



Troops' Morale And Operational Efficiency Of The Nigerian Military Counterinsurgency Against Boko Haram

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study was to ascertain how morale affect the operational efficiency of Nigerian troops in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. Three research objectives and research questions were formulated to guide this study. The research utilized descriptive research design. The population of this study was 13,500. 13,200 of this population was the strength of the Nigerian Military troops participating in the counterinsurgency operation in North-Eastern Nigeria at the time of the research. 200 were members of Civil Society Organizations, and 100 Retired Security Personnel from the different states covered by the study. The sample size was 744 respondents, obtained through purposive sampling technique. 720 of the respondents were Soldiers, 15 Civil Society Organizations, and 30 retired security personnel. The study obtained its data from both qualitative and quantitative primary sources. A researcher-design questionnaire tagged Troops' Morale and Operational Efficiency Questionnaire (TMOEQ) was used for the data collection for the study. Frequency counts, percentage mean and standard deviation were used to analyze quantitative data obtained from questionnaire. The key findings of the study identified that; affective morale significantly relate to the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. It further established that goal morale significantly relates to the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram, as well as interpersonal morale, among other findings. The study concluded that there is need for the Nigerian military to review its counterinsurgency strategy to reflect the human dimension of military operations, which has been long neglected. The study suggested the organization of public and expert hearings on formulation of a comprehensive military reform program, including a new, more relevant national defense policy.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Troops Morale, Insurgency, Operational Efficiency

INTRODUCTION

The global emergence of liberal democracy after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 appealed to most nations, especially in the developing world. Between 1989 to 2000, over seventeen African countries had embraced democracy, a period which was referred to as the Third Wave of Democratization. Democratization, whose central objective is the consummation of supreme powers to the people and the reinstatement of their franchise to vote and elect their leaders and representatives gained more popularity in Africa during this period. Nigeria was not left out in this turn of events as the country was ushered into the Fourth Republic after several failed attempts to entrench sustainable democracy. However, this new form of government came with the attendant challenge of satisfying the multicultural sociopolitical

landscape of the country which had already been largely polarized across ethnic, religious and political lines. More often, agitated and disenchanted individuals and groups, wielded violence to pursue their interests. These have often manifested through militancy, communal conflicts, kidnappings, armed robbery and terrorism, which is the most recent and most devastating. The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, for example, has resulted to the death of over 10,000 persons and has led to the displacement of over 2.5 million people since 2009 to date, as reported by the Amnesty International. The socio-economic impact of the activities of this vicious group had been a major security challenge to the Nigerian Government, posing significant threat to national security and thus impede on national development.

According to Forest, (2012), the Nigerian Government adopted a multidimensional counter terrorism approach to address the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency conflict as well as suppress the violent activities of the terrorist group. These include the use of counter-violent extremism, economic, alternative dispute resolution, and military measures to address the menace across various layers and fronts. Unfortunately, all military operations conducted by security agencies since the violence started had little success despite the massive budgetary allocation to the Nigerian Military. Nevertheless, Umar, (2013), and Onah, (2014) had posited that systemic deficiencies in the political environment in Nigeria and failures by the Nigerian government to address the root causes and symptoms of terrorism have been cited as some of the issues that enable the insecurities engendered by the deadly acts of terror by Boko Haram to linger (Onah, 2014; Umar, 2013).

The threats posed to the Nigerian government and citizens by Boko Haram has been debilitating given the extensive loss of lives and properties resulting from the indiscriminate terrorist attacks by the group. More so, the persistent dominance of some communities especially in the North East, showcased by the Boko Haram sects has exposed the security agencies to accusations of highhandedness and allegations of atrocities, both of which have initiated an action-reaction cycle of violence. If such allegations are something to go by; what then would motivate the Nigerian Military troops to counter the Boko Haram insurgency?

For every insurgency that threatens the peace and security of a nation, there is always a motivating force behind its persistence to linger. On the other hand, for every military counterinsurgency that is successful, there is always a motivating force propelling the strategies adopted and the goals accomplished. This motivating force in the context of this study is what has been termed; 'troops' morale'. Morale, also known as *esprit de corps* is the capacity of a group's members to maintain belief in an institution or goal, particularly in the face of opposition or hardship.

Morale, generally defined, is a state of mind that either encourages or impedes action. The greatest combat commanders have always understood that morale reflects the mental, moral, and physical condition of their troops. These conditions, in turn, directly related to the troops' courage, confidence, discipline, enthusiasm, and willingness to endure the sacrifices and hardships of military duty. Troops with high morale can operate; even succeed against high odds, in all kinds of conditions. Poor morale can lead to failure, even when odds favour victory. At a basic level, good morale allows soldiers to overcome fear. In wartime, civilian morale is also important. *Esprit de corps* is considered to be an important part of a fighting unit. However, military morale is in a large sense inseparable from civilian morale because each reacts upon the other and both are in large measure based on fidelity to a cause. But there is a certain kind of morale that is distinctly military. It begins with the soldier's attitude toward duty. It develops with the soldier's command over himself. It is a spirit that becomes dominant in the individual and also in the group. Whether the soldier has physical comforts or suffers physical hardships may be a factor but is seldom the determining factor in making or unmaking his morale. A cause is known and believed in; knowledge that substantial justice governs discipline; the individual's confidence and pride in himself, his comrades, his leaders; the unit's pride in its own will; these basic things, supplemented by intelligent welfare and recreation measures and brought to life by a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation, combine to weld a seasoned fighting force capable of defending the nation (Ullo, 1941, cited in Lutfi, Ma'ruf, Dedi, & Muhammad, 2019).

Before the twentieth century, commanders attentive to their soldiers' morale mainly attended to their physical well-being. As long as an army was reasonably well-fed, had adequate clothing and shelter, and

could expect to be paid more or less regularly, its morale might be considered adequate to the task at hand. Modern notions of troop morale arose out of the horrific casualties generated by the trench warfare of World War I. Some military historians suggest that stress-related casualties were almost unknown earlier. Evolution of weapons technology, mass armies, and General Staff leadership increased the scale and magnified the intensity of warfare, levying terrific burdens on a soldier's mental fitness. Accordingly, troop morale attracted the detailed attention of military and medical authorities.

Lord Charles Moran, a former World War I medical officer, wrote the first systematic explanation of troop morale. *Anatomy of Courage*, first published in 1945, postulated an explanation for troop morale and explained how it might be managed. Moran argued that;

Courage had measurable limits and could be expended as easily as water can be poured from a beaker. Commanders had to determine how much bravery soldiers possessed and not allow them to exceed those limits without replenishment. Moran also believed courage was largely a function of a man's character. Cowards simply lacked moral strength (p. 23).

Events of World War II only partially supported Moran's notions. By then, psychiatrists and psychologists had more fully investigated the components of morale, and come to recognize that all troops, not just the weak or morally flawed, were subject to the effects of unrelenting fear and anxiety. Only a sense of duty allowed men to overcome their fears; thus duty—devotion to a cause or comrades—joined the traditional factors—food, clothing, training, discipline, and leadership—as a defining component of morale.

Based on the foregoing, Buratai (2016) at a recent 'transformational leadership' workshop organised by the military for its middle cadre officers, attributed the latest round of operational setbacks in the battle against the Boko Haram insurgents to sabotage, low morale and lack of commitment on the part of officers. Although Buratai has withdrawn the statement, following a barrage of criticisms, the damning verdict on his men has nonetheless raised a lot of pertinent questions: Why are the troops unwilling to perform 'assigned tasks' when the implications are very clear? Why are they 'insufficiently committed' to the crucial task of bringing down the insurgency? What is responsible for the implied chronic indiscipline problem in the force?

Consequently, morale, in the context of this study adopted the three dimensions of Hardy (2010), who opined that morale incorporates three components – affective, goal, and interpersonal morale. Affective dimension includes; praise, recognition and an emphasis on the intrinsic value of the individual. The prospects for the future and particularly progress towards the future are also important and effect on the future/goal dimension of morale, while the Interpersonal morale entails the motivation that is directed toward other people. Therefore, relating the foregoing dimensions of morale to find answers to the numerous questions raised on the reason behind the present level of morale of the Nigerian troop, and the effect of morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigeria military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is the motivation behind this study.

Statement of the Problem

In a report compiled by 'Nigeria Mourns', a media tracking group released in June 2019, noted that the insurgents killed 64 persons in Borno State alone out of the 310 lost to a combination of banditry, kidnapping and terrorism in the tragic month of May. Additionally, the Boko Haram terrorists attempted to sack a military base at Goniri in Yobe State with seven guns trucks reportedly seized. The murmurs of doubts about the capacity of the state vis-à-vis that of the insurgents became louder recently when the Commanding Officer of the 158 Battalion of the Nigerian Army, Lt.-Col. Amanda Azubuike and 25 others fell victim of the Boko Haram assault on Kareto village, 130 kilometres from Maiduguri, Borno State capital.

While it is believed that the capacity for havoc by Boko Haram has been degraded by the military whose officers and men deserve commendation for their sacrifices, it is also true that the policy put in place to win the war in recent years, in particular, is ineffective and inadequate and it is draining the army and the authorities of the goodwill of most Nigerians. Again this study assumes that part of the reason is that many of the officers and men in the frontlines are not adequately taken care of and properly psychod to do

their job. Even though the army chief recently relocated to Maiduguri for a pep talk with his men in the frontlines in the face of recent losses, it is not a once-in-a-while thing.

Every anti-insurgency war is first a psychological operation. The troops on the battlefield must themselves be constantly motivated and ‘drunken’ adherents and advocates of the national spirit. Therefore, when the source of troop morale in any war is reportedly in short supply or missing, there is likely to be a problem. In the current phase of the war against insurgency, food and other welfare items are reportedly rationed, besides issues of outstanding payments and entitlements to families of fallen officers and men. This is not to mention guns and ammunition vital for the successful prosecution of any war. But even more important is leadership. Strong indications have emerged that senior military officers and the fighting troops hold serious grudges against the continued stay in office of service chiefs who have outlived their usefulness.

The status of troops' morale can be assumed to be one of the most significant elements of operational efficiency in any military engagement. This further suggests the need to examine the level of morale the Nigerian military have in their counterinsurgency against Boko Haram to find practicable and research-based solutions that will improve troops' morale for enhanced operational efficiency in its fight against Boko Haram and other future operations. It is against this background, the study seeks to examine the effect of troops' morale on operational efficiency in the Nigerian military's counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.

Aim and Objectives of the Study

This study aims to examine the effect of troops' morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. To achieve this, the objectives of this research are to:

1. Examine the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.
2. Identify the factors impeding on troops' morale in the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.
3. Examine suggestions to the challenges experienced by troops of the Nigerian military in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

Research Questions

The following research questions were raised to guide the study;

1. What is the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?
2. What are the factors impeding on troops' morale in the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?
3. What are the suggestions to the challenge experienced by the troops of the Nigerian military in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?

Significance of the Study

The findings from this study will be of significance to the Federal Government, State and Local Government, Non-governmental organizations, citizens of Nigeria, other countries experiencing insurgency, the Nigerian Military High Command, and lastly, it will contribute to knowledge on the concept studied.

The findings of this study will inform the Federal Government to formulate and implement policies to boost and sustain soldiers' morale during any field operations (not only against Boko Haram) since it is a critical factor for efficiency and positive performance.

The State and Local governments will benefit from the strategies that will be proffered for enhancing and maintaining security personnel's morale in general in their respective areas of jurisdiction.

Lastly, this study will contribute to the existing literature on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, particularly as it focused on soldiers' morale and their operational efficiency, which has been a neglected area of study, especially in Nigeria.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework

Vroom's Expectancy Theory

Another theory which explains how people are motivated is the expectancy theory by Vroom. It was propounded by Vroom in 1964. The theory states that people will be motivated to do things to get their goal, that if they believe in the worth of a goal; they can see what needs to be done to attain that goal Lauby (2005). The expected result is likely to be achieved when there is a perceived relationship between outcome and performance. It involves both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The intrinsic motivation (motivation from the work itself) is envisaged to lead to more reward than extrinsic motivation (financial reward). As proposed by Lauby (2005), expectancy theory connects efforts, performances and results.

The present study which focused on troops' morale as a determinant to the operational efficiency of the Nigerian Military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram, proxy troops' morale for affective, goal, and interpersonal morale, which corroborates the postulates of the Vroom's Expectancy Theory; that 'people will be motivated to do things to get their goal, that if they believe in the worth of a goal; they can see what needs to be done to attain that goal'. The theory is a framework of the dimensions of troops' morale adopted by this study. By implication, troops will feel (affective) the need to achieve their task (goal/future) of countering the Boko Haram insurgency if they believe in the need to keeps others (interpersonal) safe and uphold the oath they have sworn to ensure the security of lives and property of the Nigerian citizens.

Conceptual Review

Concept of Insurgency

Insurgency is a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources.

Other terms that describe insurgency according to Fearon and Laitin (2013) includes:

- i. **Counterinsurgency:** This is the combination of measures undertaken by a government to defeat an insurgency. Effective counterinsurgency integrates and synchronizes political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological activities to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening the insurgents while bolstering the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
- ii. **Guerrilla warfare:** This is a form of warfare in which small, lightly armed groups use mobile tactics against a stronger opponent. Guerrillas employ small-scale attacks, such as ambushes and raids, to harass their enemy rather than to win a decisive victory in battle.
- iii. **A militia:** This is a body of armed fighters' often representing specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, or other community groups or political parties. Militias may serve the government directly or indirectly, operate independently to combat other militias or insurgent groups, pursue a criminal activity, or support an insurgency.

Counter-Insurgency

According to Moore (2012), counter-insurgency is an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability. Counter-insurgency is a term used to explain the various techniques and theories that relate to the prevention and suppression of armed insurgencies. At such, it is a response to the insurgency.

Morale and Operational Efficiency

Hocking (2008), he states that: What condition is to the body, morale is to the mind. Morale is condition; good morale is the good condition of the inner man; state of will in which you can get the most from the machinery, deliver blows with the greatest effect, take blows with the least depression and hold out for

the longest time. Richardson (1978) summarized personal morale as being sustained by physical factors, such as good health, good food, rest, and amenities, he believed that a good morale is made-up of three major elements: the soldier's personal or individual morale, his morale as a member of a small group, and the morale of the unit as a whole.

Empirical Framework

Njoku (2020) explored alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State to deter Boko Haram. Data were collected through interviews with 10 NPF counterterrorism experts selected through a purposive sampling strategy. The results of this study have implications for positive social change including policy recommendations to the Nigerian government to invest in counterterrorism efforts rooted in trust-building at higher levels of government to reduce the impact of potential infiltration of Boko Haram in government as well as implementing education and outreach programs highlighting the ills of terrorism, making it less attractive for vulnerable youths, enthroning peace and normalcy in the community, and promoting a society devoid of the destructive tendencies of terrorism.

Bowei (2019) looked critically at the effects of the strategies applied in the attempt to fight terrorism and how these strategies have affected insurgency in Nigeria. The background of the study gives an insight into the evolution of terrorist groups in Nigeria, their mode of operation, effects on citizens and the Nigerian economy, as well as the operations of counterterrorism agencies. The qualitative research method was used for this study. Critical theory and resource dependence theory were applied, and data were obtained through face-to-face and telephone interviews with 7 stakeholders. Detailed recommendations are made to aid counterterrorism agencies in developing and applying additional and effective workable strategies in their fight against terrorism. Policies in Nigeria were recommended that may discourage terrorism initiations and centre the focus of youth towards nation-building. Social problems were identified connecting young people as the primary causes of terrorism in Nigeria. Solid recommendations in this direction have been provided to ensure youths across the country who form a vulnerable population and are the targets of terrorist sect recruitment are protected and provided with effective tools to prevent their conscription while engaging them positively in becoming knowledgeable and self-reliant citizens.

Adepelumi (2018) investigated the psychological consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency for Nigerian children. Studies have examined the causes and impacts of terrorism in Nigeria; however, no known research has documented the psychological impacts of witnessing ongoing Boko Haram terrorist violence based on the lived experiences of Nigerian children. Results showed that all the participants reported negative symptoms of mental health disorders, which did not lead to permanent mental health illnesses. Among the participants, the primary factors that moderated the symptoms, preventing progression to permanent mental health illnesses, were fasting and religious support. Implications for positive social change include giving voice to voiceless Nigerian children and providing the Nigerian populace, multilateral and bilateral organizations, and the Nigerian government with the information necessary to understand the effects of terrorism on children and promote resilience in children who have experienced terrorism.

Olanrewaju, Oluwafunke, and Sheriff (2017) investigated insurgency and national security challenges in Nigeria: An introductory analysis. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia designed a state system on the twin-principles of territoriality and sovereignty. Sovereignty accords the state unquestionable but legitimate control over the nation and polity, and gives it the latitude to preserve and protect its territorial domain from both internal and external threats. However, besides the fact that globalisation and the internationalisation of the globe have reduced the primacy of these dual principles, there has also been the problem of ideological and terrorist networks that have taken advantage of the instruments of globalization to emerge and threaten state sovereignty and its preservation. The study shows that the frequency of insurgent attacks has resulted in collateral damage on the peace, stability, development and sovereignty of the state. It finds also that the federal government has not been decisive enough. This places urgent and decisive demands on the government to adopt new management strategies that will address and contain the insurgent and terrorist groups. It is recommended that the government at all levels

should awake to its responsibilities, ensure adequate funding and training of the security agencies, as well as the fortification of the armed forces with sophisticated weapons that will effectively outmatch the firepower of the terrorists. The government must also ensure the tightening of the borders to check the influx of people into its territory.

METHODOLOGY

This study was a descriptive survey. The population of the study consisted of 13,500 comprising troops serving in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States, as well as registered Civil Rights Groups (CRG) and Retired Service personnel (RSP) with expert knowledge on the Boko Haram insurgency and the Nigerian military counterinsurgent against Boko Haram (Table 1). The sample size for this study comprised of 720 soldiers were selected through random sampling across strategic military locations in the area of study; 13 CRGs within the axis of visited troops deployment were considered for FGD, to save cost as well as obtain relevant data based on their active encounter on the field and video conference session (FGD) was conducted with the 11 selected RSP to obtain vital information. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the respondents for the study.

Table 1: Population distributions of the respondents

Categories of Respondents	Location			Total
	Adamawa	Borno	Yobe	
Soldiers	3,600	5,850	3,750	13200
CRGs	45	101	54	200
Retired Security Personnel	20	50	30	100
Total	3,665	6,001	3,834	13500

Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2020.

Table: 2 Sample Size Distributions

Categories of Respondents	Location			Total	%
	Adamawa	Borno	Yobe		
Soldiers	140	380	200	720	96.8
CRGs	2	7	4	13	1.7
Retired Security Personnel	2	6	3	11	1.5
Total	144	393	207	744	100%

Source: Fieldwork, 2020.

The instruments for data collection were a set of structured questionnaires. A standardized questionnaire titled, “Troops’ Morale and Operational Efficiency Questionnaire (TMOEQ)” was used as the instrument of the study. The instrument consisted of two sections; A and B. Section A elicited bio-data information from the respondents, while section B, addressed the subject matter of the study. A total of 744 copies of questionnaires were administered to the respondents. While 740 copies were completed and retrieved, four (4) copies of the questionnaires were not returned by the respondents.

Adopted questionnaire was subjected to face and content validation. The instruments were validated by the research supervisor and three experts from the Measurement and Evaluation in the University of Lagos. It was subjected to modification for the current study. The reliability of the instrument was determined through a test-retest method for a measure of its stability. 20 security personnel who had been engaged in the counterinsurgency against the Boko Haram Insurgency, but are currently not in the camp were used for the reliability testing. The initial and the retest scores of the sample were correlated using Pearson Product Moment Correlation. The correlation yielded a reliability index of 0.86, which indicated a high internal consistency of the instrument. Data was collected and analyzed using the statistical package for social science (SPSS) version 23.0. Descriptive statistical tools were utilized to analyze the socio-demographic factors of respondents and answering the research questions, whilst Linear Regression Analysis at the 0.05 level of significance was employed to test the hypothesis.

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Age of the Respondents

Table 3: Distribution of the age of the Respondents

Soldiers			CRG/RSP		
Age	No	%	Age	No	%
18-30 years	340	47.2	18-30 years	-	-
31-42 years	280	38.9	31-42 years	8	33.3
43 years -Above	100	13.9	43 years -Above	16	66.7

The result of table shows the age distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 340(47.2%) were aged 18-30 years, 280(38.9%) were aged 31-42 years, while 100(13.9%) were aged 43 years – above. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 16(66.7%) were aged 43 years – above, while 8(33.3%) were aged 31-42 years.

Gender of the Respondents

Table 4: Distribution of the gender of the Respondents

Soldiers			CRG/RSP		
Gender	No	%	Gender	No	%
Male	560	77.8	Male	17	70.8
Female	160	22.2	Female	7	29.2

The result of table shows the gender distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 560(77.8%) were male, while 160(22.2%) were female. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 17(70.8%) were male, while 7(29.2%) were female.

Marital Status of the Respondents

Table 5: Distribution of the marital status of the Respondents

Soldiers			CRG/RSP		
Marital Status	No	%	Marital Status	No	%
Single	400	55.6	Single	6	25.0
Married	220	30.6	Married	11	45.8
Divorced	70	9.7	Divorced	5	20.8
Widowed	30	4.2	Widowed	2	8.3

The result of table shows the marital status distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 400(55.6%) were single, 220(30.6%) were married, 70(9.7%) were divorced, while 30(4.2%) were widowed. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 11(45.8%) were married, 6(25.0%) were single, 5(20.8%) were divorced, while 2(8.3%) were widowed.

Level of education of the Respondents

Table 6: Distribution of the level of education of the Respondents

Soldiers			CRG/RSP		
Level of Education	No	%	Level of Education	No	%
WAEC	370	51.4	WAEC	-	-
NCE/OND	280	38.9	NCE/OND	-	-
Degree/HND	70	9.7	Degree/HND	12	50.0
Masters	-	-	Masters	9	37.5
PhD	-	-	PhD	3	12.5

The result of table and figure 4.5 shows the level of education distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 370(51.4%) possess WAEC, 280(38.9%) possess NCE/OND, while, 70(9.7%) possess Degree/HND. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the

result indicated that majority of the respondents 12(50.0%) possess Degree/HND, 9(37.5%) possess Master's degree, while, 3(12.5%) possess, PhD degree.

Location of the Respondents

Table 7: Distribution of the location of the Respondents

Soldiers			CRG/RSP		
Location	No	%	Location	No	%
Adamawa	220	30.6	Adamawa	7	29.2
Borno	320	44.4	Borno	10	41.7
Yobe	180	25.0	Yobe	7	29.2

The result of table shows the location distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 320(44.4%) were camped at Borno State, 220(30.6%) camped at Adamawa State, while 180(25.0%) camped at Yobe State. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 10(41.7%) reported from Borno State, 7(29.2) equally reported from Adamawa and Yobe States.

Research Questions

Research Question One: *What is the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?*

Table 8: Mean score and standard deviation of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

S/N	Items	Responses (n=720)		
		Mean	Std. Dev	Decision
.1	The area where Boko Haram maintains influence- has the highest poverty rate of any of the six ethnic-regional geopolitical zones	3.60	0.71	Accept
.2	The usual mode of the Boko Haram insurgency entails trailing their target to a place where the individual is most vulnerable to being successfully killed	2.93	0.74	Accept
.3	Boko Haram members usually use cars or motorbikes in going after their targets and shoot at a very close range	2.86	1.07	Accept
.4	Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of millions of civilians as well as the tragic death of thousands of affected civilians	3.42	0.82	Accept
.5	Boko Haram has been able to kill several civilians, politicians, religious leaders, security agents, and community leaders that were outspoken against its ideology and activities	3.08	0.90	Accept
.6	Drive-by-shooting is a method that is very similar to the targeted assassination in that some of the targets killed in the past have been executed through a process that involves operatives riding on a motorbike	3.54	0.75	Accept
.7	The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is another tactic that gained prominence after the July 2009 revolt	3.60	0.74	Accept
.8	Boko Haram believes that through the creation of its caliphate state, it will lead to a purely Islamic society which will rid of the 'infidels, kafirs	2.88	0.71	Accept
.9	Boko Haram's objective is to overthrow the secular Nigerian state, dismantle its institutions, and impose its interpretation of Islamic Sharia law across all of Nigeria	3.13	0.77	Accept
.10	IEDs are often planted along roads, bridges, and rail lines, or deposited in bags or containers that are left behind in public places, including churches, drinking establishments, lecture halls, car parks, and bus stops	3.47	0.75	Accept

(Criterion Mean = 2.5, Mean ≥ 2.5 = Accepted, Mean < 2.5 = Rejected)

Table 8 shows the responses of the respondents on the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The result indicated that majority of the respondents agreed to items 1-10, with their mean scores ≥ 2.50

(criterion mean). This result implies that the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency is attributed to all outlined descriptions.

Research Question Two: *What are the factors impeding on troops' morale in the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?*

Table 9: Mean score and standard deviation of the factors impeding on troops' morale in the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

S/N	Items	Responses (n=720)		
		Mean	Std. Dev	Decision
.1	The delay in the rotation of troops in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is a key determinant of the level of morale troops showcase	2.93	1.09	Accept
.2	There are inadequacies in the equipment and weaponry used by the Nigerian troop in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram which is a key determinant of the level of morale troops showcase	3.71	0.59	Accept
.3	The level of welfare-related issues experienced by troops in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is a key determinant of the level of morale troops showcase	3.47	0.75	Accept
.4	The lack of favourable policies for troops wounded or killed in action in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is a key determinant of the level of morale troops showcase	3.72	0.59	Accept
.5	There is lack of adequate CTCOIN training to prepare troops for the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is a key determinant of the level of morale troops showcase	3.24	0.76	Accept
.6	The level of command and control of high ranking military leader in charge of troops in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is a key determinant of the level of morale troops showcase	2.44	1.15	Reject
.7	The level of public support for troops in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is a key determinant of the level of morale troops showcase	3.10	0.74	Accept
.8	The tactics and doctrine of Nigeria military's counterinsurgency is a key determinant of the level of morale troops showcase	3.06	0.69	Accept

(Criterion Mean = 2.5, Mean \geq 2.5 = Accepted, Mean < 2.5 = Rejected)

Table 9 shows the factors impeding on troops' morale in the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. The result indicated that majority of the respondents agreed to items 28-32, & 34-35, with the mean score \geq 2.50 (criterion mean). On the other hand, majority of the respondents disagreed to item 33; with the mean score less than the criterion mean (< 2.50).

Research Question Three: *What are the suggestions to the challenge experienced by the troops of the Nigerian military in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?*

Table 10: Mean score and standard deviation of the suggestions to the challenge experienced by the troops of the Nigerian military in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

S/N	Items	Responses (n=720)		
		Mean	Std. Dev	Decision
.9	The allegations that the Nigerian Army has been infiltrated by members of the Boko Haram Sect should be checked	3.65	0.79	Accept
.10	The allegations that there is social and political interference in the organization of the military's ranks should be investigated	3.74	0.58	Accept
.11	The allegations of lack of discipline and equitable leadership in the Nigerian arm forces should be checked	3.71	0.59	Accept
.12	The lack of priority giving to the welfare of soldiers in the line of duty in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram should be checked	3.72	0.61	Accept
.13	The high level of corruption in the management of the funds allocated to the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram should be checked	3.71	0.52	Accept

(Criterion Mean = 2.5, Mean \geq 2.5 = Accepted, Mean < 2.5 = Rejected)

Table 10 shows the suggestions to the challenge experienced by the troops of the Nigerian military in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. The result indicated that majority of the respondents agreed to

items 36-40, with the mean score ≥ 2.50 (criterion mean). The suggestions included that; the allegations that the Nigerian Army has been infiltrated by members of the Boko Haram Sect should be checked, allegations that there is social and political interference in the organization of the military's ranks should be investigated, allegations of lack of discipline and equitable leadership in the Nigerian arm forces should be checked, the lack of priority giving to the welfare of soldiers in the line of duty in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram should be checked, and the high level of corruption in the management of the funds allocated to the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram should be checked.

CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the study, it can be concluded that the Nigerian nation is at the precipice of becoming a failed state going by the indices of the Boko Haram insurgency. More worrisome is the inability of the Nigerian military to effectively suppress these flames of insurgency. The root cause of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria remains the failure of government to address basic issues of education, employment, economy, leadership, health, and development among others. As long as these loopholes exist, rebellions in form of insurgencies and other violent vices will erupt. However, the Nigerian military has an important stake in ensuring the physical manifestations of the Boko Haram insurgency is adequately degraded to allow the government deploy the requisite soft approaches needed for development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings above, the research therefore recommends the following:

1. For the reason that the nature of the Boko Haram Sect started from agitations and demand for better living conditions, Government should provide communities in the North East with better basic amenities. In the same approach, empower religious and traditional leaders to improve inter-ethnic and religious communication, peace and harmony among their subjects.
2. Government should as a matter of urgency, address issue bordering on the morale of soldiers. This can be done by organizing public and expert hearings on formulation of a comprehensive military reform program, including a new, more relevant national defense policy.
3. The goal of the Military should not be compromised in any way, as such government should refocus its efforts on a people-centric, community-based and intelligence-driven, whole-of-government approach to better police its borders, enhance interagency cooperation and improve the capacity of the security forces.

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