



Addressing Corruption in the Nigerian Military Establishment

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria is currently bedeviled by the problem of Boko Haram insurgency and other ethno-religious conflicts which are ravaging the geopolitical zones of the country. The Nigerian armed forces have been playing significant roles in crisis management especially, the fight against insurgency in the country. This paper investigates the operations of the Nigerian armed forces in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents and these identities, their success and challenges. The modernization theory was adopted as the theoretical framework of analysis. Documentary method was adopted as the method of data collection and content analysis was employed as the method of data analysis. The paper found that the Nigerian armed forces have made significant achievement in the fight against Boko Haram and these groups as shown in the number of territories it has recovered from the insurgents. However, the paper is of the view that a lot still needs to be done as the insurgents have fought back on several occasions. The Paper also found that the Nigerian armed forces do not have adequate weapons to prosecute the war against insurgents. There are also reports of a third force within and outside the armed forces that sabotage the efforts of the armed forces. This third force are politically and financially exposed persons who are involved in corruption. The paper recommends adequate funding and monitoring of these funds of the armed forces to enable them purchase modern military equipments to fight the insurgents. The armed forces themselves should be motivated through training and adequate financial and material incentives. Finally, the federal government should fish out sponsors of Boko Haram and other groups in the country and punish them as provided by the law of the country.

Keywords; Armed force, Boko Haram, Insurgency, Ethno-religious identities & Politically & financially exposed persons.

INTRODUCTION

The funding of the military, especially the ongoing decade of counter insurgency operation, is generating heated controversy especially over who handles the money allocated to the Ministry as both the Ministry of defence (MOD) and the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) have repeatedly denied handling the money. While the former has washed its hands off the expenditure of the military, the ONSA, too, has done the same but some officials of the former have faulted the ONSA's claim.

In view of the above, critical sections of the populace have been asking questions about the funding of the ongoing counter insurgency operation which involves the military and all the security agencies such as the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Department of the State Security Services (DSS). The controversy came to the open when the *Leadership Weekend in 2014*, in a story published in one of its edition quoted a ministry source alleging that the ministry of

defence was not involved in the funding of the operation. The story further disclosed that the Presidency dealt directly with Service chiefs.

Another MOD official, who corroborated the story, explained that the funding of the counter insurgency operation is being handled by the office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). According to him, the MOD's involvement in the funding of the military is on paper, not real. It is on paper that the military receives its fund through the MOD that may have to do with the overheads but when you are talking of the real funding of the ongoing counter insurgency operation, the vote is allocated to the Office on the National Security Adviser. This is why the ministry is not aware of the purchase of any ammunition or any other thing that is needed for the operation. Some soldiers, SSS and policemen and officers according to the source left the country for the counter insurgency training in Germany. The MOD was not aware of it. Whatever they need is channeled to the NSA and all we are told is that some officers are traveling to some place.

In the area of purchasing, the *Leadership Weekend(2014)* had posed the puzzle who is in charge of the due process, verification, qualities, standardization, etc? By implication, ministries of interior, defence, and the police affairs are not directly involved in their capital expenditure, and the question is, who accounts for their purchases. What we are saying is that, each of these ministries not only the MOD, should be deeply involved in all their transactions for accountability.

Reacting to a story published by *TELL Magazine*, the then ONSA, in a statement issued and signed by the special adviser to the NSA on media and publicity, Mr. Karounwi, Adekunle, denied ever being involved in the funding of the military as reported. He said, our attention has been drawn to the false and misleading story published in *TELL magazine* of June 2, 2014, alleging that for some years now, defence funds have been under the management of the national security adviser instead of the ministry of defence where the funds were traditionally administered.

We state, clearly and unambiguously, that ONSA is separate from MOD in all budgetary affairs. The ONSA defends its budgets before the National Assembly and MOD does for its own. All budgetary provisions are clearly spelt out and within the public domain, ONSA has no responsibility for military personnel's salaries and allowances, capital projects or otherwise. All are within the domain of MOD. So, how can the ONSA be accused of managing defence funds. We request that, for any allegation from any source about ONSA, please recourse be made to the NSA for his own side of the story before publishing. There is need for a holistic and balanced report at all times.

But the findings of Transparency International (2017), BudGIT (2018) and Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption(2019) have contradicted the ONSA defence. From their findings, they were able to establish that the military is being poorly funded, some disagree and that the money passed by the National Assembly is being diverted or withheld by the Presidency. They even found out that military purchases some refurbished ammunition as a result of poor funding or mismanaging of the money allocated to it and that most of the contractors given jobs are recommended by the National Assembly members and the officials of the presidency and the ruling party.

The objective of this paper is to identify and discuss the major military corruption, the actors and cost implications on the polity. To achieve this objective, following the introduction is conceptualization of corruption. Theoretical framework of analysis and methodology follows. The analysis of cases, conclusion and recommendations follows.

Conceptualizing Corruption

Transparency International(Dixon & Raymond,2017), reiterated its position on the problem of corruption in military establishments across the globe, maintaining that corruption in military procurement was not peculiar to Nigeria, but a global challenge which undermines confidence in state institutions. A Senior Advisor with the TI, Mr. Ian Andrews, said corruption in military establishments has become dangerous, divisive and wasteful with far reaching consequences on the state. He, however, expressed confidence that the standard raised by Nigerian military institution based on the approaches adopted by the present leadership would restore confidence and reposition the nation's military for efficiency and effectiveness (2017). According to him,

What corruption is about today, it is not about exposing issues? It is not about us telling you what you need to do but we are here today to help you to understand the reasons and I learnt from the comments we had with officers. There is a great understanding to the challenge. It undermines the confidence and public trust in the constitution of the state and of the Armed Forces and it is wasteful because too much is spent on a lot of things which do not meet the needs of the Armed Forces(TI,2017,p2).

There have been different efforts to define corruption by many organisations, scholars and commentators. Ontologically the word corruption comes from the Latin verb “rumpere” meaning “to break”, which connotes the breaking of normal or societal norms or practices. Corruption is to make putrid, to taint, to rot, it means depravity, to defile, not genuine, much vitiated, dishonest, and venal (Eme,2015).

The word “corrupt” when used as an adjective literally means “utterly broken”. It was first used by Aristotle and later Cicero who added the terms bribe and abandonment of good habit. Corruption is a form of dishonest and unethical conduct by a person entrusted with a position of authority, often to acquire personal benefit (Aristotle ,1981) Khan sees corruption as an act which deviates from the rules of conduct governing the action of someone in a position of public authority because of private regarding motives such as wealth, power and status (Khan cited in Amundsen, 1996). Corruption could also be conceived as pervasion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour or depravity (Otite, 2000).

In a more holistic conceptualization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) vignettes corruption as an abuse of office or trust for private benefit: and is a temptation indulged in by not only public officials but also by those in positions of trust and authority in private enterprise or non-profit organizations (IMF, 1998). Transparency International observes corruption to be the use of entrusted power for private gain; and is classified as grand, petty and political depending on the amount of money lost and the sector where it occurs.

Akinwale (2012) believes that corruption is the abuse of public for private gain, dishonesty for personal gain, dishonest exploitation of power for personal gain, depravity, and extreme immorality. It connotes the abuse of public roles or resources or the use of illegitimate forms of political power and influence, by public or private parties. Larwal and victor (2015) described corruption as the biggest problem Nigeria has, and a bane to good governance, which has invariably translated into corrosive and geopolitical poverty among the citizenry. This is as result of the fact that the money that is supposed to be expended on social needs and infrastructures to engender development circulates among and within the few privileged and after, taken abroad for investment.

Nwakanma, (2003) explains that corruption is seen as illegal, unethical and often criminal acquisition of wealth or benefits by individuals whose main motive is ego bossing and self-aggrandizement with it attendant negative consequences on the rest of the society.

Transparency International (2009) for example, defines corruption as ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain,’ and it involves ‘behavior on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them’. The World Bank defines the phenomenon as ‘the abuse of public or corporate office for private gain’ The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act (2000) states that corruption includes bribery, fraud and other related offences.

While there may be some slight variations as to what truly constitutes corruption, it is generally agreed that corruption involves misuse of a position of trust and that it is motivated by direct or indirect gain to suspected perpetrators, their relatives or friends. Moreover, whereas some early scholars such as Leff () and Nye() in the field argued that corruption in poor economies like Nigeria can be ‘welfare enhancing’, empirical evidence suggests that corruption is far worse than this description, as it invariably impedes sustainable development, and thus disproportionately affects the economically and socially vulnerable, weakens the rule of law, erodes public trust in government, and permeates (and undermines) critical institutions of the state. Corruption can be harmful across national borders-regionally and internationally- and has been stated to undermine ‘economic development and political stability [of countries] while also being a threat to international peace and prosperity, as well as facilitating drug-trafficking, money laundering, and other international criminal activity’.

Theoretical framework of Analysis

This study is anchored on the Modernization theory of corruption. This theory was propounded by Lipset (1959), but Huntington (1968) viewed it from corruption perspective as reported in Adefulu (2007). The idea of modernization is relatively new. Its basic principles can be derived from 18th century Age of Enlightenment with the idea that people themselves could develop and change their society.

Modernization theory is used to explain the process of modernization within societies. It therefore refers to a model of a progressive transition from a traditional to a modern society. This theory also sees the character of a state's political system, the nature and rate of its socio-economic change as the major causes of political corruption. A major assumption of this theory is that as states reach a developed status, their corruption level will subside.

Huntington (1968) in Adefulu (2007) argues that the degree of corruption in a developing state is dependent upon;

i. The nature of the state's traditional society, and

ii. The nature of the state's political and economic modernization processes. He offers that "corruption is one measure of the absence of effective political institutionalism".

Huntington further states that corruption varies inversely with political organization and to the extent that corruption builds parties, and undermines the conditions of its own existence. Corruption is most prevalent in states that lack effective political parties, in societies where the interest of the individuals, family, clique, group, or the clan predominate. In a modernizing polity, the weaker and less accepted political parties, the greater the likelihood of corruption (Adefulu, 2007).

Adefulu (2007) citing Huntington observed that the process of economic and political development in modernizing societies tends to breed inequality, political instability and corruption which may be defined simply in terms of the use of public power to achieve private goals.

This theory considered corruption to be the hallmark of underdevelopment, while modern societies are perceived as basically free from corruption. Cases of corruption in modernized societies are seen as individual failings or misdemeanors in an efficient world governed by laws and anonymity as opposed to an inefficient world governed by personal networks of greed. While societies classified as modern are considered to be morally superior, underdeveloped societies are viewed as backward and corrupt (Adefulu, 2007).

Given the above therefore, corruption in Nigeria is endemic with cultural phenomena with the level of social, economic, and political underdevelopment in the country. Also, the Nigerian society is bedeviled with corrupt practices such that once a person is appointed into any political office; the expectations from his people will be so high in terms of what the office will offer for them. Therefore, the people he or she represents are ready to teach him or her how to steal.

Hence, corruption in Nigeria knows no bound irrespective of tribes or cultural affiliations and this is as a result of underdevelopment of Nigeria. Although, other theories such as economic development theory, political institution theory, history and cultural theory and public policy theory could have been used to analyze this study, but none of them was sufficient in explaining the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria better than modernization theory.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This refers to all the strategies employed in gathering or sourcing for information for this study. It has to do with the selection of the method for data collection, including instruments and methods of analysis in order to gather relevant information for the study; and this needs to be clearly stated and defined. This section deals with the system of inquiry to be adopted for this study and the procedural steps to be taken to ensure the accomplishment of this task; and it focuses on sources of data and method of data analyses applied. Based on the objective of the study, the methodology adopted is the qualitative research design methods based on secondary data. The research methodology employed for data collection was to facilitate the information gathering process, in order to achieve the stated objective as well as to arrive at an accurate conclusion on the study. Because of the scope of this research, the secondary data were from available information gathered from previous documentation relevant to this area of study, information

from textbooks, journals and relevant information from articles. This was done through the effective use of the library and the internet. Relevant literature- including journals, websites, books and magazines were reviewed and extensively used. The technique of content analysis based on a thematic discussion of issues is used.

Analysis of Anti-Corruption Initiatives & Cases of Military Corruption in Nigeria

As early as the 1960s, corruption was identified as a key issue in public administration. Successive constitutions of Nigeria since independence have always contained, in varying degrees, accountability provisions, which in some respects allow for the imposition of liability on public officials guilty of acts of corrupt enrichment and abuse of the public trust. For example, the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 (as amended) requires that elected as well as certain appointed holders of public office take an oath (FRN,1999). The 1999 Constitution also requires them to declare their assets and pledge to abide by a national Code of Conduct. Furthermore, under chapter two of the Constitution dealing with Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, high-ranking public officials, including the President, are obligated to promote and realise the security and welfare of the Nigerian citizens. They are also required to ensure their freedom and happiness, on the basis of social justice, equality of status and opportunity. In addition, the chapter obligates the president and other high ranking state officials to ensure that the material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed in a manner that serves the common good of all Nigerians; and to prevent the exploitation of Nigeria's human and natural resources for any reasons other than for the good of the community. Significantly, it requires them to eradicate all corrupt practices and abuse of power. At the same time, the chapter imposes a watchdog duty on the citizens in order to protect and preserve public property and prevent misappropriation of public funds.

The 1999 Constitution also provides for the Code of Conduct for public officials¹ which require public servants to avoid conflicts of interest. Furthermore, it prohibits them from simultaneously receiving remuneration for two public offices and engaging in private practice while in the employ of government. The Code of Conduct also bars public servants from accepting gifts or benefits in kind for themselves, or any other person, on account of anything done, or omitted to be done, in the discharge of their duties. It also prohibits abuse of office. Code of Conduct defines, 'abuse of office' as 'any arbitrary act prejudicial to the rights of any other person when the public officer knows that such an act is unlawful or contrary to any government policy (Code of Conduct Act.)' Furthermore, the Code of Conduct prohibits the president, vice-president, state governors, deputy governors, and other enumerated public officers from maintaining or operating foreign bank accounts. Public officers are required to declare their assets and those of their families immediately after taking office, at the end of every four years in office, and at the end of their terms.

The Constitution establishes the Code of Conduct Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal to deal with acts of political corruption by top ranking state officials. According to Section 12 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, 'any allegations that a public officer has committed a breach of or has not complied with the provisions of the Code of Conduct shall be made to the Code of Conduct Bureau.' The Bureau is vested with the responsibility to receive and examine among others, all declarations of assets by high ranking state officials; ensure compliance and where appropriate enforce the provisions of the Code of Conduct. The Bureau is also empowered to receive complaints about non-compliance with or breach of the Code of Conduct; investigate the complaint and where appropriate refer such matters to the Code of Conduct Tribunal. The Tribunal tries cases of non-compliance with or breach of any of the provisions of the Code of Conduct by a public officer. The National Assembly may confer on the Tribunal additional powers necessary for it to be more effective in the discharge of its functions. The Tribunal may impose a punishment ranging from vacation of office or seat in any legislative house; disqualification from membership of a legislative house and from holding any public office for a period of up to 10 years; to seizure and forfeiture to the state of any property acquired in abuse or corruption of office. The exercise of the constitutional prerogative of mercy shall not extend to any such punishment. However, any

defendant who is dissatisfied with this sentence may appeal to the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, the Tribunal cannot impose a custodial sentence: that power is reserved only for the courts. Section 88 of the 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to conduct an investigation into the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department; the disbursing or administering of money appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly among other actions. One of the purposes of this investigative power is to 'expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of funds appropriated by the National Assembly.'

Other initiatives to combat corruption in Nigeria have historically included the 1977 'Jaji Declaration' by former president Olusegun Obasanjo; the 'Ethical Revolution' by former president Shehu Shagari in 1981; 'War Against Indiscipline' by the General Muhammadu Buhari in 1984; 'National Orientation Movement' by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1986; 'Mass Mobilisation for Social Justice' by General Babangida in 1987; 'War Against Indiscipline and Corruption' in 1996 by General Sani Abacha, the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices (and Other Related Offences) Commission in 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission 2002 by Olusegun Obasanjo.

The Jaji declaration sounded the commitment of President Olusegun Obasanjo in taking early steps against corruption. The 'ethical revolution' as conceptualised under Shehu Shagari was an admission of sorts that corruption was deeply ingrained in the national psyche and a revolution was needed to tackle it. This was taken further by President Muhammadu Buhari who adopted a 'war against indiscipline'. But it is under Sani Abacha and later Olusegun Obasanjo that the affront against corruption took a more institutionalised approach following the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices (and Other Related Offences) Commission in 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission in 2002 (SERAP, 2017).

Several federal and state legislation have provisions aimed at checking corruption. A good example is the Freedom of Information Act 2011 and the local government laws of the various states. The Administration of Criminal Justice Act of 2015 significantly altered the criminal justice process, replacing the Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Act. It contains important provisions to raise efficiency and effectiveness in the quality of justice delivery in Nigeria.

The Public Procurement Act No. 14 of 2007 is another legislation aimed at preventing corruption in Nigeria. The Act covers all aspects in public sector procurement including the procurement of goods and services. The Act established the National Council on Public Procurement and the Bureau of Public Procurement as the regulatory authorities responsible for the monitoring and oversight of public procurement setting standards harmonising existing government policies and practices, and developing the legal framework and capacity for public procurement in Nigeria. Section 53(1) of the Act empowers the Bureau to review and recommend for investigation any matter related to the conduct of the procurement process by any Ministry or agency of government, if it considers such investigation desirable so as to detect or prevent the violation of any of the provisions of the Act.

Nigerians have witnessed an increased level of arrests and prosecutions, and recovery of stolen assets. However, public goodwill for the fight against corruption was squandered due to mixed signals and outright failure in some instances to take decisive action in clear cases of corruption. In other instances, anti-corruption institutions have been seen to work in an uncoordinated manner and at cross purpose.

It is against this background that this paper was conceptualised. It aims to provide a credible platform on which Nigerians could reflect on cases of corruption in the military establishment, efforts undertaken, the achievements, challenges and lessons to take forward.

Transparency International (TI) (2017) informed the Nigerian armed forces that corruption in the military is dangerous, divisive, wasteful and fuels insurgency. It said where graft is entrenched among military establishment, was dangerous. This was made known at a one-day Leadership Workshop organised by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) in conjunction with Transparency International and the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CSLAC).

Senior Advisor to TI, Ian Andrews, explained that high level of corruption in the military has the tendency to derail national growth, development and even stir up insurgencies and warfare.

He maintained that the problem of corruption in military establishments across the globe, adding that corruption in military procurement was not peculiar to Nigeria, but a global challenge which undermines confidence in state institutions.

He said: "Corruption in military establishment is dangerous, divisive and wasteful with far reaching consequences on the state, and fuels insurgency". As Dixon, et.al (2017:2) rightly observed that corruption has been particularly destructive in the Defense and security sector. Overlooked in peacetime, Defense sector corruption has devastating real world consequences when conflict flares. With lower oil prices, corrupt elites have increasingly exploited alternative illicit revenue streams. The secret nature of Defense and security budgets has made them the easiest and most lucrative opportunity to exploit. While Boko Haram has constructed a conflict economy geared around pillage, racketeering, and kidnapping; senior players in the Nigerian security sector have also profited from the insurgency.

This view supports the thesis that corruption and violence are interlinked. For instance Kemp (2004) examined the relationship among crime, corruption, politics, and ethnic polarization and argues that many current conflicts rage on because at one party has a vested interest, economic or otherwise, in perpetuating the conflict and creating instability. As Chaye (2015) wrote;

This common framing is particularly ironic given the growing evidence that corruption is helping to drive many people into the folds of extremist movements and indeed lies at the root of many of today's security crises (Chayes 2015; Sky 2015).

Supporting this view, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar, explained that following the 2014-2015 Report of Transparency International on Government Defence Procurement System, came up with a "Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (61).

The survey was conducted between Year 2014 and 2015. The report of the survey ranked Nigeria amongst the highest risk corruption categories in the defence and security sector. The document suggested ways forward, with one cardinal recommendation being the need for defence sector reforms, including an overhaul of the procurement process. He further stated:

Let me state here clearly that the period covered by the Index, that is 2014-2015, coincided with a period when the NAF used to procure its equipment and material through a NAF Tenders Board; a procedure which was hitherto adjudged as being not sufficiently transparent and not in consonance with international best practices. However, in order to ensure transparency and integrity of the system, the NAF has since instituted various changes in the procurement process and procedure within the ambit of the Public Procurement Act 2007. This led to the establishment of a Directorate of Procurement tasked with the responsibility of coordinating all procurement activities in the NAF. The Directorate is staffed with well-trained technical and legal personnel to ensure that NAF obtains value for money spent while at the same time, adhering to the law.

In addition, the NAF is vigorously following through on the government's directive to deal directly with foreign governments that is (government to government), Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and authorised Equipment Maintenance Repair Organisations (MROs) in the acquisition of spares and/or maintenance of NAF equipment rather than with some third-party organisations. However, there have been challenges especially in dealing with some governments.

According to a Transparency International report, a network of Nigerian military chiefs, politicians, and contractors worked together to steal more than N3.1 trillion through arms procurement contracts between 2008 and 2017. The contract my guest was involved with would have seen himself, military chiefs and a couple of other agents steal N3 billion. Here are some of the top defence and security procurement related scandals in recent memory as documented by PREMIUM TIMES(2017), TI(2017) and Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption(2019):

1. Cash in bullion vans For Special Services?

Late 2014 to early 2015

Cash withdrawal from CBN using two bullion vans

Former President Goodluck Jonathan authorised the withdrawal of N67.2 billion in cash from the Central Bank of Nigeria between November 2014 and February 2015 for "special services," linked to defence and security operations. How the funds were used remains unclear.

2. Cash for Black market Arms in South Africa? September 5, 2014

The South African border authorities seized \$9.3 million belonging to Nigeria from two Nigerians and an Israeli who arrived the country in a private jet owned by a pastor, Ayo Oritsejafor. Customs officers discovered the money stashed in three suitcases after the suitcases were put through airport scanners. The Nigerian government later admitted the money was meant for the procurement of black market arms for the Nigerian military.

3. The Amit Sade contracts October 6, 2008

On that day, Amit Sade, an Israeli contractor – who does not own any arms manufacturing business – working out of Nigeria was gifted a combined N5.2 billion contracts. The first was to deliver “assorted ammunition” at the cost of N2.1 billion. The other was to supply “20 units of K-38 twin hull boats” at the cost of N3.1 billion. He was paid 95 percent for the ammunition, he delivered a 63 per cent worth. On the K38 boats, he was paid 80 per cent, he delivered only 40 per cent. In the last decade, Mr. Sade, records show, was gifted another six heavy-weight military contracts worth N6.721 billion. He is alleged to have failed to deliver on any of them. He could not be reached to comment for this report. He did not reply emails sent to him, and his current location remains unknown.

4. NIA #IkoyiScandal – Defence cash stashed in defence chief’s wife’s apartment April 12, 2017

Whistleblowers led the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to a house in upscale Ikoyi where \$43.4 million was kept. The NIA director later claimed the money was meant for undisclosed special security and defence projects. Investigations are still going on and the real motive for keeping the fund in that location remained unclear.

5. Progress Limited “gift” April 29, 2005 to October 19, 2010

The ministry of defence gifted two purchase contracts to Progress Limited for the supply of 42 units of BTR-3U Armoured Personnel Carriers and spare parts for the Nigerian Army without documented contract or agreements. There was no cost negotiation between the two parties. Two years later, 26 used APCs were delivered but they broke down almost immediately after they were deployed for peacekeeping operations in Sudan.

6. N2 billion grew wings from the office of the National Security Adviser May 13, 2013The Nigerian government released N1.35 billion to re-stock ammunition for OPERATION BOYONA, aimed at dislodging terrorist camps along the borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Two months later, the National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki, requested and got approval for additional N2 billion. It does appear neither the Defence Headquarters nor the soldiers on the battlefield benefited from the second cash released to the NSA. The money is believed to have disappeared, an allegation Mr. Dasuki is denying.

7. “Urgent” N7 billion Boko Haram funds missing

January 2015

Nurudeen Mohammed, the then Minister of State Foreign Affairs, requested N7 billion to urgently fund operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin. The funds were released to the National Security Adviser. It is unclear how the money was used. Officials say most were traced to companies that had no business with the Task Force. One and a half billion naira was withdrawn in cash.

8. Santa NIMASA

Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption(2019) has documented this corruption thus:

The 2012 sale of seven decommissioned Norwegian naval vessels took a curious turn when a report revealed that they were serving, two years later, in the private flotilla of a former Nigerian dissenter. The news about the six demilitarized missile torpedo boats and one naval support vessel, the former KNM *Horten*, triggered an investigation that led to the conviction in May 2017 of one Norwegian official on bribery charges and the revelation of the role played by a UK intermediary, CAS-Global Ltd. The firm applied for export licenses in Norway and for a re-export license for the *Horten* from the UK, telling the Norwegians that the ships would support an ECOWAS mission and the British that they were intended for use by the Nigerian government. In fact, the vessels would be passed on to Global West Vessel Specialist Ltd. (GWVSL), a private firm likely controlled by the former Nigerian rebel Government Ekpemupolo, which had obtained a maritime law enforcement contract from the Nigerian Maritime

Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). In 2016, after a change in government in Nigeria, the GWVSL fleet was seized and its controllers charged with conspiring with NIMASA officials to embezzle funds. The of the *Value of deal: is* USD 12 million and the *sum involved in corruption allegations is* USD 242,000

The people in the deal include Government Ekpemupolo (aka Tompolo) – former leader in the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta who accepted amnesty in 2009 and as a result of the deal was since 2016 wanted for theft and money laundering of up to USD 171 million. Bjørn Stavrum – an orlogskaptein (OF-3, Lt. Cdr.-equivalent) of the Norwegian Navy assigned to the Norwegian Defense Logistics Organization; received around USD 242,000 in bribes from CAS-Global Ltd. to approve the sale. Convicted of corruption-related offenses and sentenced to four years and eight months in prison.

Patrick Akpobolokemi – director-general of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency; suspected of embezzling funds but acquitted by an appeals court in June 2018. Stuart MacGregor – CAS-Global Ltd. director who signed on behalf of the company for purchase of the ships.

9. The Shaldag contracts 2010

The Shaldag contract is one of the deals that paved the way for a regime of kleptocracy in the Nigerian Defence sector, and the emergence of a gang that has grown to be more powerful than elected regimes. The 2010 deal saw an Israeli shipbuilder, Israeli Shipyards, win a \$25 million contract to supply Nigerian Navy with two fast assault boats. Their market value at the time was estimated to be \$5 million each. Nigeria, therefore, lost \$15 million in the deal. It is unclear how the \$15 million excess was shared between everyone involved, but the Israeli police have established that the middleman, Amit Sade, received \$1.47 million in what is now termed brokerage fee. Three people are facing trial in Israel over this deal.

10. Dasuki armsgate

At the center of the web of corruption is Col. (retd.) Sambo Dasuki, Jonathan's National Security Advisor (NSA) from March 2012 to March 2015. Dasuki effectively controlled military procurement during his period in office with no supervision and virtually no input from the Ministry of Defence. The transactions involved in the Armsgate scandal took place under the rule of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) government of Presidents Umaru Yar'Adua, who ruled from 2007 until his death in 2010, and Goodluck Jonathan, Yar'Adua's vice president, who took over in 2007 and subsequently won reelection in 2011.

According to TI(2017) and Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption(2019) Nigeria's 'Armsgate' scandal that broke in 2015 when a government-appointed independent investigation revealed a series of arms 'deals' in which Ministry of Defense funds were transferred to private accounts and no arms were procured. Rather than corruption, these 'deals' are more accurately classified as theft. The scandal, which is still unfolding, involves the alleged theft of at least USD 2.1 billion, and possibly as much as USD 15 billion of extra-budgetary funds between 2007 and 2015 intended for weaponry to aid the government's efforts to defeat the insurgent group, Boko Haram. The deals allegedly benefited a number of senior military officers, politicians, government officials, and businessmen, and their families.

What these investigations illustrate is a system of kickbacks, where billions of dollars were diverted from procurement spending, through the use of 'briefcase' companies, especially Société d'Equipements Internationaux in order to fund the ruling party's supporters and ensure electoral success for the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in the 2015 general elections. Most of these companies were awarded fake contracts for equipment that was never delivered. Largest contract was for 4 Alpha jets and 12 helicopters, also never delivered.

The Value of contracts are unknown. 'Extra-budgetary interventions' between 2007 and 2015 totaled between USD 4.5 and USD 7.2 billion, but other contracts from budgetary funds was also involved. Initial investigatory committee studies contracts amounting to over USD 19 billion. *The sum involved in corruption allegations* is at least USD 2.1 billion, possibly as much as USD 15 billion. The amounts stolen are shockingly bold. Yet the misappropriation of budgets to buy political support is not new. Successive Nigerian leaders, both civilian and military, have built governmental power structures around the country's main income stream: oil. And until recently oil revenues have typically accounted for up to

70 per cent of government revenues – feeding powerful patronage networks. Obasanjo did not even appoint an oil minister, preferring to supervise the ministry directly himself. Successive administrations have maintained the same structure: former PDP president Goodluck Jonathan, a civilian, appointed his close ally Diezani Alison-Madueke as Oil Minister. Madueke – who has recently been charged with money laundering – was described by one Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) official as, “the oil institution.” (TI, 2017, p. 11).

CONCLUSION

For a nation that is not at war, Nigeria’s defence spending raises several critical concerns. The paradox of course is that the more government spends on defence, the more insecure Nigerians feel. Travelling inside the country has become so perilous that it is now advisable to get a ‘security report’ of all towns and villages on our way before setting out. Today, all major defence-related structures in Abuja, and the North-east which supposedly should be the safest place in the country are so barricaded and are constantly attacked. The non-investment of previous administrations on the security sub-sector has both internal and international security implications for Nigeria and her population. In an effort to justify this lack of investment, Crisis Group (2016, pp i-ii) posits that inadequate funding, corrupt procurement and poor maintenance result in serious equipment and logistics deficits. For a country of over 170 million people, facing several security challenges – from an Islamist insurgency in the north east to a resource-based conflict in the Niger Delta – a military numbering less than 120,000 personnel (all services) is clearly inadequate. Under-staffing reflects poor planning and a dubious recruitment system, but also is further aggravated by over-stretch induced by deployments in over two dozen internal security operations. Training institutions are short of facilities and instructors, lack training modules, and because they are largely focused on conventional operations, somewhat outdated. Personnel are under-motivated due to low pay, poor welfare services and bleak post-service prospects. These fallouts are as a result of corruption in the sector which this paper examined.

Among the findings is the fact that although bribery can crop up in arms procurement anywhere, the problem can be far worse in countries where military spending and decision-making lacks transparency, accountability, monitoring and oversight institutions are weak. In such cases, corruption can go well beyond a 10% commission on the sales price being paid in bribes, and can encompass wholesale embezzlement or ‘stealing’ as it’s more plainly called in Nigeria. In the Nigerian ‘Armsgate’ scandals, for instance, former President Goodluck Jonathan for instance gave his National Security Advisor Sambo Dasuki unchecked control over the country’s military procurement budget, including both on- and off-budget spending, with no oversight. Dasuki proceeded to loot at least \$2 billion to his political, military, business cronies using fake procurement contracts for which no equipment was ever delivered.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the above conclusions, the paper recommends as follows:

Procurement processes for the acquisition of arms and ammunitions for the Nigerian Army and all the security agencies operating in the country should be reviewed. This new approach to arms procurement will eliminate some of the controversies surrounding the exercise. The current controversies over the purchase of arms and ammunitions or the alleged purchase inferior or substandard arms call for an urgent review of our processes. Indeed our several international and domestic civil society groups, academics, leaders and generals have repeatedly affirmed, war is too important to be left in the hands of generals. The world have moved on in most democratic countries, representatives of the people, the parliament is involved in the details of implementation of budgets and procurement processes.

The army has made some progress in regard to the recovery of territory from Boko Haram. However, much more is needed to thwart the group. To consolidate military gains, grievances among troops on the ground must be attended to. Part of the solution lies in dialogue to understand concerns of those on the battlefield. For instance, some units lament the delays in getting weapons and supplies when their detachments are under attack. To consolidate military gains against Boko Haram, grievances among troops must be attended to.

The recent amendments to the Public Procurement Act are an important advance in the fight against defence corruption, but they will have limited impact without corresponding amendments to the Freedom of Information Act of 2011. Finally, the implementation of the whistle-blower policy is already positively contributing to law enforcement efforts. More whistle-blowers would be encouraged to come forward with evidence of defence sector corruption with the enactment of a whistle-blower protection law that includes citizens and private sector employees. Alternatively the Office of the Attorney General could issue guidelines clarifying that the Freedom of Information Act 2011 protections for whistle-blowers also apply to defence and security sector whistle-blowers.

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