



The Yom Kippur War In The Prism Of The Just War Theory

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ABSTRACT

The paper examined Yom Kippur war in the prism of the Just War Theory. The Yom Kippur war or the 1973 fourth Arabs Israeli war was fought from 6th to 29 October, 1973 by 10 Arabs nations against Israel. On October 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt having full hope of taking back their territories which they lost to Israel during the third Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Egyptian force and Syrian force launched an unannounced simultaneous surprise attack against Israel on Yom Kippur day, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. Intervention by international organisations, especially the United Nations Organisation, resulted to a cease-fire in October 25, 1973. The belligerents have reasons to justify their decisions for going into the war. The Just War Theory explains such reasons and why nations go into war as well as the justification of war. This paper discussed the Yom Kippur war in relation to the just war theory. The paper equally examined the role of international communities (especially US and Soviet Union) in the war. The paper established a link between the just war theory and the Yom Kippur war to ascertain the reason for the war. Finally, the paper discussed the aftermath of the war on Israel and the Arabs nations.

Keywords. Yom Kippur war, Just War Theory, Global Response

INTRODUCTION

The Yom Kippur war is equally refers to as the October War, the Ramadan War, the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the 10 against 1 war- i.e. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Cuba versus Israel war, or the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, and fourth of the Arab-Israeli wars. The war was initiated by Egypt and Syria on October 6, 1973, on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement). Incidentally, this war equally coincided with Ramadan, the sacred month of fasting in Islam, and the war lasted until October 25, 1973 (19 days). The war drew both the United States and the Soviet Union (cold war Lords) into indirect confrontation in defense of their respective allies of the world wars II. The intention was to diplomatically persuaded Israel to negotiate on a favourable terms to the Arab nations (Shazly, 2003, Rabinovich, 2017, Nte, 2020).

The 1973 Yom Kippur War was intended to be a revenge of the 1967 Six-Day War between the Arabs nations and Israel, during which the Israeli forces captured and occupied Arab territories including the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Israel's stunning victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 left the Jewish nation in control of territory four times its previous size. Egypt lost the 23,500-square-mile Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, Jordan lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Syria lost the strategic Golan Heights to Israel (Herzog, 1998, Rabinovich, 2004).

After the overwhelming victory of Israel over Egypt and Syria in the six day war in 1967, Israelis became increasingly relaxed. This exhilarated victory by Israel in the six days war resulted to growing level of anger and terrorism in countries around Israel. The incessant ominous threats from Egypt on Israel, resulted to delayed in peace talk.

Meanwhile, instead of the Arabs nations to seek for lasting peace and reconciliation with Israel, they looked for a way to avenge their perceived humiliation and defeat in the 1967 war. The defunct Soviet Union came into direct support of it allies (the Arabs nations). The Soviet Union ignited the war by pouring arms into the Arabs region of Egypt and Syria. Similarly, the US supported Israel with arms.

The Yom Kippur war was championed by Anwar el-Sadat when he emerged as the president of Egypt in 1970, and inherited the Egyptians crusade against Israel. As president, he intended to make peace to achieve stability and the recovery of the lost Sinai but the 1967 defeats informed him that the peace initiative would not be in the favour of Egypt (Rabinovich, 2004). Thus, Sadat conceived a secret plan to attack Israel again, with the intention of, even not being successful, Israel should be convinced that peace with Egyptians and other Arabs nations is paramount.

The above thoughts informed Awar el-Sadat to expel about 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972. He (Sadat) eventually opened a new diplomatic ties and relationship with Washington D.C. which was a key ally of Israel. The aim of this diplomatic channel with U.S was to promote mediatory role of U.S in any future peace talks. Sadat formed a new alliance with Syria and a concerted plan to attack Israel was negotiated by Syria and Egypt. How is the above war and the reasons for the war related to the just war theory?

Just war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought. The justification can be either theoretical or historical. The theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and the forms that warfare may or may not take. The historical aspect, or the “just war tradition,” deals with the historical body of rules or agreements that have applied in various wars across the ages. For instance, international agreements such as the Geneva and Hague conventions are historical rules aimed at limiting certain kinds of warfare which lawyers may refer to in prosecuting transgressors, but it is the role of ethics to examine these institutional agreements for their philosophical coherence as well as to inquire into whether aspects of the conventions ought to be changed. The just war tradition may also consider the thoughts of various philosophers and lawyers through the ages and examine both their philosophical visions of war’s ethical limits (or absence of) and whether their thoughts have contributed to the body of conventions that have evolved to guide war and warfare.

The Arabs nations may justified their reasons of going into the Yom Kippur war on the aftermath of the 1967 Six days war that gave some parts of their territories to Israel and also with the intention to brokered peace with Israel. Based on this introduction, this paper examined the Yom Kippur war from the angle of the Just War Theory.

METHODOLOGY

The paper is based on qualitative data collection which entails the review of Literatures to Survey published works by other authors. Qualitative research is expressed in words. It is used to understand concepts, thoughts or experiences, and to enable one to gather in-depth insights on topics that are not well understood. This paper is limited to literature review. Data for this study were mainly from secondary source (printed and published materials).

Overview of the Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur war which was the fourth Arab-Israeli war started on the 6th of October, 1973, at a time when the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) were off their duty posts in observance of Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), the only day in the year in which there are no radio or television broadcasts, shops close and transportation shuts down. The holiday fell on Saturday, October 6, 1973. This leakage propelled the Arab armies to launch a two-front grave attack Under “*Operation Badr*” on Israel from the north and the south. The Arabs nations made impressive advances over Israel with their up-to-date weaponry from the Soviet Union. Iraqi forces joined the war in support of Egypt, while Syria received tremendous support from Jordan to equally attack Israel. Egyptian forces and Syrian troop attacked Israel simultaneously on two major fronts on the afternoon of the 6th October, 1973. The surprise attack on Israel, gave initial advantage and victory to Egypt and Syria over Israel. Thus, the Egyptian military forces managed to cross the Suez Canal and capture the Bar Lev Line; a fortified sand wall on the east bank of the canal. This initial military success, which came to be known to Egyptians as *the crossing*, served as a sign of victory

after 25 years of defeat in the hands of their Jewish neighbour. Similarly, on the northern front line, three Syrian infantry divisions crossed the 1967 ceasefire line known as the **Purple Line**. And, two hours into the war, the Syrians gained their first significant victory when they captured Israel's Eye; a key Israeli vantage point 2,000m above sea level on top of Mount Hermon. Syrian forces were able to launch their offensive attack against Israeli positions and break through to the Golan Heights.

The Israeli losses were heavy and the course of the war seemed to lay squarely within Arab hands. But in less than 24 hours, Israel had mobilized two armoured divisions, which soon turned the Syrian advance into a retreat. The Israelis advanced, capturing territory deep inside Syria. As a result, units from the Iraqi, Saudi and Jordanian armies joined the fight on the Syrian front to face the counterattack. Still, the Israelis manage to achieve significant gains; advancing to within 35km of Damascus, and occupying new territories to bring to the bargaining table. (History.com; Nte, 2020).

The force and intensity of the Egyptian and Syrian combined forces on Israel Defence Force, which differs from the 1967 operations, lead to the decrease in Israel's stocks of ammunition and rapidly began to exhaust Israel's reserve stocks of arsenal. The shortage of ammunition, forced the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to solicit for aid from the United States, while the Israeli General Staff hastily improvised a battle strategy. At first, the U.S was reluctant to assist Israel. However, the reluctance of the United States to help Israel changed rapidly when the Soviet Union commenced fully, her resupply of weapons to Egypt and Syria. The United State President, Richard Nixon immediately established an emergency supply line to Israel amid the imposition of costly oil embargo by the Arab countries on various U.S. allies.

The support and reinforcements of Israel by the U.S, made the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to rapidly changed the rhythm of the war. Israel succeeded in disabling portions of the Egyptian air defence, which allowed Israeli forces commanded by Gen. Ariel Sharon to cross the Suez Canal and surround the Egyptian Third Army. On the Golan front, Israeli troops, at heavy cost, repulsed the Syrians and advanced to the edge of the Golan plateau on the road to Damascus. After several days, Israel was fully mobilized, and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) began beating back the Arab at a heavy cost to soldiers and equipment. A United State airlift of arms assisted Israel's forces. Though President Richard Nixon delayed the emergency military aid for a week as a tacit signal of U.S. sympathy for Egypt. On October 25, an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was secured.

Israel's victory over the Arabs' nation was secured at a heavy cost of casualties. The Israelis criticized the government's lack of preparedness. Due to this critics, the nation's Prime Minister, Golda Meir, resigned his position in April 1974. Although Egypt suffered another military defeat at the hands of its Jewish neighbour (the Israelis), the initial Egyptian successes greatly enhanced Sadat's prestige in the Middle East and gave him an opportunity to seek peace. In 1974, the first of two Egyptian Israeli disengagement agreements providing for the return of portions of the Sinai to Egypt were signed, and in 1979 Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the first peace agreement between Israel and one of its Arab neighbours.

The Yom Kippur war was a grave disaster to Syria. The unexpected Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire exposed Syria to military defeat, and Israel seized even more territory in the Golan Heights. On October 22 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 338, which called for an immediate end to the fighting; despite this, however, hostilities continued for several days thereafter, prompting the UN to reiterate the call for a cease-fire with Resolutions 339 and 340. With international pressure mounting, the war finally ceased on October 26. Israel signed a formal cease-fire agreement with Egypt on November 11 and with Syria on May 31, 1974. In 1982, Israel fulfilled the 1979 peace treaty by returning the last segment of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. In 1979, Syria voted with other Arab states to expel Egypt from the Arab League. Rather than reconciling themselves to existence, they looked for a way to avenge the humiliation of their defeat.

Both the USSR and the Americans (cold war super powers) began airlifting arms, including tanks and artillery, to their allies as their stockpiles began to run out. On October 16, 10 days after the start of the war, Israeli forces, under the command of Ariel Sharon, managed to penetrate Egyptian and Syrian defence lines and came within a shocking distance from Cairo, the Egyptian capital city. The

counterattack severely turned the tide of the war in favour of the Israelis, and the fighting came to a stalemate.

On October 17, the Arabs decided to use a different tactic (oil). The Arab oil-producing countries, under the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), decided to reduce their oil production by five percent (5%). They pledged to “maintain the same rate of reduction each month thereafter until the Israeli forces are fully withdrawn from all Arab territories occupied during the June 1967 War, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are restored”. The Arab countries enforced an embargo on the US, suspending oil supply. The reduction in oil production and supply led to major price hikes around the world, causing the US to reassess its support for the war.

Causes of the Yom Kippur War

The conditions that shaped the 1973 War were established six years prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur war. In June 1967, Israel launched a six-day attacks on Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and captured most of the territories that belong to these Arabs nations. The June War, remained historic as the Egyptian Sinai and the Golan Heights were taken over from Egypt and Syria respectively. In a matter of six days, the Israeli army delivered a huge set back to the forces of three Arab countries and occupied territory that was three and a half times its size. Six years after the 1967 victory of Israel over the three Arabs nations, Egypt and Syria decided to launch a two-front coordinated attack to regain the territory they lost in 1967.

Egypt's initial war objective was to use its military to seize a limited amount of Israeli-occupied Sinai on the east bank of the Suez Canal. This would provoke a crisis which would allow it to bring American and Soviet pressure to bear on Israel to negotiate the return of the rest of Sinai, and possibly other occupied territories, from a position of relative strength. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's publicly stated position was "to recover all Arab territory occupied by Israel following the 1967 war and to achieve a just, peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict".

Similarly, Syria intended to seize back some or all of the Golan and then negotiate its retention via great power pressure. Both Egypt and Syria expected that the use of the "oil weapon" would assist them in post-conflict negotiations, once their attacks had generated a reason for its use.

In January 1973, Anwar Sadat and Hafez al-Assad former heads of Egypt and Syria, concerted secret plans and agreed to align their military forces under one command in order to launch attack against Israel. Though with differing objectives.

Some of the reports and accounts of the Yom Kippur war claimed that the Egyptians motive of going into the war was not necessarily to retrieve the land from Israel, rather to seek for peace with Israel. Contrary to the Syrian motive of recapturing back the Golan Heights which was seized from them during the 1967 third Arabs Israel war.

The Role of the Cold War Super Powers in Fuelling the Yom Kippur War

The Soviets Union threw their weight behind the Arabs nations and wholeheartedly supported the Arab invasion politically and economically. Starting as early as October 9, they also began a massive airlift of weapons, which ultimately numbered 8,000 tons. The United States had given Israel some ammunition and spare parts, but it resisted Israeli requests for greater assistance. As the Soviets continued to pour weapons into the Arabs region, Kissinger decided that the United States could not afford to allow the Soviet Unions' allies to win the war against their allies (Israel). The secretary of state wanted to show the Arabs they could never defeat Israel with the backing of the Soviets. He also couldn't afford to let U.S. adversaries win a victory over a U.S. ally. The United States ensure Israeli victory by pouring arms to the IDF.

On October 12, Nixon ordered an emergency airlift (*Operation Nickel Grass*) to Israel. Cargo planes carrying spare parts, tanks, bombs, and helicopters flew round-the-clock to Israel. While the U.S. was resupplying Israel, the British under Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, imposed an arms embargo. This inhibited Israel's ability to get spare parts for its British-made Centurion tanks. Heath also denied the U.S. access to British bases in Cyprus to gather intelligence and would not allow British bases to be used to refuel or resupply Israel.

One positive outcome of the British policy was to stimulate the creation of Conservative Friends of Israel (Labour Friends of Israel was established in 1957). The resupply efforts were further hampered by Americas other NATO allies who, capitulating to Arab threats, refused to allow American planes to use their air space. The one exception was Portugal, which as a consequence became the base for the operation. Between October 14 and November 14, 1973, 22,000 tons of equipment were transported to Israel by air and sea. The airlift alone involved 566 flights. To pay for this infusion of weapons, Nixon asked Congress for and received \$2.2 billion in emergency aid for Israel.

The Role of International Communities in Ending the Yom Kippur war

The belligerent of the war, Arabs and Israel were ready and willing to accept a ceasefire deal toward the end of October. Estimates put the number of Israeli soldiers killed in the Yom Kippur war at 2,600 and 8,800 wounded, significantly larger in proportion compared with the Israeli population at the time, while Egypt was reported to have lost 7,700 men and Syria some 3,500.

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 338 on October 22, which called for a ceasefire and reaffirmed Resolution 242 passed in 1967, which called on Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied from the Arabs nations in 1967 third Arabs Israel war. Six days later, Israeli and Egyptian military leaders met to negotiate a ceasefire. It was the first meeting between military representatives of the two countries in 25 years. But the negotiations was strained as skirmishes continued over the confusion of the battlefield. The US then began intensive diplomatic efforts to secure disengagement agreements between Israel, Syria and Egypt, and offered them millions of dollars to reach such deals.

Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, flew from country to country in an effort to broker a peace deal, in what came to be known as *Shuttle Diplomacy* a new lexicon that had entered the realm of international politics. On Tuesday, November 6, Kissinger, flew in to Cairo for his first ever meeting with Sadat. Four days later, an initial agreement was signed guaranteeing daily convoys of non-military supplies to the city of Suez and the besieged Egyptian 3rd army. Four days later, prisoners from both sides were exchanged. As the New Year arrived, Kissinger returned to the region to hammer out the next step in his grand plan for Egyptian-Israeli disengagement. On January 11, 1974, he arrived in the southern Egyptian city of Aswan to meet Sadat. The next day, he left for Tel Aviv. Both sides accepted a disengagement agreement.

Meanwhile, the Israelis were still occupying a salient deep inside Syria, not far from the capital Damascus. So, in May 1974, Kissinger set out on his second round of shuttle diplomacy, this time between Damascus and Tel Aviv. After almost a month of hard talking, Kissenger managed to secure a second breakthrough in the region when, on May 28, Israel approved a disengagement agreement with Syria. It was signed in Geneva on June 5, bringing the War in October to an official end after days of fighting. Egypt and Syria regained a portion of their territory and UN buffer zones were established between them and Israel.

Outcomes of the Yom Kippur War

The end of the war saw the Arab countries managed to salvage their defeats after repeated defeats in the 1948, 1956 and 1967 wars with Israel. Within four years, in 1977, Sadat was in Jerusalem giving a speech of peace to the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. Then US President Jimmy Carter invited both Sadat and former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David, a country retreat for the US president near Washington, DC. The three leaders engaged in secret discussions over 13 days, leading to the signing of the Camp David Accords on September 17, 1978, which laid out conditions for an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and a framework for Israeli-Palestinian peace using Resolution 242. While the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed by March 1979 in Washington, DC, the framework never materialized for several reasons, although both sides laid blame on one another. The proposal was vague on the subject of Palestinian refugees, and the key issue – the status of Jerusalem. To the Palestinians, Egypt had placed its own interests first and put the Palestinian cause on the backburner. After normalizing relations with Israel, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, and all Arab countries broke diplomatic relations with Cairo. Jordan also signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1992, making Egypt and Jordan the

only two countries to have normalized relations with Israel, which continues to occupy the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, and a portion of the Golan Heights to this day.

The war did not immediately alter the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it did have a significant impact on the trajectory of an eventual peace process between Egypt and Israel, which culminated in the return of the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in exchange for lasting peace. The war proved costly for Israel, Egypt, and Syria, having caused significant casualties and having disabled or destroyed large quantities of military equipment.

Furthermore, although Israel had staved off any advance by Egypt to recapture the Sinai Peninsula during the war, it never restored its seemingly impenetrable fortifications along the Suez Canal that Egypt had destroyed on October 6.

A United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force established a buffer zone between the two armies. The Israel-Egypt agreement was supplemented by another, signed on September 4, 1975, that included an additional withdrawal of forces and the expansion of the UN buffer zone. On March 26, 1979, Israel and Egypt made history by signing a permanent peace agreement that led to Israel's full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and to the normalization of ties between the two countries.

The Just War Theory and the Yom Kippur War

The principles of a Just War originated with classical Greek and Roman philosophers like Plato and Cicero and were added to by Christian theologians like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Notion that the resort to armed force (*jus ad bellum*) is justified under certain conditions; also, the notion that the use of such force (*jus in bello*) should be limited in certain ways. Just war is a Western concept and should be distinguished from the Islamic concept of *jihad* (Arabic: striving), or holy war, which in Muslim legal theory is the only type of just war.

Historically, the just war tradition which is a set of mutually agreed rules of combat, may be said to commonly evolve between two culturally similar enemies. But when enemies differ greatly because of different religious beliefs, race, or language, and as such they see each other as "less than human", war conventions are rarely applied. It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people, sharing a moral identity with whom one will do business in following peace, that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve and what kind of relations should apply in the aftermath of war. The above view of Just War confirmed the stand of Egyptian president Anwar el Safat in the Yom Kippur War. Egypt initial plan was to go into the war for peace to be sustained between Israel and Egypt. However, the two nations were divided by their religious affiliations making it impossible for the just war traditions to be applied in the Yom Kippur war.

Partly, the motivation for forming or agreeing to certain war conventions, can be seen as mutually benefiting; preferable, for instance, to the deployment of any underhand tactics or weapons that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts, or the kinds of action that have proved to be detrimental to the political or moral interests to both sides in the past. Regardless of the conventions that have historically formed, it has been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that the lack of rules to war or any asymmetrical morality between belligerents should be denounced, and that the rules of war should apply to all equally. That is, just war theory should be universal, binding on all and capable in turn of appraising the actions of all parties over and above any historically formed conventions.

However, what is honourable is often highly specific to culture: for instance, a suicidal attack or defence may be deemed the honourable act for one people but ludicrous to another. This is explicit in the Islamic Holy War (*Jihad*). While the Arabs nations may justify attacks on Christians as holy, on the contrary, the Christian culture sees it as immoral. Robinson (2006) notes that honour conventions are also contextually slippery, giving way to pragmatic or military interest when required. What is honourable differ with culture, time and place.

In the political settings, justification of war still requires even in the most critical analysis a superficial acknowledgement of justification. On the ground, generals have extolled their troops to adhere to the rules, soldiers are taught the just war conventions in the military academies (through military ethics courses and through veterans' experiences). Despite the emphasis on abiding by war's conventions, war

crimes continue; genocidal campaigns have been waged by mutually hating peoples, leaders have waged total war on ethnic groups within or without their borders, and individual soldiers or guerrilla bands have committed atrocious, murderous, or humiliating acts on their enemy.

However, such acts do remain atrocities by virtue of the just war conventions that some things in war are deemed to be inexcusable, regardless of the righteousness of the cause or the noise and fog of battle. The unannounced attacks of the Arabs nations with sophisticated Soviet weaponry on Israel on Yom Kippur day may have violated conventional just war theory.

Peoples' justification of destructiveness and killing to whatever relative degree they hold to be justifiable triumphs over attempts to establish the laws of peaceful interaction into this separate bloody realm; and in some wars, people fighting for their land (as it was in the case of the Yom Kippur war) or nation prefer to pick up the cudgel rather than the rapier, as Leo Tolstoy notes in *War and Peace*, to sidestep the etiquette of war in favour of securing their land from occupational or invading forces. This was the remote cause of the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Israeli-Arabs War), which might justify the Just war theory.

The continued brutality of war in the face of conventions and courts of international law lead some to maintain that the application of morality to war is a nonstarter: state interest or military exigency would always overwhelm moral concerns. But there are those of a more sceptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can or should exist in war.

Just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war. From the just war (*justum bellum*) tradition, theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war (*jus ad bellum*) from those that govern just and fair conduct in war (*jus In bello*) and the responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war (*jus post bellum*). The three aspects are by no means mutually exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or situations.

Just war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought. The justification can be either theoretical or historical. The Just War theory specifies conditions for judging if it is just to go to war, and conditions for how the war should be fought.

In line with the above arguments, the Egyptian president El Sadat and his Syrian counterpart secretly initiated the Yom Kippur war for three main reasons based on their moral justification to go into war with Israel. Viewing the Arabs motives from the prism of the just war theory, they Arabs nations (1) saw Israel's victory in the 1967 war as humiliation; thus they went into the war to reclaim their status, (2) to reclaim their lost territories in the 1967 war from Israel and (3) to negotiate for lasting peace if not successful. Though defeated in the war, their motive of going into the war was achieved making it a Just War.

The Clause of the Just War Theory that Favours the Yom Kippur war

The just war theory though was largely a Christian philosophy that attempts to reconcile three things:

1. Taking human life is seriously wrong. In the 1967 war, human lives were taking.
2. States have a duty to defend their citizens, territory and defend justice. Similarly, it was the duty of the Arabs nations and Israel to defend their respective territories.
3. Protecting innocent human life and defending important moral values sometimes requires willingness to use force and violence. Forces were used by the Arabs nations and Israel to protect lives and territories.

The Just War Theory specifies conditions for judging if it is just to go to war, and conditions for how the war should be fought. The four most important conditions are similar to the motives of the belligerents are:

(1) The war must be declared openly by a proper sovereign authority (e.g. the governing authority of the political community in question). In the Yom Kippur war, it was the sovereign authorities of the Arabs nations that declares the war against Israel.

(2) The war must have a just cause (e.g., defence of the common good or a response to grave injustice). This is Explicit in the seizure of territories belonging to the Arabs nations by Israel. Egypt and Syria deemed it injustice against their nations for Israel to occupy their respective territories.

(3) The warring state must have just intentions (war must be waged for justice rather than for self-interest). The intention of the Arabs nation was to reclaim their lost territories from Israel.

(4) The aim of the war must be the establishment of a just peace. It was the initial intention of the Egyptian president to seek for peace, even unsuccessful in the war. The end of World War II added three other conditions:

(1) There must be a reasonable chance of success;

(2) Force must be used as a last resort; and

(3) The expected benefits of war must outweigh its anticipated costs.

The above clause of the just war theory reflects the intentions and the position of the Egyptians president Awar el Sadat for going into war with Israel nation on the Yom Kippur day.

Although the Just war theory was extensively developed by Christian theologians, it can be used by people of every faith and none (as it is argued in this paper). The aim of Just War Theory is to provide a guide to the right way for states to act in potential conflict situations. It only applies to states, and not to individuals (although an individual can use the theory to help them decide whether it is morally right to take part in a particular war). Just War Theory provides a useful framework for individuals and political groups to use for their discussions of possible wars.

The theory is not intended to justify wars but to prevent them, by showing that going to war except in certain limited circumstances is wrong, and thus motivate states to find other ways of resolving conflicts. 'Just', or merely 'permissible'? The doctrine of the Just War can deceive a person into thinking that because a war is just, it's actually a good thing. But behind contemporary war theory lies the idea that war is always bad. A just war is permissible because it's a lesser evil, but it's still an evil.

The above analysis reveals that both Israel and the Arabs nations justified their actions for engaging in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. While Egypt and Syria were humiliated in the 1967 six-days war in which Israel took over a significant part of their land, they deemed it justifiable to go into war with Israel to redeem their respective territories from Israel. Similarly, Israel deemed it necessary to go into the war in other to protect the citizen's life and to defend her territory.

CONCLUSION

The Yom Kippur war which was the fourth Arabs-Israel war was fought in 1973. The war was a two-front reprisal attack from Egypt and Syria on Israel to redeemed their territories and the perceived humiliation from Israel in the 1967 third Arabs-Israel war in which Israel within a six day war took over Sinai peninsula from Egypt and the Golan Height from Syria.

During the war, the two cold war lords (Soviet Union and USA) came in indirect confrontations as the Soviet Union supported the Arabs nations and the USA supports Israel. The war ended on October 25, 1973 as the parties to the war signed a cease-fire agreement. The 1973 Arabs Israel's war is connected to the Just War theory in that Egypt and Syria attended to justify the humiliation from the 1967 six day war in which they were defeated by Israel and also to recover their lost territories from Israel and as well sue for peace.

The proponents of the Just war theory emphasizes the justification of how and why wars are fought. The justification for war can either be theoretical or historical. The theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and the forms that warfare may or may not take. The historical aspect, or the just war tradition, deals with the historical body of rules or agreements that have applied in various wars across the ages. For instance, the Cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt.

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