cut out a distinct image of a debonair, smooth-talking, charismatic and multi-project initiator using her substantial charm and poise to woo the women folk around various projects. The projects entailed or attracted her consuming many multi-million state-funded ventures requiring her to maintain offices, personnel, infrastructures, travelling to states and local governments through the country. It needed her dishing pronouncements on the projects, going over the Head of State and of State Governors and state and federal bureaucracies, thus wives of state governors and local government chairmen became prominent and constant visitors and beneficiaries of Government House and Offices. There were apprehensions that J J Rawlings was planning the instiallation of his wife as Ghanaian President, but such remained a piece of speculation ref Ekeh Peter; 2012; Theory and Curse of Military Rule and the Transition Program; http://www.waado.org/Nigerian_scholars/archive/opinion/theory/tml. These superstructural operations were not subject to any formal scrutiny or restraint nor the possibility of public accountability, it was near-impossible to query the content and appropriateness of the conduct of Her Excellencies the first ladies. In no time at all this wanton innovation spread to Local Governments. It is only in recent times with the advent of Muhammed Buhari that Nigeria seems about to dispense with the free-spending and conspicuous consumption spree of first ladies. The current Head of State has deliberately subsumed the office thus far.

The concept of charismatic populism introduced into Ghana by Jerry Rawlings became somewhat of a model in West Africa copied by popular leaders including Murtala Muhammed of Nigeria, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, Samuel Doe of Liberia.

The demise of Ghanaian and Nigerian economies which reached their climaxes in the 80s can be traced to the Structural Adjustment Programme whose roots started soon after independence in 1957 and 1960 respectively. Analysts and experts depicted an international bureaucracy networked by the Western nations whose ultimate aim was to humble and level down the burgeoning vibrancy of West African mono-product economies. The dynamics of the fate of Cocoa in the world market is instructive; Ghana, Nigeria and Ivory Coast were amongst the largest world producers of the commodity. The task of fixing the price of this commodity meant taking and implementing instructions ineluctably from the IMF and the World Bank for which de Rivero declared that it was like the TNA, 'there is no alternative' de Rivero 21 p 133. All of the underdeveloped countries are today at the mercy of the transnational aristocracy and dominated by doctrine..... After 20 years of undergoing an ideological experiment (SAP), Africa has entered the new millennium as a continent full of dysfunctional national economies out of sync with global economy'. Some have tried to re-schedule and a few like Nigeria did a huge pay-off. All still remain in debt and its shackles.

The contrast between charismatic Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria is far-reaching. Rawlings started his entry into Ghanaian politics by a cruel shock treatment, immediately recoiled by fulfilling his hand-over promise after three months. On the contrary, Babangida toyed and sifted with Nigeria's feeling, shifting position on virtually all topics altering, waving, repelling and antagonizing the political and the middle classes. For Nigeria, a protracted military rule has procured pervasive arbitrariness, into the entirety of the society and has weakened and debased the federal structure.

The saga of successive turmoil which Ghana and Nigeria underwent were largely similar and intense; consolidation of independence, creating a democratic culture, setting up a working bureaucracy, tackling the issue of national integration and development, using available natural, physical and human resources to modernize and develop, trying to stand tall in the region, on the continent and in the world system, trying to achieve sustainable relevance and capacity for the citizenry within a short space of time. The events that characterize Nigeria's transition are multiple and complex, a congeries of events that were premeditated alongside others that were fortuitous and accidental. Regime change has procured intense institutional, structural and policy changes particularly because there is a scant presence of institutional or organizational semblance of stability in the Nigerian state. Heads of states, ministries, parastatals, and of local governments are constantly swept away and substituted at random thus giving room to endless discontinuity and disjointedness and an ever-present succession crises and inordinate ambitions in government offices. These help to fuel the widespread disgruntlement stemming from a nation lacking in the most basic form of cohesion and unity as majority and minority tribes battle for supremacy and superiority. The resultant chaos and acrimony tend to produce the finding by Osaghae:

"Harmony, cooperation and unity have manifestly not characterized social and political life in post-independence Nigeria". *ibid* p 15.

The same Author saw the debacle of Nigeria's fate as resulting from mismanagement of the national economy, itself attributed to regime instability, the disablement of rational planning and deployment of resources by centrifugal politics, primitive accumulationist inclinations of state or pervasive corruption and the absence or ineffectiveness of institutions of oversight.

GHANA AND NIGERIA COMPARED

Ghana and Nigeria have passed through developmental socio-economic, and historical furnace. Both have swum through pleasant and odious vicissitudes. Both have hosted brutal emotions, fast-decision military and ruinous kleptocratic regimes in civilian and military garments. Both have passed through gruesome and tortuous international and local indebtedness, poverty and dependence. In recent years, Ghana is joining Nigeria as an oil-producing country, having learnt various lessons – from erstwhile profligacy and the repercussions of staying as a mono-product economy.

CONCLUSION

The fate of Ghana and Nigeria appears to depend on various factors:

The question arises, is democracy a prerequisite for development? Is federalism a must for Nigeria? Some analysts see democracy as necessary for development, others see the reverse and argue that development brings democracy. The controversy is strengthened by the emergence of supposedly democratic countries that remain un-developed (especially in developing countries) and countries in which development has helped to sustain and strengthen democracy. The often quoted examples of the latter are the Asian Tigers especially Singapore, Malaysia and even China which have subsumed or relegated democracy but have achieved enormous development and modernization. A closeness is established between democracy and good governance thus affirming a relationship even if tenuous between the two.

The dreams of integration and African unity have remained a pipe dream as each country settles into its peculiar scourge of torment and crises usually internal and sometime with external input. Much of the concerns of African countries is how to deal with multitudinous layers of discontent, underdevelopment, unemployment, national unity and progress amidst the battle for sustainable and credible democracy. At the international level, the hopes for an integrated region of West African countries as a first step towards an African union has all but fizzled out although the African Union is trying to proceed with some integration effort through several economic ventures. In any case, the prospects for integration is severely limited by the fact that each of the countries in the ECOWAS sub-region is pre-occupied with such internal crises as to leave hardly any room for integration ambitions across their borders. The Union is also keeping the component countries on their toes by using the African Peer Review Mechanism (and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation) to assess and encourage the drive towards good governance. These assessment mechanisms help to complement the fine precedent already laid by the United Nations Development Programme's annual Human Development Index and other tools such as Transparency International. In virtually all of these, Ghana's performance consistently outshines Nigeria's distinctly.

In any case today's preoccupation is intra-country security, progress and development rather than serious international cooperation programmes. Most African countries including especially Ghana and Nigeria are intensely busy with survival strategies for which some greater co-action would be catalytic. The disincentive which is virtually always present is the truism that each of the two countries are bogged down with profound internal crises (especially Nigeria), that are engaging, distractional and enduring in nature. The Boko Haram insurrection and insurgency in Nigeria has outlived expectations and predictions and have kept the country engaged in a colossally expensive and tortuous war. The numerous items of prizes and advantages that could flow from inter-country amity is lost just as each country is battling to secure internal cooperation and unity.

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